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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis aims to examine Eisenhower’s foreign policy towards Latin America from 
1953 to 1961. In order to win the Cold War, the leading bureaucrats were split over 
different approaches needed to achieve policy objectives in Latin America within the 
hierarchically regularized machinery- but it was not necessarily welcomed by every 
Latin American nation.  
  
There were three problems with Eisenhower’s staff structuring arrangement towards 
Latin America: (a) politicization of U.S.-Latin American relations from 1953 to 1961 
by senior U.S. bureaucrats with an anti-communism agenda for Latin American 
development; (b) neglect of Latin American requests for public funds before 1959; (c) 
bureaucratic conflicts over different methods to achieve foreign policy objectives, 
often resulting in tensions between policy and operations.  
 
The bureaucratic approach limited U.S. understanding of Latin America, meaning (a) 
the National Security Council (NSC) advisory system could not meet stated ideals; (b) 
the American approach had limited applicability to Latin American societies; (c) 
tensions existed between U.S. ideals and political, economic and social realities in 
Latin American countries. 
 
By examining the Foreign Relations of the United States volumes and Latin American 
literature, this thesis moves beyond the existing scholarship of U.S.-Latin American 
relations and provides a new appraisal of Eisenhower’s approach towards Latin 
America in the Cold War context. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction: 
Eisenhower’s Cold War Strategy and Latin America 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine Eisenhower’s foreign policy towards Latin 
America from 1953 to 1961. Eisenhower was the president who routinely utilized the 
National Security Council (NSC) more often than any other president during the 
post-war era. The most conspicuous efforts that Eisenhower made to the foreign 
policy organization were the clear division of Cabinet secretariat and White House 
staff. Apart from advising the President, the NSC integrates policy recommendations 
across related agencies or departments and coordinates general policies.
1
 The recent 
scholarship has revealed that Eisenhower was adept at “managing large, reconciling 
divergent factions, choosing subordinates…and making decisions on the most vital 
issues” based on his military experience. 2  Detailed evidence to support that 
Eisenhower was politically on the alert for policy planning has burgeoned.  
 
The latest scholarship on Eisenhower has focused on how implicitly he manipulated 
his power in the policy-making process but distinguished scholars scarcely assessed 
                                                        
1 R. Gordon Hoxie, “The National Security Council,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 
(Winter, 1982), p. 109. 
2 Chester J. Pach and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1991), p. 29. 
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the policy outcomes towards American neighbouring states. Based on the extensive 
use of the Whiteman file, Eisenhower revisionists have found a symbiotic relationship 
between Eisenhower’s leadership and institutionalization of the NSC, clarifying that 
Eisenhower did not underuse his presidential power in the policy-making process 
throughout his presidency.
3
 However, their inward-looking analysis completely 
played down the interactions between Cold War consequences and bureaucratic 
advocacy to influence the agenda. This thesis does not deviate from Eisenhower 
revisionism; however, this thesis does aim to demonstrate that even though 
Eisenhower was in effective control of the foreign policy mechanism, this did not 
present a welcome policy for Latinos. 
 
In doing so, this thesis explores the correlations between the NSC advisory machinery 
and foreign policy objectives in the Cold War setting. The “bureaucratic politics” 
approach is applied throughout the thesis in understanding the issues placed on the 
agenda.
4
 Eisenhower perceived that economic interdependence was essential since 
                                                        
3 In the field of public administration, Eisenhower revisionists such as Fred I. Greenstein, Phillip G. 
Henderson, R. Gordon Hoxie, Richard H. Immerman and Stephen E. Ambrose, challenge the argument 
that Eisenhower’s advisory machinery did not fulfil presidential power purposes. For more information 
about how a president utilizes their presidential power, please refer to Richard E. Neustadt, 
Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990). 
4 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999), p. 280. 
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that would not only expand markets for agricultural surpluses but promote world 
peace.
5
 He further conceptualized the framework of free trade without jeopardizing 
domestic products, expansion of private investment and greater access to raw 
materials abroad in a message to Congress.
6
 The Eisenhower administration initially 
reduced the foreign military aid to Latin America but stressed the rise of nationalism 
potentially being infiltrated by communists. It is apparent that the Cold War provided 
opportunities for policy advocates to promote hemisphere solidarity through the 
framework of free trade and private investment - thereby constituting the U.S. sphere 
of influence against communist infiltration in Latin America. 
 
Eisenhower’s economic policy was challenged by a series of Soviet diplomatic and 
economic initiatives towards the Third World in the mid-1950s.
7
 The threat of 
communism was compounded by Nikolai Bulganin’s offer to expand diplomatic, 
economic and trading arrangements with Latin America known as the Soviet 
Economic Offensive (SEO).
8
 The implications of this Soviet economic tactic 
                                                        
5 For text of President Eisenhower’s Inaugural Speech, January 20, 1953, Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1953 (Washington, 1953), p. 4. 
6 Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union, February 2, 1953, Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1953 (Washington, 1953), pp. 15-16.  
7 Robert J. McMahon, “The Illusion of Vulnerability: American Reassessments of the Soviet Threat, 
1955-1956,” The International History Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Aug., 1996), p. 616.  
8 Bevan Sewell, The US and Latin America: Eisenhower, Kennedy and Economic Diplomacy in the 
Cold War (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2016). 
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signalled a strategic shift from the East-West military conflict to more flexible tactics 
in the Third World. The Kremlin did not change its global strategy to undermine the 
U.S. hegemony but tactically devised different means throughout the Third World in 
the achievement of it.
9
 Whether the SEO was a red herring has triggered a series of 
debates between the Executive branch and Congress on military aid programs. The 
former tried to place security relevance to the spread of Soviet threat while the latter 
sought to deemphasize the Soviet infiltration into Latin America. Both interpreted 
their implications in different ways but they helped maintain U.S. global hegemony. 
 
U.S. approaches were interpreted by most Latin Americans as a form of intervention. 
From the Rio Conference in 1954 to the Buenos Aires Conference in 1957, Latin 
American countries ardently urged that the U.S. arrange a regional approach to 
combat the continuing economic problems in Latin America, including more public 
funds, commodity stabilization and stockpile program
 
for raw materials.
10
 Those 
requests were heard but not even considered by the United States Department of the 
Treasury (USDT), George Humphrey, who did not envisage a Marshall plan for Latin 
                                                        
9 McMahon, op. cit, pp. 598-599. 
10 Foreign Relations of the United States, the American Republics, “Minutes of a Meeting Held in the 
Executive Office Building, 11a.m.,” in Historical Documents, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IV, June 21st, 
1953. 
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America.
11
 However, the imposition of tariffs on lead and zinc in 1957 was added to 
Latin American imports and this fuelled up widespread discontent. Latin Americans 
reacted violently during Richard Nixon’s trip to South America, attacking his car 
when he was riding. It was not until Nixon’s trip that U.S. policy-makers realized the 
potent force of local nationalism was not instigated by communist agitators.
12
 
Kubitschek’s concept of Pan Americanism was exactly the presentation of Brazilian 
nationalism that forced the U.S. policy-makers to respond to Latin American requests 
from a multilateral aspect. 
 
The Cuban Revolution widens the focus of analysis for stability beyond the Cold War 
construction. Cuba was an independent state but it was politically and economically 
dependent upon the U.S. With the consolidation of Fidel Castro’s power, he 
promulgated the Agrarian Reform law to nationalize private properties which collided 
with U.S. imperatives of indemnity. Castro turned to the Soviets for further economic 
assistance and thus Mikoyan’s visit to Cuba reassured Bulganin’s economic initiatives 
towards Latin American countries in 1956. Castro not only realigned the power 
                                                        
11 Foreign Relations of the United States, the American Republics, “Memorandum of Discussion at the 
224th Meeting of the National Security Council on Monday,” in Historical Documents, FRUS 
1952-1954, Vol. IV, November 15th, 1954. 
12 Sherman Adams, First Hand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1961), p.381.  
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structure of sovereign states in the context of globalization but also outweighed the 
U.S. global integration by Cuban development. 
 
In this thesis, I argue that the U.S. global strategy during the Eisenhower era was 
characterised by the continuing tensions within military, political and economic fronts, 
coupled with the rise of local nationalism in the Third World. In order to maintain U.S. 
global power, Eisenhower utilized staff structure to form his advisory machinery 
where the bureaucrats defined goals and debated over approaches to attain them. The 
repeatedly assiduous review of U.S. policy was the most striking characteristic during 
the Eisenhower administration. The geopolitical concerns in Latin America became 
the focal point while the U.S. was widely engaged in the global economic integration. 
Cuba, as an example, provides the interconnected process of the Eisenhower 
administration, the Third World revolution and the Cold War, with misinterpretation 
of the socioeconomic conditions as the resultant policy. 
 
The literature review will start with the scholarship of Eisenhower’s staff structuring 
which includes whether Eisenhower underused his presidential power during his 
office. The policy-making process means that the focus on Eisenhower’s leadership 
and his character could shed some light on his approach to the organization, which 
 - 7 - 
 
left a massive amount of paperwork. By assessing the primary information one could 
follow the habitual pattern of decision-making and policy-makers’ worldviews 
relating to the Cold War context. Eisenhower’s staff structuring is the main body of 
the methodology of this thesis, coupled with the bureaucratic politics approach as a 
research method. 
 
Furthermore, it will discuss how Eisenhower’s economic foreign policy developed in 
relation to the Cold War strategy, which indeed affected the construction by U.S. 
policy-makers of perceived threats in Latin America - but this simplification in turn 
presents a gap between bureaucratic perceptions and Latin American nationalism. 
Next, the academic studies of the SEO in Latin America are discussed. The Executive 
branch and U.S. Congress had different interpretations of concerns in the face of the 
SEO. On one hand, Eisenhower tried to bring the Third World’s relevance to U.S. 
security through the increase of military assistance but on the other hand, U.S. 
Congress prioritized public funds as an essentiality for Latin American development.  
 
Further, Latin American countries received nothing from the U.S. during the Buenos 
Aires Conference but the tariff imposition on lead and zinc. Even though the U.S. 
approach maintained global hegemony, it ironically strengthened the local nationalism 
 - 8 - 
 
counterbalancing U.S. economic intervention. Nixon’s trip to Latin America and 
Kubitschek’s Pan Americanism were consequences of U.S. policy. The former 
presented a strong backlash from the masses while the latter was a presentation of 
nationalism at governmental level. The U.S. received challenges of Latin American 
nationalism not only from governmental level but from Latin American nationals. 
 
Cuba gained its independence in the Spanish-American War in 1898. American 
business networks were extensive in Cuba which catalyzed the Platt Amendment 
annexed to the Cuban constitution. Santamarina’s work has fully engaged with U.S. 
economic domination over the Cuban development and U.S. Congress.
13
 Cuba 
literally became a U.S. protectorate. In such a political society, one could not exclude 
the study of Castro’s nationalism from the context of globalization. Through the 
framework of economic sovereignty, Castro’s claim of local sovereignty outweighed 
Eisenhower’s economic integration, replacing the U.S. market with the Soviet market 
for its sugar industry. Cuba was unique since Castro clearly redefined relations 
between Cuba’s localization and dogmatic globalization. 
 
                                                        
13 Juan C. Santamarina, “The Cuba Company and the Expansion of American Business in Cuba,” The 
Business History Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), pp. 57-65. 
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Eisenhower’s Staff Structuring: Leadership and Governance 
Eisenhower, who used to be Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Chief of Staff of 
the Army, carried over his military experience when taking office as President. In his 
mindset, he did not like politicians and “the Army and Army officers were supposed 
to be above politics”.14 In military service, teamwork is something that operates in 
the armed forces routinely which includes the collaboration between a group of 
organizations and individual staff. It is obvious that the military experience guided his 
presidential career - military staff and organizations were closely connected and 
viewed as a team. From Harry Truman’s anticipation, Eisenhower would not know 
how to be a political leader and he commented that “he’ll sit here, and he’ll say, ‘Do 
this! Do that!’ and nothing will happen. Poor Ike - it won’t be a bit like the army”.15 
Constrained by military management, Eisenhower would be a little confused by 
military command and presidential power. Richard E. Neustadt points out that 
“presidential power is the power to persuade”.16  
 
The old debate about whether Eisenhower underused the power of persuasion has 
mostly been filled by the materials that the revisionists have introduced in the scope 
                                                        
14 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 
47. 
15 Neustadt, op. cit., p. 304. 
16 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
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of presidential leadership. James David Barber, who was the traditional scholar, 
classified Eisenhower’s character into a passive-negative category that tends to 
“withdraw, to escape from the conflict and uncertainty of politics by emphasizing 
vague principles (especially prohibitions) and procedural arrangements”. 17 
Revisionists, such as Fred I. Greenstein, argue that Eisenhower made use of the 
hidden hand leadership exercising his underlying influence in his self-effacing 
character. This strategy indeed helped to avoid a backlash against any controversial 
policy, such as the Guatemalan coup d’état in 1954.18 Meanwhile, Eisenhower highly 
recognized the virtues of organization that he regularly used. Scholarship has 
classified Eisenhower’s organization into formal and informal categories.19      
 
Eisenhower considered the organization as an inseparable component of the advisory 
system. He has shown strong proclivity for systemizing the policy-making process. 
Eisenhower confessed in his memoir:  
 
Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent, even less can it, of 
itself, make the decisions which are required to trigger the necessary action. On 
the other hand, disorganization can scarcely fail to result in inefficiency and can 
                                                        
17 James David Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (New 
York: Pearson Education Inc, 2009), p. 170. pp. 179-180. 
18 Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 58-65. 
19 Ibid., pp. 100-102.  
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easily lead to disaster.
20
 
 
Eisenhower’s leadership was composed of effective organization and Cabinet or staff 
officials. John W. Sloan analysed that the Cabinet was typical of the formal advisory 
system where “Cabinet bickering, personality conflicts, end running, tale hearing, and 
throat cutting were much recorded”. Hence, cabinet meetings were described as an 
“arena for conflict”. However, those who provided advice for the President outside 
the institutionalized mechanism were viewed as the informal advisory system. Dr. 
Milton Eisenhower’s channel presented the best example of this relationship. Sloan 
concluded that the informal advisory system
 
was supplementary to the formal 
advisory system in support of Eisenhower’s leadership.21   
 
Sloan explained that neither the formal nor the informal advisory system contributed 
to his decision-making style. During Eisenhower’s administration, delegation of 
responsibility to staff and Cabinet officials was common. For example, John Foster 
Dulles whom Eisenhower trusted was given much responsibility. Eisenhower 
expected “a specific recommendation”, rather than “a range of options”. At the initial 
stage, Eisenhower could accept “half-baked ideas”; however, he turned out to be “the 
                                                        
20 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change (New York: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc, 1963), p. 114. 
21  John W. Sloan, “The Management and Decision-Making Style of President Eisenhower,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.20, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), pp. 297-304. 
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coldest, most unemotional and analytical man in the world”.22 Charles Walcott and 
Karen M. Hult criticized that “the categories of formal and informal reveal little about 
the exact nature of particular decision processes”. Moving beyond this, they adopted 
the organizational governance theory for the study of public organizations. This 
approach assumes that an organization is hierarchically structured for “greater 
consensus and certainty”, with the president being at the top. Governance theory 
consists of three basic parts: goals (Eisenhower explored and defined goals via 
speeches and messages), means (press briefings as means to cope with uncertainty 
and controversy) and consensus (Cabinet Secretariat serving as managerial 
functions).
23
 
 
Scholars have examined the symbiosis between the orderly advisory organizations 
and Eisenhower’s leadership. Phillip G. Henderson and R. Gordon Hoxie have 
reviewed the hierarchical structure of the NSC, the central focus of the policy 
formulation and implementation coordinating efforts with the Planning Board and the 
Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). From Hoxie’s observation, the President 
                                                        
22 Ibid., pp. 304-305. 
23 Charles Walcott and Karen M. Hult, “White House Organization as a Problem of Governance,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.24, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 328-336.  
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“institutionalized the NSC and gave it clear lines of responsibility and authority”.24 
Followed by orderly procedures of the organization, all policy ideas began from the 
Planning Board where members dedicated themselves to “debating, refining and 
drafting policy papers” before they reached the Council and the President. The 
Planning Board provided an opportunity for assistant secretaries who attended the 
Board to present the drafts that might possibly be discussed at the Council to their 
respective Secretaries. However, the OCB was created to monitor the progress of 
implementation and normally presented by the Director of Central Intelligence, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency and 
Eisenhower’s representative. The OCB was hosted at the under-secretary level every 
Wednesday at 1:00 p.m.
25
   
 
Robert Cutler, who served as the 1
st
 NSC adviser, helped Eisenhower reorganize the 
NSC structure into the top of the ‘policy hill’. The bottom-up design of the foreign 
policy mechanism assigned “each department or agency with a function to perform 
under such approved policy must prepare its program to carry out its responsibility”.26 
                                                        
24 Phillip G. Henderson, “Organizing the Presidency for Effective Leadership: Lessons from the 
Eisenhower Years,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.17, No. 1 (Winter, 1987), p. 54.  
25 Ibid., pp. 54-58. 
26 Robert Cutler, “The Development of the National Security Council,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.34, No. 3 
(Apr., 1956), p. 448. 
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He warned that “the Special Assistant has direct access to the President...[this] would 
tend to intervene between the President and his Cabinet members” that confuses “the 
line of responsibility from the President to his Cabinet”.27 Henderson indicated there 
was a growing centrality during the post-Eisenhower administration which inwardly 
boosts the growth of policy-entrepreneurship among leading NSC bureaucrats. They 
prove to be policy advocates who advance ideas and proposals directly opposite to 
those of the heads of their own Department - or perhaps other agencies and 
Departments.
28
 The literature has revealed that scholars should pay more attention to 
the growing influence of the policy advocates in the policy-making process. 
 
Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman analysed that the President was surrounded by 
various advocacy of policy campaigns “supervised by an assistant for national 
security”. His role is like a “custodian-manager rather than a policy advocate”. Critics 
viewed the NSC advisory system as a bureaucratic machine since it produced plenty 
of papers.
29
 However, those initial drafts, policy statements, interdepartmental 
memorandums and progress reports serve as great resources for the development of 
the bureaucratic approach in exploring the interactions between policy advocates and 
                                                        
27 Ibid., p. 457. 
28 Henderson, op.cit., p. 59. 
29 Fred I. Greenstein and Richard Immerman, “Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the 
Eisenhower Legacy,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.115, No. 3 (Autumn., 2000), pp. 343-345. 
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foreign policy mechanism. Responding to this, Graham T. Allison’s bureaucratic 
politics approach provides a theoretical framework to explain how agendas are set in 
policy-making.
30
 John W. Kingdon argues that policy entrepreneurs are those who 
could transform an idea into the public agenda.
31
 It is necessary to observe how the 
NSC bureaucrats organize and formulate specific agendas in the NSC system. 
American scholarship has placed much emphasis on the successful interaction 
between Eisenhower’s management and advisory system but often ignored the Cold 
War origins of national security and economic consideration. Therefore, there was a 
substantial gap between how individual bureaucrats reacted to the impact of the Cold 
War and which issues should be on the agenda. 
 
Eisenhower’s Economic Policy and Cold War Strategy of Containment 
In 1953, there was a growing concern about Truman’s approach to the Soviet Union, 
especially Truman’s proposal following the Korean War to increase the defense 
budget for fiscal year 1954. Eisenhower criticized that Truman’s military expenditures 
in excess of U.S. domestic economy were perilous. Consequently, one of 
                                                        
30 Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., pp. 280-282. 
31 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1995), 
pp. 179-180. *Kingdon argues that an idea needs to go through three streams before entering the public 
agenda: (a) Problem stream suggesting how individual bureaucrats identify its origin, (b) Policy stream 
meaning bureaucrats propose a change, (c) Political stream directly referring to the influence of 
political campaigns launched by pressure groups or a group of policy advocates.   
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Eisenhower’s agendum was to reduce the unnecessary budget for national security. 
According to Chester J. Pach and Elmo Richardson, Eisenhower was gravely 
concerned about “the economic implications of national security programs”. His 
restructure of the NSC also incorporated the Bureau of the Budget and the USDT. 
Unlike Truman, Eisenhower made the NSC principal arms of an advising body 
considered as a balance between the U.S. economy and national security in the Cold 
War context.
 
Eisenhower’s global strategy initially rested on the concept of 
containment against Soviet expansionism - this involved Project Solarium under the 
framework of the NSC.
32
 
 
Project Solarium was composed of working groups. George F. Kennan, who 
represented the first group, urged Eisenhower to continue the containment principles 
and keep Western Europe and Japan from communist aggression through military 
strength and economic growth. In Kennan’s philosophy, the Marshall Plan and 
Allied-occupied Germany were proper realization of the containment policy but the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 was formed from “an exaggerated fear of 
the possibility of Soviet attack”. Kennan confessed that the containment policy had 
been overly militarized before Truman was ready to execute the NSC 68. Therefore, 
                                                        
32 Pach and Richardson, op. cit., pp. 76-78. 
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his proposal was based on “the containment principles that he had advanced in the late 
1940s but support them with national security expenditures equal to those of the early 
1950s”. The second group was chaired by James McCormack, who proposed to 
threaten the Soviet aggression by using nuclear weapons and thereby decrease defense 
spending. The third group included Richard L. Conolly, who advocated rolling back 
Soviet influence by attainable methods such as covert actions, propaganda activities, 
military assistance, diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions.
33
  
 
Project Solarium divided Eisenhower’s global strategy into two conspicuous camps - 
the containment strategy and the roll back theory. According to Pach and Richardson, 
the USDT and budget authority emphasized the U.S. economy would be badly 
damaged because of “deficits or high taxes over a sustained period” and this could 
jeopardize free institutions; on the other hand, the Department of Defense (DOD) and 
the Departments of State (DOS) argued the defense budget for the present could be 
managed effectively without endangering the U.S. economy despite tax increases. 
Eisenhower and fiscal conservatives all agreed the U.S. economy could bear for a 
short period of time but in the end the U.S. must have sufficient supply of dollars. As 
a result, economic prosperity was fundamental to “the security and stability of the free 
                                                        
33 Ibid., pp. 78-79.  
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world”. Eisenhower’s global strategy in 1953 was indeed a continuance of Kennan’s 
containment policy in the late 1940s.
34
 Project Solarium has revealed policy-makers’ 
perceptions of world stability maintained by a strong U.S. economy. In sum, 
policy-makers all recognized the positive outcome of stability under the U.S. 
leadership against Soviet communism but Project Solarium referred little to the 
relationship between U.S. national security and regional instability, and concentrated 
much less on Latin America. 
 
In this regard, Lars Schoultz provides a broad analysis for “the causes and 
consequences of instability in Latin America” beyond the U.S. narrative of stability. 
Schoultz proposes that Latin American instability is a complex phenomenon and U.S. 
bureaucrats often simplify this through the construction of differing beliefs. In fact, 
U.S. policy-makers had different interpretations of “the causes of instability” and no 
one was that positive of “the consequences of instability for U.S. security”. 35 
Schoultz identified “poverty and communism” as two causes of instability. For the 
belief in poverty, he divided this into three distinct interpretations. Conservative 
interpretation concludes economic and social resources were unevenly distributed 
                                                        
34 Ibid., p. 80. 
35 Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 11. 
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which leads to poverty. Liberal and moderate bureaucrats also viewed poverty as a 
resultant but presented a more convincing argument that “structural change” in 
society such as the regime transition would risk U.S. national security. For the belief 
in communism, Soviet ideology was intrinsically evil and driven by a strong penchant 
for expansion. Latin America was susceptible to Soviet infiltration. George Kennan’s 
trip in 1950 revealed the underlying disparity between the rich and the poor. 
Economic inequality deepened the ingrained belief that communism might utilize the 
trend. Being egotistic and self-centred, Latin American leaders were biased against 
the U.S., further evolving into Anti-Americanism upheld by radical leaders.
36
 
 
Schoultz summarized four consequences of instability in Latin America - “strategic 
access to raw materials”, “military bases and support”, “sea lines of communication” 
and “Soviet military bases”. He reached a conclusion that maintaining global balance 
of power was the fundamental belief in constructing policy-makers’ perceptions and 
the role of Latin America was to support U.S. global power to prevent any region 
falling under the influence of Soviet communism.
37
 Hence, Latin America was of 
minimal importance to the U.S., the degree of which varies with the pursuit of U.S. 
global balance of power. This affected how U.S. policy-makers perceived of U.S. 
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37 Ibid., pp. 143-269.  
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interests in Latin America and prioritized their foreign policy agenda. There has been 
an extensive discussion about the hegemonic rise of the U.S. in the new world order 
after the Second World War.  
 
Margarita López-Maya identifies three historical events that changed Latin American 
priority in the U.S. global hegemonic agenda. Firstly, the U.S. deepened the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals, requiring the Latin American states in support of U.S. 
leadership as a world power during the Chapultepec Conference from February to 
March in 1945 but Latin American governments concentrated on economic issues. 
The U.S. required “a reduction in the tariff barriers and the elimination of economic 
nationalism in all its forms”; however, most Latin American countries supported the 
protectionism to safeguard the nascent industries. Secondly, the Rio de Janeiro 
Conference in August 1947 strengthened the concept of collective security, further 
crystallizing the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR). Thirdly, the 
Conference of Bogotá in 1948 followed in the wake of the Cold War. The significance 
of this Conference was the creation of the Inter-American system where a regional 
dispute resolution is set before going to the United Nations (the Pact of Bogotá). 
Secretary of State Marshall added that the economic recovery in Europe was essential 
for the revival of world economy. Marshall set the tone for the revival of world 
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economies through the stimulation of private investment soon after the Economic 
Charter of the Americas, which dismayed bureaucrats who envisaged a Marshall Plan 
for Latin America.
38
 
 
López-Maya presented the Truman Doctrine in 1947 as a U.S. initiative to deepen the 
democratic belief in Greece and Turkey by providing economic assistance for fear that 
both states might fall in the Soviet communism; Latin American local democratic 
proponents did not benefit from the change of the U.S. priority. Prior to the Cold War, 
some groups like “the Catholic Church, the armed forces, and the landowners” had 
predated and controlled the Latin American societies. They demonstrated no interest 
in Truman’s pro-democratic initiative but were ardently responsive to the 
anti-communist agenda. López-Maya proposes that the lack of interest was because 
the upper class in Latin America did not believe “the participatory democracies” 
would come into being in Latin America. Throughout U.S.-Latin American 
historiography from 1945 to 1948, although the U.S. and Latin America had differing 
interests during the Chapultepec Conference in 1945, the maintenance of global 
power would echo in the national security agenda with Latin American conservatives 
                                                        
38 Margarita López-Maya, “The change in the discourse of US-Latin American relations from the end 
of the Second World War to the beginning of the Cold War,” Review of International Political 
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who were more likely to defend against external aggressors within the Cold War 
imperative, as shown in the TIAR in 1947.
39
  
 
López-Maya concluded that Latin American governments were divided into “more 
popular or democratic bases” and anti-communist campaigners. The former was an 
impulse to nationalism, democratization and inter-American economic collaboration 
while the latter reached to the U.S. national security priorities. However, changes in 
discourses, especially the anti-communist narrative, represented “the changing 
configuration of Latin American social forces” and “the re-establishment of regressive 
forms of political domination in Latin American societies”.40 López-Maya’s analysis 
reflected a paradigm of cooperation and confrontation on U.S.-Latin American 
relations from 1945 to 1948 but did not cover the second term of the Truman 
administration until the Eisenhower administration. Therefore, Chapter Two 
emphasizes Eisenhower’s restructuring bureaucracy to shape foreign economic policy 
and explores a correlation between cooperation and confrontation in Argentina, 
Bolivia and Guatemala through changes in discourses. López-Maya’s work has 
referred to nationalism as one of the social forces but did not develop its concept. 
Chapter Two will develop a bottom-up design in three cases with wider reference to 
                                                        
39 Ibid., pp.145-146.  
40 Ibid., pp.147-148. 
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nation and nationalism in the literature.  
 
Nation and Nationalism: Effects on Latin American Politics 
Latin American nationalism is a complex issue because the concept involves different 
histories, languages, cultures and multiracial groups. To understand the construction 
of Latin American nationalism, it is essential to define ‘nation’ and ‘state’.  
According to Andrew Heywood, a nation, in a broad context, means a group of people 
who share common values such as history, language, culture, ethnicity or religion - 
usually bounded by the same border. However, a state signifies self-governing 
institutions that exercise their power recognized or used by the nation. There are two 
interpretations of ‘nation-state’. In a narrow sense, a group of homogeneous people 
inhabit the territory that is governed by the political entity, usually one nation within a 
single state. For example, the Dutch Republic, the Kingdom of France and Spain were 
defined by Westphalian sovereignty as one nation within the one state.
41
 In a broad 
sense, two or more nations living in a state is possible. For example, Woodrow Wilson 
proposed to promote self-determination after World War I in 1918 such as the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire.
42
 One nation and two states also 
                                                        
41 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction 5th edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), pp. 168-169. p. 178. 
42 Matthew Vink, “The Competition for Self-Determination in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1919,” New 
Zealand Slavonic Journal, Vol. 46 (2012), pp. 41-43. 
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existed as shown in North Korea and South Korea because the U.S. employed the 
application of a ‘divide and rule’ policy to stop the Korean War.43 
 
The nation is the core element to understanding Latin American societies. The word 
‘nation’ has connotations of ethical, historical, cultural and social grounds with the 
territory that shapes identity. However, nationalism is recognized as a core element of 
the revolutions in Europe during the mid-eighteenth century. The word ‘nationalism’ 
has the political foundation to start a movement. Heywood claims that the French 
Augustin Barruel was the first priest to use ‘nationalism’ in 1789. 44  Eric J. 
Hobsbawm started the scholarly discussion between ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ in his 
work Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. He traced back 
to the dictionary of ancient French, citing Froissart’s interpretation to mean ‘land of 
birth’ but the liberal bourgeois from 1830 to 1880 was described as “a phase in human 
evolution or progress from the small group to the larger, from family to tribe to region, 
to nation and, in the last instance, to the unified world of the future” rather than 
homeland. In this regard, Germany has gone through the process of unification.
45
 
                                                        
43 B.C. Koh, “The War’s Impact on the Korean Peninsula,” The Journal of American-East Asian 
Relations, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring, 1993), p. 63. 
44 Heywood, op. cit., p. 168. 
45 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 15-17. p. 38. 
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Hobsbawm said little about the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and nothing about 
Romantic nationalism. David Luban adds that there has been the constant demand for 
national sovereignty against cosmopolitanism and universalism.
46
 In this scenario, the 
nationalism will evolve into patriotism. 
 
Heywood indicates that Latin American nationalism adopted this sentiment from 
France. In the early nineteenth century, the idea of nationalism came across Latin 
America when Simón Bolívar liberated Latin American territories (Colombia, Peru, 
Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia) from Spanish rule to form the Gran Colombia. The 
salient feature of nationalism came up with political creeds to “shape and reshape 
history in many parts of the world for over two hundred years”.47 Benedict Anderson 
claims that the notion of nation has its roots in ethical identities. Criollo peoples were 
descendants of European kinship but born in the Americas and some were of Native 
American backgrounds. In 1821, José de San Martín, who was Bolívar’s fellow and a 
liberator for Peruvian independence, instructed that in the future Peruvians should 
include the Indians or natives who are aborigines. They all belong to Peru and are 
“children and citizens of Peru”. Anderson discusses the reasons why the colonial 
                                                        
46 David Luban, “The Romance of the Nation-State,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Feb., 
2017), p. 392. 
47 Heywood, op. cit., pp. 169-170. 
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territories in Latin America had some non-Spanish speaking inhabitants but on the 
other hand creates creoles who consciously incorporated the native aborigines into a 
more inclusive society. The answer was that Madrid centralized political control of 
Spanish-American territories. New taxes were issued to benefit the Spanish Empire 
but the Spanish America had been an administrative unit where Criollo peoples were 
subject to the effect of Madrid’s policy. For example, all competition with Madrid was 
prohibited and each administrative unit could not trade with other units.
48
 
 
Anderson describes nation as “an imagined community”. Nation is to be understood 
as a socially imagined community recognized by a certain group of people but 
nationalism has been an uneasy anomaly for Marxist theory. For instance, Anderson 
raises the question whether the “proletariat of each country must settle matters with its 
own bourgeoisie”. Nationalism-with-a-big-N was treated as an ideology such as 
‘liberalism’ or ‘fascism’ but it should be compared to ‘kinship’ and ‘religion’.49 
Anderson’s proposition of print-capitalism laid the foundation for national 
consciousness for three reasons. Firstly, print-language facilitated circulation of 
information and ideas. The content written in the vernacular made the fellow readers 
                                                        
48 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
revised edition (London: Verso Press, 2016), pp. 48-52. 
49 Ibid., pp. 3-5. 
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feel part of a nationally imagined community. Secondly, print-capitalism “gave a new 
fixity to language” that eventually shaped a new image of antiquity. Thirdly, 
“print-capitalism created language-of-power of a kind different from the older 
administrative vernaculars”. These reasons contributed to the formation of 
nation-states in Spanish America and illustrated why Criollo nationalism took place in 
the Americas prior to Europe.
50
  
 
Despite the national-print language, Professor James Dunkerley’s analysis also helps 
explain the correlation between nationalism and Karl Marx’s philosophy. Based on the 
memoirs of William Miller who was an officer in the southern army of José de San 
Martín, Dunkerley’s claim to “the resurgence of a radical relativism offers every liar 
the veil of simply being discursively sovereign”.51 From the description of Bolívar’s 
characteristics and personality, the elite leader was axiomatically affiliated to the 
America (fatherland), societal integration, and political allegiance, with the latter as 
the clear presentation of nationalist in outlook - indicating lower classes into political 
community. Latin American nationalism contains parochialism, patriotism, and 
ethnicity. It is suggested that Latin American forces reach “beyond even the pressing 
                                                        
50 Ibid., pp. 44-46. 
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contemporary problem of ‘bonapartism’ to the ‘essential’ question of economic 
structure”. 52  From Marx’s perspective, the mode of production determines the 
character of cultural, political, legal, social and intellectual life. However, a 
Bonapartist regime was the presentation of a narrower ruling class, describing state 
and bureaucracy as separate parts of the society. This logic is apparently contradictory 
to Marx’s assumption that the class struggle launched by the ‘class-conscious’ 
proletariat leads to a harmonious society. In the Bonapartist regime, it highlights the 
centrality in the society. 
 
In this respect, Dunkerley adds that Engels had acknowledged the U.S. presence as an 
industrial ‘empire’ in the event of the Mexican war but raised doubts about the logical 
relations between bourgeoisie and capitalist-industrial empire: 
 
In America we have witnessed the conquest of Mexico and have rejoiced at it. It 
is also an advance when a country which has hitherto been exclusively wrapped 
up in its own affairs, perpetually rent by civil wars, and completely hindered in 
its development, a country whose best prospect had been to become industrially 
subject to Britain - when such a country is forcibly drawn into the historical 
process. It is to the interest of its own development that Mexico will in future be 
placed under the tutelage of the United States. The evolution of the whole of 
America will profit by the fact that the United States, by the possession of 
California, obtains command of the Pacific.
53
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Professor Claudio Lomnitz, a well-known Mexican scholar at Columbia University, 
challenges Anderson’s basic proposition that nation is imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign. However, this conception did not reflect much on the 
development of ‘nación’ prior to the independence movements in Spanish America. 
The invocation of ‘nación’ by Mexican Creoles would mean differently. It would 
mean either to identify themselves with Spain or to separate from Spain. Possibly, 
they would draw a clear distinction between their territorial space in New Mexico and 
the indigenous communities. In this regard, ‘nación’ is indeed separable with distinct 
sovereignty rights. In addition, Lomnitz criticizes Anderson’s conception of imaginary 
communities for its abstract definition of communities. Lomnitz, on the other hand, 
convincingly argues that ‘nación’ as a community requires “deep horizontal 
comradery” that clearly delineates hierarchical ties on the grounds of fraternity. The 
vertical tie could be extended to the public sphere between indigenous people, 
haciendas, and bourgeois or private sphere between fathers, women and other 
dependent children. Citizens were the main body of the state. Moreover, Anderson’s 
emphasis on personal sacrifice represents as a misleading interpretation of nationalism 
because the imagined community to nationhood is easily taken as “a communal 
ideology”.54 The problem with Anderson’s proposition lies in his abstract definition 
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that nationalism does not distinguish sovereign from imagined communities. 
 
Professor Nicola Miller bases on Lomnitz’s review of nationalism, responding to 
historical usage of Latin American nationalism in this academic debate.
55
 Miller 
claims that the notion of the sovereignty could be interpreted as a separable unit in 
association with a single role or person (the presidency) from the state, especially for 
much of the twentieth century. For example, Juan Perón, while being in exile from 
1955 to 1973, was widely recognized as the sovereign leader of the nation by most 
Argentines. Perón continued exerting his political influence to launch the 1958 
elections in Argentina in support of the moderate Arturo Frondizi, even though Perón 
was in Madrid.
56
 Miller has also examined the effects of war and militarism on Latin 
America nation-building. For example, the Second French intervention in Mexico 
from 1862 to 1867, the Mexican-American War from 1846 to 1848, the Paraguay War 
from 1864 to 1870 and the Chaco War from 1932 to 1935. These examples have 
shown that the construction of national identity by Latin American leaders of 
perceived militarism affected the nation-building process. Consequently, the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
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militarism was an impulse to create national heritage or legitimate authority against 
other states, which had a magnificent impact on some Latin American nationalism 
during the nineteenth century.
57
 
 
According to Miguel Angel Centeno, the phenomenon of state-building taking place 
in Europe did not apply to Latin America. Compared with Europe, the social elite 
were unable to transform a society ripped asunder by war to realize institutional 
autonomy.
58
Centeno emphasizes that England, France and Prussia had 
institutionalized central authority and a crumb of a bureaucracy prior to the 
state-building stage of war.  On the other hand, the venal practices in the Spanish 
bureaucracy and “the financial leakage of a tax farming system” that allows the tax 
farmers to gain the right of tax collection from the state largely impeded state 
development.
59
 Interestingly, Centeno’s work has touched the theme of 
nation-building in association with the iconographic nationalism, such as the 
monuments and street names in memory of some heroic figures as well as national 
currency. Despite sporadic boundary disputes in Latin American states, this 
nationalism did not grow hatred against foreigners, nor did military figures foster 
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bellicose fervour and fight against one another under the patriotism. They would 
become bellicose to deal with internal conflicts and maintain centralized authority.
60
 
 
Centeno has examined the correlations between war and the institutional development 
in Latin America. Wars give an impulse to construct national pride, which motivates 
the national leader’s heroism and patriotic sentiments. Conscription to a large extent 
contributes to citizenship and facilitates the social integration. However, Latin 
American states did not undergo tremendous wars in the region and the military 
participation was not high in the area.
61
 In my analysis, Centeno’s work discusses 
little about the interaction between the U.S. perspective of ‘nation’ and Latin 
American perspective of ‘nation’. His interpretation of Latin American nationalism 
focuses on the nineteenth century, which causes methodological limits of ideological 
nationalism. His concept of nationalism does not present an intimate relationship with 
ideology which is compared to the concept of nation perceived by Anderson. 
 
Craig Calhoun observes that nationalism should not be solely viewed as a political 
doctrine since this does not explain the ramifications or the degree to which 
nationalism and national identities impact on people’s lives. Therefore, he contends 
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that “nationalism is more basic way of talking, thinking, and acting”.62 Nations, to be 
put in Anderson’s words as the imagining communities, represent the “collective 
identities” in actual forms such as national flags, ceremonies and prides - that are 
fundamental components of nationalism in popular emotional appeal. Nationalism, 
constructing the way that human beings live, is more than a political doctrine.
63
 From 
my perspective, this suggests that nation is a dynamic concept. Citizens can discern 
nationalism as it is part of life. Collective identity might demonstrate one’s attachment 
to one’s nation - this is what we call patriotism. 
 
To explore origins of nations, Anthony D. Smith argues that nations were based on the   
pre-existing ethnic ties but many nationalisms misinterpreted accounts of historical 
events. The force of nationalism results from “the myths, memories, traditions, and 
symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in which a popular living past has been, and 
can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias”. Smith 
provides the ethno-symbolic approach to explain how the pre-existing cultures fashion 
the basis of the national identities in the modern epoch.
64
 History and culture are two 
reference points to shape popular visions, and to form the social configurations. 
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Hence, modern national identities often reflect or incarnate old identities in new 
generations. The concept of a nation built on the pre-existing ethnic ties has a lasting 
effect, which gives fresh impetus to nationalists’ initiative in creating an inclusive 
society through the international agenda and local appeal. 
 
The time frame of this thesis starts from the early Cold War, spanning the whole 
Eisenhower administration. This period includes geopolitical tensions between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union, the expanding market of capitalism and anti-imperialist 
movement in the Third World. Richard L. Harris and Jorge Nef contended there were 
some “national populist regimes” in Latin America between the 1930s and 1960s - 
forming a political alliance between “the more urban sectors of the upper, middle, and 
working classes” - to encourage social development. Alliance supported state 
intervention in the economy against the capitalist globalization. Economic nationalism 
was a hurdle to the capitalist globalization. The characteristics from the late 1920s 
until the 1960s were delineated by “conflict between the competing centers of the 
world capitalist system over their [the U.S.] spheres of influence, hegemony, and 
colonial domination”.65  
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Frankly speaking, Harris and Nef have provided a ‘political alliance’ approach to 
understanding Latin American politics. Consequently, three cases (Argentina, Bolivia 
and Guatemala) in Chapter Two will focus on interactions between local political 
coalitions and nationalization practice. In my analysis, Latin American nationalism is 
multifaceted; political alliance only represents one side of it. Moreover, they 
recognized the competing nature of the Cold War but did not elaborate much on the 
role of the Soviet Union. The current literature paid scant attention to policy shift in 
the Soviet Union; the Third World especially. The central focus should go beyond this 
and move on to the theme of Soviet propaganda towards Latin America in a regional 
context. More importantly, Chapter Three will examine the U.S. response to Soviet 
efforts in the Third World (Latin American states in particular) and see whether Soviet 
efforts, over periods of time, present a centrifugal force in the global balance of 
power. 
 
Latin America in Soviet’s Narrative: Soviet Economic Offensive (SEO) 
The argument that Latin America is part of the U.S. global strategy in the 1950s has 
been widely discussed by scholars. In addition to Harris and Nef, Stephen G. Rabe 
observes that the focus of U.S.-Soviet relations during Eisenhower’s administration 
was switched from the European and Asian battlefields to the Third World. The 
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geopolitical tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was compounded by the 
blazing nationalism and the soaring aspirations of Third World nations. Judging from 
this point, he suggests that a more thoughtful understanding of “Eisenhower’s 
leadership qualities, his commitment to peace and change and his place in history” 
could be presented until his policies towards the Third World are thoroughly studied.
66
 
Rabe’s work has raised attention to the field of Eisenhower’s policy towards the Third 
World; however, this suggests how Eisenhower and his leading bureaucrats conducted 
U.S. foreign policy to the emerging nations of the Third World. Since Latin America 
was part of U.S. global strategy, local national movements were often misunderstood 
as Soviet’s communism from the Kremlin’s conspiracy.  
 
The Soviet effort in Latin America was demonstrated in Nikolai Bulganin’s 
presentation on 16th January 1956 to “expand diplomatic, economic, and cultural 
relations, extend technical assistance, and conclude trading arrangements with Latin 
America nations”. Rabe’s analysis of the SEO was tension of release from Moscow 
politics to seek peaceful coexistence with the West; meanwhile, new Soviet tactics 
aimed to gain “allegiance of Asian, African, and Latin American peoples”. Utilizing 
the NSC 5613/1, Rabe has identified that the Soviet intentions were not simply driven 
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from economic or trading benefits but from strategic considerations to alienate 
traditional U.S. alliances from U.S. global hegemony. He developed the theme based 
on the U.S. global strategy of anticommunism, demonstrating that “closer relations 
between the Soviet Union and Latin America are against the security interests of the 
United States”.67 In my analysis, Rabe’s work has little engagement with the theme 
but it suggests additional lines of future study on the SEO.  
 
Bevan Sewell has found that Rabe and James Siekmeier have understated the 
importance of the Soviet efforts in the Third World. The existing literature regarding 
the impact of the SEO on the U.S.-Latin American relations has been scarcely 
discussed in their respective works. Sewell explained why the Soviet’s offer to Latin 
America was downplayed. First, because the Soviet industrial manufacturing was 
poor in quality and the unpleasant political effects after Khrushchev’s secret speech in 
February 1956 made the Soviet offer somewhat unpopular, the initial Soviet offer 
went away soon. Second, the U.S. policy-makers did not take the Soviet offer into 
account for immediate policy adjustment. Sewell interpreted the SEO as a crucial 
moment to see whether the Eisenhower administration should adjust its economic 
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foreign policy towards Latin America in response to the SEO.
68
 Sewell has therefore 
filled in the gaps with relevant historiography and provided an insightful assessment 
of the SEO for the future course of inter-American relations. 
 
Sewell has identified that the SEO was driven by power contestation for the leader of 
the Soviet Union in the Kremlin, rising power of Mao’s Chinese government in the 
Communist bloc and changing characteristics of East-West tensions in the Cold War, 
with the latter presenting the most far-reaching consequences. Sewell
 
concluded the 
Third World has increasingly become the focus of the Cold War by 1955 since 
U.S.-Soviet competition in Europe tended to be more stable in 1945. With 
Khrushchev’s consolidation of power in the Kremlin, Khrushchev took a more 
proactive approach in the Third World, attaching much importance of the Third World 
to world politics. Hence, the U.S. was compelled to reconsider the current policy 
towards the Third World from strategic and economic perspectives in response to the 
SEO.
69
 In my assessment, the consequences of the SEO were successfully presented 
in Sewell’s work that divides the historiography from short term impact and long term 
perspectives. Chapter Three identifies that the short term impact of the SEO triggers 
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the debate over Mutual Security Act Funds and enlarges Congress’s participation in 
the foreign aid programme. Mikoyan’s visit to Cuba (Chapter Five) demonstrates the 
long term impact of the SEO.  
 
Robert J. McMahon, who is a leading scholar of Cold World history, started from the 
same ends of the strategic security perspective as Sewell, but emphasized U.S.  
reconceptualization of the Soviet threat. McMahon and Sewell both agreed the 
far-reaching impact of the SEO; however, the former conducted an in-depth 
investigation into the implications of the SEO for U.S. security subject to policy shift 
in the Soviet priorities. McMahon summarised different schools of Cold War 
historians. The traditional school of scholars interpreted East-West tensions in the 
early Cold War as a resultant of struggle over Europe. As a result, they seemed to 
neglect the non-Western World. Revisionist scholars, such as Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, 
emphasized the shifting focus towards the Third World served the best interests of U.S. 
global hegemony because of strategic domination to the markets in the emerging 
nations. Melvyn P. Leffler represented the moderate school, arguing that the Third 
World attention to U.S. hegemony stemmed more from strategic than from economic 
concerns, the priority of which is shaped by South East Asia and the Middle East. 
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McMahon’s assumption was built primarily on Leffler’s argument.70  
 
McMahon gave a very detailed analysis of continuity and change in U.S. foreign 
policy after Stalin’s death in March 1953. The Soviet premier, Georgi Malenkov, was 
in effective control of Soviet foreign policy. On 15
th
 March, he delivered a message to 
the Supreme Soviet that “there is no litigious or unresolved question which could not 
be settled by peaceful means on the basis of the mutual agreement of the countries 
concerned…”. The presentation of peace offensive aimed shortly to mitigate security 
tensions with European countries, even with the U.S. Eisenhower’s administration 
was sceptical about Malenkov’s rhetoric and motives in Soviet Union behaviour. 
Intelligence experts in the White House confirmed the Soviet Union would continue a 
Stalinist approach by the late spring of 1953 after Malenkov was away from the 
Kremlin’s corridors of power. The peace offensive existed for a short time. It was not 
until 1955 that the Soviet Union launched a series of diplomatic initiatives towards 
the uncommitted areas in the Third World. Khrushchev moved beyond Stalin’s ‘two 
camps’ context, allowing some room for neutrality in the Cold War.71  
 
                                                        
70 McMahon, op. cit, pp. 594-595. * Revisionist school in Cold War history domain is different from 
those in public administration domain which I have mentioned in page 2. It directly refers to Robert J. 
McMahon and Melvyn P. Leffler.    
71 Ibid., pp. 596-600. 
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Bulganin’s economic offensive in 1956 was a derivative of Khrushchev’s diplomatic 
offensive within the narrative of peaceful coexistence. Jawaharlal Nehru in India and 
Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt were highly receptive to the SEO which made South 
Asia and Middle East hotspots under its inducements. Soviet intentions were to 
neutralize the U.S. global hegemony and challenge U.S. ‘trade and aid’ policy. 
McMahon’s analysis of the SEO was limited, to say nothing of covering Latin 
America. His contribution to the current literature is based on his in-depth analysis of 
the Soviet threat that potentially bears the Third World’s relevance to U.S. security. It 
is the different conceptualization of Soviet threat that triggers a series of policy 
debates. U.S. fears served as “an expedient tactic employed by cynical officials 
seeking public, congressional, or bureaucratic support for a particular set of 
policies”.72 
 
Burton I. Kaufman is a pioneer scholar who contextualizes Eisenhower’s response to 
the SEO highlighted by the rise of nationalism in the Third World (such as historical 
significance of the Bandung Conference by its outcomes). The SEO did present the 
only cause of foreign aid reappraisal by the U.S. His analysis of the SEO did not 
particularly concentrate on Latin America but presented a wider understating of 
                                                        
72 Ibid., pp. 602- 605. p.612. p. 617.  
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fervent nationalism in the face of the SEO. The U.S. was compelled to rethink its 
foreign aid policy as a consequence of Richard Nixon’s trip to Latin America. 
Kaufman also emphasized the role of U.S. Congress over the conduct of foreign 
assistance policy in the Eisenhower administration.
73
 I think Kaufman’s focus on U.S. 
Congress situates my argument in Chapter Three, developing Congress’s concern for 
Latin America. In examining whether the SEO caused a fundamental change in U.S. 
foreign policy, I also offer some case studies in order to demonstrate that the U.S. has 
to combat local ‘political alliance’ - one kind of Latin American nationalism - in 
dealing with Latin American countries rather than the SEO. 
 
The Irony of Global Hegemony: Modernization and Pan Americanism 
Eisenhower exhibited much complacency about his foreign policy towards Latin 
America by 1958.
74
 Scholars of hegemonic stability appreciated the symbiotic 
relationship between world stability and single preponderance of power. Charles P. 
Kindleberger presented the central idea behind hegemonic stability theory as being 
globalized economic institutions. However, he proposed that the instability in the 
system lies in the absence of a world leader to stabilize the world economy through a 
                                                        
73 Burton I. Kaufman, “The United States Response to the Soviet Economic Offensive of the 1950s,” 
Diplomatic History, Vol.2, No. 2 (April, 1978), pp. 153-165.  
74 Rabe, Eisenhower: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism and Latin America, p. 100. 
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close examination of World War I, World War II and the Great Depression.
75
 
Ironically, Eisenhower’s claim of stability in the late 1950s failed to appreciate latent 
instability after the Buenos Aires Economic Conference in 1957. Latin American 
requests for a regional approach have been unsolved since Eisenhower took office in 
1953. What’s worse, Nixon encountered a near-death experience during his visit to 
Latin America.  
 
Eisenhower’s Latin American policy came under sustained geopolitical tensions 
despite the narrative of hegemonic stability. However, scholars of hegemonic stability 
did not engage much with regional instability upon the global stability. It is my 
contention that the maintenance of global balance of power paves the way for being a 
hegemon. If there is a difference between seeking global balance of power and 
maintaining hegemonic domination, I shall say the former suggests the prolonged 
process of power struggles between the U.S. and the Soviet Union characterized by 
sporadic skirmishes but the latter associates with the idea of definite control over 
other territories and peoples. In the 1950s, seeking global balance of power is 
desirable but intertwined with the rise of nationalism in the Third World. Hence, 
hegemony should be considered as an ultimate goal; however, the way to hegemony is 
                                                        
75 Charles P. Kindleberger, the World in Depression, 1929-1939 (California: University of California 
Press, 1986), p. 269. p. 290.  
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replete with competing national narratives in the Third World, implying potential 
instabilities in the Cold War era.  
 
With the rise of leftist nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, liberal bureaucrats 
perceived modernization theory as an optimal means to orient nationalism in the Third 
World countries towards “stable, capitalist, pro-Western anticommunist nations”. 
According to James F. Siekmeier, modernization theorists envisaged a final 
emergence of a middle class to take the lead in creating stable environments for trade 
and investment, which bring about stability in the Third World. Meanwhile, Siekmeier 
contended that the origins of modernization had a connection with the aftermath of 
World War II. The Soviet Union and the U.S. had their respective economic 
developments, notably capitalism and socialism. Most underdeveloped nations could 
not plan out an economic project for social progress, which likewise made them rely 
on either route of development theories.
76
 
 
Soon after World War II, Truman proposed the Point Four Program to counter the 
infiltration of communism which emphasized that U.S. “scientific advances and 
                                                        
76  James F. Siekmeier, Latin American Nationalism: Identity in a Globalizing World (London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2017), pp. 134-135. 
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industrial progress” will help the social transformation in the underdeveloped areas.77 
The Marshall Plan epitomized the concept particularly for Western European 
economies but presented as a smaller foreign aid program than that of the Point Four 
Program. David Ryan said that “development through modernization theories 
provided a conceptual framework, which reinforced acceptance of U.S. economic 
penetration of the post-colonial economies”.78 Fundamentally, Eisenhower’s initial 
conception of ‘trade not aid’ was a derivative of the Point Four Program.  
 
Walt Whitman Rostow’s work, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto, explained every society must pass five different stages of progress through 
a linear economic model.
79
 Rostow’s materialistic approach does not explain how 
each stage shifts from one to the other. Although he has outlined the characteristics of 
each stage, he does not clarify the issue as to whether the successive stage takes place 
in sequence as the history proceeds. Michael Latham has found that the assumptions 
relied much on Western values, capitalist economy, technological improvements and 
societal progress. Driven by a set of universal ideas, the generalization does not fit in 
                                                        
77 Department of State Bulletin, January 30, 1949, p. 125.  
78 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 
2000), p. 142. pp. 156-157.  
79 Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 4-6. 
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every Latin American nation as it lacks empirical studies.
80
 According to C.E. Black, 
he proposes modernization was the “process by which historically evolved institutions 
are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase 
in man’s knowledge, permitting control over his environment”.81  
 
All scholars have already raised the scholarly inquiry of the validity of the 
modernization paradigm. Black has given attention to how historical context 
influences mankind’s thoughts and behaviours that reflect social patterns during the 
social progress. Latham’s work reflected how the underlying collection of Western 
experiences motivated by ideological impulses capsulate into the modernization 
theory. They all acknowledged the theoretical deficiency in Latin American historical 
and cultural grounds but none of them has identified how economic globalization has 
impacted the regional development, changing the social mobility, merging class 
fractions and reshaping the class system. 
 
Modernization theory, a linear economic model, increasingly became problematic 
during the Buenos Aires Conference in 1957 since it did not fully recognize the 
                                                        
80 Michael Latham, Modernization As Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in 
the Kennedy Era (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 4.   
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enduring tension in U.S.-Latin American relations over economic development. First 
of all, Eisenhower’s free trade policy came under domestic pressure from the U.S. and 
mining industries, pushing the administration to increase tariffs on lead and zinc. 
Secondly, Latin American nations expected that the U.S. could stabilize commodity 
prices and create an Inter-American Development Bank for Latin American nations. 
Latin American requests for a Marshall Plan have been framed in inter-American 
relations since Eisenhower took office as president in 1953 but the U.S. imposed 
tariffs on zinc and lead in response to Latin American nations. 
 
Some liberal bureaucrats had considered a more generous economic policy towards 
Latin America. Thomas Tunstall Allcock pointed out that the scholarship has paid less 
attention to the change of “senior personnel in the State Department’s Offices of 
Inter-American Affairs (ARA) and Economic Affairs”. Roy R. Rubottom, Thomas C. 
Mann and Douglas Dillon were newly assigned to more senior levels in the State 
Department after Humphrey was succeeded by Robert A. Anderson. Allcock has 
widened the focus of analysis for U.S. policy towards Latin America in the late 1950s 
to understand the driving forces that challenge Eisenhower’s ‘trade not aid’ policy by 
emphasizing the influence of second-tier bureaucrats. The second-tier bureaucratic 
approach was supplementary to the mainstream analysis of first-tier bureaucrats (the 
 - 48 - 
 
president and cabinet-level advisers).
82
 From my perspective, Allcock’s analysis 
provided great insight into Allison’s bureaucratic approach to elaborate the transition 
from ‘trade not aid’ to ‘trade and aid’.  
 
When returning to Washington, Rubottom, Mann and Dillon became much more 
active in promoting new economic initiatives with more public funds through 
different channels. Except for Mann’s particular interest in commodity stabilization 
agreements, Rubottom and Dillon’s economic initiatives did not depart from Dr. 
Milton Eisenhower’s recommendations to the current Latin American policy. Even 
though tipping the balance in favour of developmental funds at the secretary level, 
they soon found they had no authority to do this. However, they were much more 
supportive of such an economic initiative when the government was prepared to move. 
They were concerned private investment alone might compound hemispheric relations, 
which is insufficient to meet economic development in Latin America. The belief in 
the rethinking of U.S. policy circulated widely in bureaucratic politics soon after the 
Buenos Aires Conference.
83
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Latin American discontent with U.S. foreign policies continued to grow representing 
great violence during Nixon’s visit to Latin America and Juscelino Kubitschek’s 
concept of Operation Pan America. In March 1958, Nixon was beset by 
anti-American leaflets in Lima and assaulted by hostile masses who “widely 
publicized attack on his motorcade in Caracas”, maliciously spitting on Nixon and his 
wife. The incident also brought about “a panicked dispatch of additional U.S. forces 
to Caribbean bases”. The outcome of Nixon’s trip aroused an echo in the Brazilian 
President’s call for a pragmatic approach from Latin America to re-define its 
economic scope of cooperation with the U.S. Therefore, Eisenhower’s approach 
received much criticism. The New York Times criticised U.S. policy-makers’ inability 
to meet political realities; Lyndon B. Johnson, who was the Leader of Senate Majority, 
deplored the “neglect of our close neighbors to the south”.84 
 
Sewell’s appraisal of Nixon’s trip to South America challenges the school of 
Eisenhower revisionists who consider Eisenhower as an effective leader who was 
aware of what to achieve by means of his advisory machinery. Clearly, Eisenhower’s 
policies did not get to the bottom of it; it was Anti-Americanism.
85
 Max P. Friedman 
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 - 50 - 
 
added that “yankeephobia” was a distinct challenge to U.S. foreign policy towards 
Latin America by the end of 1958.
86
 In Chapter Four, I use the concept of economic 
sovereignty when the trend of globalization was taken up. The historiography on 
U.S.-Latin American relations has contributed to the concept of economic sovereignty 
to define the different levels of cooperation. The growing recognition of sovereignty, 
especially in the process of integration, is characterised by due jurisdiction to 
sovereign states to decide and execute policies. I will evolve this with discussion of 
the Calvo Doctrine to build up an analytical framework serving as a link between U.S. 
globalization and Latin American nationalism.  
 
Economic Globalization: Cuba as a Confrontation of Economic Sovereignty  
To grasp the intersection between U.S. globalization and Latin American nationalism, 
Cuba represents a successful case to counterbalance U.S. economic domination. 
Chapter Five will concentrate on Cuba which explains political and economic clashes 
between U.S. cooperation and the Castro government. Globalization is characterized 
by multifaceted aspects such as history, economics, military and culture. The 
economic globalization, though not representing the whole characteristics of the 
globalization process, undoubtedly affects local economic policy. Economic 
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globalization also reflects close networks of interdependence in the global economy 
as a consequence of the increasing inflows of investment and trade. I will deepen the 
concept of economic sovereignty in Chapter Five to demonstrate how Castro regained 
autonomy over the scope of economic activities in the context of economic 
globalization. 
 
The pros and cons of globalization have triggered a scholarly debate. The most 
conspicuous pros of globalization try to emphasize the positive side of economic 
interdependence by the increasing flow of trade and financial capital across the border; 
however, sceptics are worried about erosion of national economies being exploited by 
the privileged few. The latter places its impact on an individual sovereignty and limits 
of autonomy and thus the central focus should be nation-states. As historical evidence 
shows, the gold standard era denotes a closer international economic interaction but 
the world economy becomes less globalized from the central focus of the 
‘nation-states’ perspective to accentuate local political legitimacy and powers.87 As a 
result, economic globalization has a dual effect.  
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William Robinson provides a great insight into social and development change in 
Central America, with particular emphasis on the role of emerging transnational 
capitalists in the age of globalization. His claim that transnational processes will 
happen if national and regional economies can be integrated is based on a neo-Marxist 
perspective of global economy.
88
 However, social structure combined with the inflow 
of capital liberalism at the stage of ‘pre-globalization’ might “displace some classes 
like peasantries and artisans”. For this reason, class restructuring is one of the 
characteristics that concur with the global economy; that is to say, new classes will 
come into being because of the merge of class fractions in the socioeconomic 
structure presented in Central America. In the transnational process, national interests 
in Central America respectively might diverge from or converge on the capitalist 
system, and thus the local politics would experience a distinct level of regime change 
from authoritarian polity to democratization.
89
 
 
Robinson’s proposition intended to prove that global capitalism determines the 
transnational processes in which Central America has little political lever against the 
global capitalist system dominated by the U.S. Therefore, Central America supplied 
                                                        
88 William I. Robinson, Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change and Globalization 
(London: Verso Book Press, 2003), pp. 56-57. 
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labour forces under the global context of capitalist production. This approach 
described the globalization as potent influences in Central America but did not 
demonstrate the increasing level of the sovereignty in Latin America. The 
globalization has much to do with the nationalism because the latter might refuse the 
former connectivity by any means if the national leader becomes intransigent, 
strengthening the concept of the sovereignty. In Chapter Five, I will explore how 
Castro aligned himself with local anti-U.S. sentiments under the non-intervention 
principle and regained economic autonomy against U.S. globalization. 
 
Cuba was without doubt one of most conspicuous cases in Central America for 
contending its sovereign territory beyond political, economic and military 
considerations of U.S. domination. Franklin W. Knight focuses on larger political 
groupings in Caribbean history, arguing that the Caribbean identities from colonial 
rule experienced political statehood prior to a cultural nation-building process.
90
 
Speaking to Cuba, Knight summarized Cuban history into three periods: the late 
colonial period, ending in 1898; the period of republican independence between 1902 
and 1959; and the Castro revolution that replaced it after 1959”. Knight’s analysis of 
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Cuban development follows an extensive chronological trajectory.
91
  
 
Knight discussed the interaction between technological changes and the sugar industry. 
The sugar industry was booming in Cuba during the nineteenth century. Technological 
improvements by 1840 catalyzed the sugar revolution which drastically changed the 
socioeconomic structure; meanwhile, the emergence of new classes, such as slave 
owners, was fervently interested in the sugar business which as such upgraded their 
social status in the middle of the eighteenth century. From 1902 to 1959, Cuba was 
independent but its government operated under the influence of U.S. economic and 
political networks in Cuba. Finally, Knight
 
said economic discount was not a main 
factor resulting in Batista’s fall in 1959; however, he explains Cuban nationals had 
tolerated “illegitimate governments, corrupt politicians, and a system apparently 
incapable of regenerating itself”. Thus, the Cuban revolution was confusion.92  
 
In my analysis, the Cuban revolution was not a state of confusion between idealism 
and pragmatism. The revolution indeed reflected Cubans’ aspirations for the actual 
attainment of sovereignty. As a result, I will continuously utilize the concept of 
economic sovereignty to demonstrate gradual attainment of autonomy under the 
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Castro government. According to Paschal Donohoe, the main components of 
sovereignty are: capacity (a state or political leader has ability to make decisions in 
national issues), supremacy (a state has the sovereign authority, absolute power and 
final say on all national issues) and territorial rule (jurisdiction over the territories 
where rulers and inhabitants dwell). Economic sovereignty is the demonstration of 
absolute sovereignty over economic activities, reflecting economic control and 
independence from any external force.
93
 
 
Castro’s gradual regain of economic sovereignty springs from Washington’s neglect 
of the anti-Batista forces in Cuba. In this regard, Gaddis Smith argues that U.S. 
influence in Cuba has been legitimately codified into the Platt Amendment. In fact, 
Washington was obsessed by global balance of power and “did not pay much attention 
at first to the anti-Batista revolutionary band organized by the young Fidel Castro”. As 
a consequence, Cuba’s policy was largely conducted by the State Department from 
1957 to 1958, in particular in the hands of ambassador to Cuba, Earl T. Smith. The 
Department’s assessment was not to a point which delinked Castro’s relevance with 
Moscow. The Department’s assessment contributed to the overall argument of the 
book - the Monroe Doctrine serves as a legitimate claim of U.S. sphere of influence in 
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the Americas but denies any sphere of influence into the area. Castro’s role was not a 
pressing priority of Eisenhower’s agenda.94 In Chapter Five, I assume that the 
non-intervention principle advocated by the State Department facilitated the growth of 
Castro’s nationalism and thereby strengthened Castro’s power to regain the economic 
sovereignty in Cuba.  
 
Chapter Outline 
The thesis utilizes Eisenhower’s staff structuring as a theoretical analysis throughout 
all chapters, with a particular emphasis on the importance of leading bureaucrats. 
Eisenhower’s advisory machinery could be described as a conglomeration with 
strategic, political, economic and military objectives. However, it is essential to 
re-examine whether these were achievable in the Cold War context. I, for that reason, 
combined extensive reading of scholarship with examination of primary documents of 
the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volumes with the expectation of 
presenting a new interpretation of Eisenhower’s foreign policy towards Latin America, 
which is of contemporary as well as historical importance. 
 
Chapter One builds an analytical framework of the thesis from the current literature 
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review. Starting from the revisionists’ argument that Eisenhower was in effective 
control of his foreign policy mechanism, implicitly exercising his presidential power, 
coupled with the existing historiography in the Cold War, provides a wider focus of 
U.S.-Latin American relations. The U.S. was too preoccupied with the global struggle 
for balance of power to consider the fundamental difference between nation and 
nationalism in Latin America. Eisenhower’s advisory machinery tried to 
accommodate differences in foreign policy objectives towards Latin America in order 
to maintain U.S. hegemony.  
 
Chapter Two focuses on the formation of U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America 
in 1953 and onwards, identifying how national security and economic development of 
Latin America were placed under the U.S. foreign policy. It also explores the nature 
and implications of the policy-making process in which the leading bureaucrats took 
initiatives in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America. Cooperation or 
confrontation alternated while the U.S. bureaucrats tried to find the links between the 
threat of international communism and economic development. The combination of 
national security and private investment became problematic in the 1954 Guatemalan 
coup d’état but other Latin American states such as Argentina and Bolivia were fed up 
with this façade of policy consistency.  
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Chapter Three is themed with the challenge of the SEO which was viewed as a more 
flexible tactic to relax tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Bulganin’s 
offer did not result in a positive response in Latin America but caused bureaucratic 
debates over the current U.S. approaches towards Latin America. For the former, I 
deconstructed the theme of its immediate impact upon Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, 
Venezuela, Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica. The cases try to demonstrate that the SEO 
would not restrain U.S. economic policy. For the latter, Eisenhower thought it 
expedient to advance military aid assistance to Latin America by addressing relevance 
to U.S. security. At the same time, the SEO expanded the role of Congress in the 
foreign aid program. The SEO indeed dichotomized U.S. foreign aid policy. 
 
Chapter Four puts emphasis on the Buenos Aires Conference in 1957. This 
Conference presented unsorted economic issues from the Rio Conference in 1954 
during which there was a cry for a Marshall plan for Latin America. Despite constant 
neglect of Latin America, Eisenhower’s free trade policy also came under domestic 
pressure from mining industries, especially lead and zinc manufacturers. This also 
meant that Eisenhower’s vision of economic interdependence to bring world peace 
became politically and economically problematic. Tariffs, normally supported by local 
protectionists, were detrimental to the free trade market, to say nothing of economic 
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integration. The U.S. had a great deal of autonomy for its own trade policies which 
motivated me to use economic sovereignty for wider understanding of Latin American 
nationalism which escalated tensions between the U.S. and other Latin American 
states.  
 
Chapter Five is set against the backdrop of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Cuba was 
extremely important because Fidel Castro, who was widely reckoned as a national 
leader of Cuba, successfully regained the Cuban political and economic sovereignty 
against U.S. globalization. Cuba was an independent state with no political and 
economic sovereignty. Washington’s constant neglect of Cuba provided an 
opportunity for Castro to develop his leadership with a penitential vision to change 
the structural power in Cuba. The Agrarian Reform in 1959 and Mikoyan’s visit to 
Cuba on a trade mission in 1960 denoted Cuba’s economic independence from 
external constraints.  
 
The conclusion provides an alternative explanation for the Eisenhower administration 
towards Latin America. The thesis has found that effective management of advisory 
machinery did not present appropriate decisions; what’s worse, the leading 
bureaucrats at the Secretary level of the NSC misinterpreted Latin American 
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nationalism as communism. The fundamental problem resulted from Eisenhower’s 
hierarchal structure of the NSC that allowed some Secretariats to dominate the policy- 
making process. The systematic inflow of advice from the second-tier bureaucrats did 
not carry much weight with the President and key figures of the Secretariat who were 
confined to the Cold War imperatives, much less to be implemented by the OCB. 
Eisenhower’s foreign policy mechanism tried to achieve different foreign policy 
objectives simultaneously which resulted in bureaucratic conflicts meant to achieve 
what they considered best for Latin America.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Eisenhower’s Initial Conception of Policy:   
Economic Development and National Security in Synthesis 
 
The second chapter of this thesis proposes that the importance of military assistance 
to Latin America was overshadowed by Eisenhower’s new framework for economic 
policy despite Dulles’ initiatives to advocate the anti-communism agenda at the 10th 
Inter-American Conference in 1954. Based on Kaufman’s assumption, the new 
economic approach considered U.S. private investment as the foundation of economic 
development in Latin America, which was in favour of further trade liberalization and 
the restoration of free convertibility of European currencies with the dollar. The 
economic prosperity of the free world must be built on the economic progress of the 
rest of the world.
1
 This approach, envisaged by the leading bureaucrats as desirable 
outcomes of modernization, facilitated the process of cooperation as shown in 
Argentina and Bolivia while Guatemala presented as an example of confrontation as a 
result of unbending position on the agrarian reform in 1953. The U.S. rectified this by 
using covert action to orient the unbending nations toward the right track of 
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modernization. 
 
NSC 144/1 was the first U.S. official document towards Latin America that covered 
various aspects of U.S.-Latin America relations, including the hemispheric solidarity 
to support U.S. world policy, the rise of nationalistic regimes, the emergence of 
nationalism caused by anti-American sentiments and communists, the strategic access 
to raw materials (oil, copper, lead, zinc, etc.), the economic development of Latin 
America, and ultimate military standardization.
2
 In short, this document was the 
initial thoughts of bureaucrats towards national security concerns and economic 
development. The U.S. decision-makers would have to ensure that the economic 
nationalism would not stand in the way of currency convertibility of profits into 
dollars, and reparation to those who suffered from expropriation. Promotion of private 
investment in furtherance of a high level of international trade was the cornerstone of 
Eisenhower’s economic policy.  
 
However, this approach does not explain to what extent military security interrelated 
with economic development in Latin America from the second presidency of Truman 
to Eisenhower’s first administration. Eisenhower’s economic approach was not a 
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single-lane-road and sometimes this was woven with the military aid program. The 
correlation between military security and economic development of Latin America 
was buried in the NSC 144/1. Despite the military standardization and the collective 
defence against external aggression,
3
 the fundamental issue was whether military 
standardization would be an obstacle to economic development in Latin America or 
not. There was a confrontation between U.S. Congress and the Executive branch 
about the military aid to Latin America. H. Alexander Smith, who was the Senator 
from New Jersey, expressed his views in a 1952 debate on the Senate floor: 
Appropriation for fiscal 1953 should complete the capital equipment of Latin 
American forces required to fit into the hemispheric defense plans, and that 
thereafter we [the U.S.] shall be “over the hill” on capital investment, and will be 
able to fall back to the “maintenance level”.4 
 
The statement further justified the position of Congress that there was no clear sign or 
need of increasing the level of military aid and it would be reduced down to a 
maintenance level in 1953. Regarding the hemispheric defence plans, the durability of 
military items in accordance with the Mutual Security Act (MSA) in 1954 ought to 
considerably fulfil the equipping stage of the program as currently designed. However, 
the military supply to Latin America was in a very slow process. George C. Stewart, 
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who was the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, declared in 1953 that not so 
much progress had been made in respect to the military aid program to Latin America. 
From Stewart’s viewpoint, the problem arose from the slow process in which the 
bilateral agreements had been in negotiations or approvals by either side. In addition, 
the administrative red tape was another difficulty involving lots of regulations in the 
process, which resulted in the slowness of military aid to Latin America.
5
 During the 
early years in the Eisenhower administration, there were two contradictory forces on 
the military aid program to Latin America. Congress recommended keeping the 
military aid to a maintenance level while the military expected more to be done on the 
program of military aid to Latin America such as improving the slow process in the 
bureaucracy. 
 
On 16
th
 January 1953, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, reviewed 
whether the local currency had the minimum capacity to finance the Military 
Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) in Latin America in the fulfilment of the 
grant-aid military program. There were two criteria to expand Military Missions; one 
was on an accredited basis and the other was on a non-accredited basis. On an 
accredited basis, “it would cost the other country considerably more than it would if 
                                                        
5 Ibid. 
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the individual were assigned as a member of the MAAG”. On a non-accredited basis, 
all costs would be paid by the U.S. government rather than the Departments of the 
Navy, Army and Air Force. The incurring financial liabilities, under this basis, could 
not be financed through the Mutual Security legislation. The DOD, serving as an 
operational agency, would have “the means and personnel required to ensure proper 
performance of necessary functions” in the face of Congress pressures.6 
 
Given the fact that the DOD’s dedications to military missions were limited to the 
maintenance level and the advisory role to provide military training and personnel 
was constrained by appropriate purposes of functions, military aid programs played a 
lesser role compared with economic development through the free trade framework.  
It is assumed that Latin American nations should commit themselves to developing 
economic development in lieu of procuring military equipment in excess of their 
economic capabilities to support. As Business Week reported in 1952, Eisenhower’s 
economic policy was labelled as ‘trade not aid’. This concept was developed by 
Banker Winthrop W. Aldrich and J.P. Spang, Jr., president of the Gillette Company. 
They indicated that “U.S. could save $5,000,000,000 in foreign aid each year by 
                                                        
6 Foreign Relations of the United States, the American Republics, “The Deputy Secretary of Defense 
(Foster) to the Secretary of State,” in Historical Documents, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IV, January 16th, 
1953. 
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reducing only 600,000,000 of its tariff duties, thereby permitting aid recipients to 
achieve prosperity through increased American trade”.7 
 
According to the NSC study on U.S. objectives and courses of action regarding Latin 
America on 6
th
 March 1953, it has shown that some Latin American countries in past 
experience have demonstrated their interests in military equipment but often the 
military equipment is beyond their economic capabilities to support. For example, 
Latin America is replete with a shortage of dollars and their current status in 
international trade is likely to get worse. They expected that the U.S. could take 
initiatives to provide assistance such as loans and economic projects. The study has 
also confirmed that Latin American nations should have the ability for self-defence of 
their own territories. Furthermore, the military assistance to Latin America should be 
placed in line with the Inter-American Defense Board and other military agreements 
to which the U.S. is a party should be given by the U.S. It means the U.S. does not 
stimulate desires and give rise to an assumption on their part of implied commitments 
beyond U.S. capacity to fulfil.
8
 It is clear to perceive, perhaps safe to say, that U.S. 
bureaucrats considered the potential contradiction between the military aid program 
                                                        
7 Thomas V. DiBacco, “American Business and Foreign Aid: The Eisenhower Years,” The Business 
History Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Spring, 1967), p. 25. 
8 NSC staff study on U.S. objectives and courses of action regarding Latin America. United States: 
National Security Council, 6 Mar. 1953. U.S. Declassified Documents Online, Web. 20 Nov. 2013. 
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and free trade framework. As a result, the U.S. could only provide very limited 
assistance with regard to the military aid program - apparently not accede to any 
current collective or bilateral agreement conditions.  
 
NSC 56/2 issued on 18
th
 May 1950 was one of the important documents with 
reference to the Inter-American military collaboration before Eisenhower took his 
presidency. The document ensured the U.S. strategic access to Latin America where 
major sea lines of communication, such as Curaçao-Aruba and Trinidad (oil reserves), 
Northeast Brazil (Straits of Natal-Dakar), Mollendo in Peru, Peru-Antofagasta in 
Chile and the Panama Canal, would need to be protected. They all served as a ‘transit 
of strategic materials’ and the sea routes, if seriously damaged or destroyed by Latin 
American communists, would cause instability. According to the NSC 56/2, Truman 
had set the basic guidance for military collaboration in July 1945. The U.S. role in 
providing the Inter-American military collaboration for collective security in the 
hemisphere was to “provide training in the U.S. for Latin American military personnel, 
participate in the making of combined joint plans for hemisphere defense, and to 
provide military equipment to the other American republics”. The guidance was in 
line with the Mutual Defense Assistance Act in 1949 that authorized Truman to sell 
military equipment to Latin American countries based on their economic capacities 
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and the hemisphere defence.
9
 From 1945 to 1950, Truman’s military approach was 
based on the collective defence in an attempt to reduce unnecessary military 
expenditures. Eisenhower’s military aid policy in 1953 bore little difference to that of 
Truman from 1945 to 1950; namely, providing limited military training and 
equipment not beyond Latin American economic conditions to sustain.  
 
The Economic Cooperation Act of 1949 and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act
 
 
combined together and became the MSA in 1951. The Mutual Security Agency was 
an independent administration responsible for economic, military and technical 
assistance to all American allies. The MSA was composed of the DOD, the Economic 
Cooperation Administration, DOS, USDT and the Executive Office of the President, 
with the latter as the highest level of the organizational structure. However, the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Act had been interdepartmental because the DOD and the 
DOS were jointly involved in the preliminary legislation. The DOS was responsible 
for administrative works while the DOD was in charge of implementations. Congress 
would need to be informed prior to the enactment of the legislation to see whether it 
had any issue with the current plans for further appropriation or not.
10
 In 1951, 
                                                        
9 Foreign Relations of the United States, National Security Affairs, “Report by the National Security 
Council to the President,” in Foreign Economic Policy, FRUS 1950, Vol. I, May 18th, 1950. 
10 Robert H. Connery and Paul T. David, “The Mutual Defense Assistance Program,” The American 
Political Science Association, Vol.45, No. 2 (June, 1952), pp. 341-342.  
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President Truman requested Congress to authorize $38,150,000 for direct military 
assistance, and it added to $51,685,750 in 1952.
11
 Truman made good use of the 
MSA to centralize his role as a chief of executive in the conduct of foreign aid policy 
based on the bilateral basis. From 1951 to 1952, there was obviously $13,535,750 
increase in foreign aid allotment from Congress. Why did Truman centralize his 
presidential power in increasing grant aid programs?  
 
Michael J. Francis has provided three points to explain the increase of grant aid 
programs in 1952 but why it did not happen in 1946 and 1947. First, the Korea War 
from June 1950 and the rising threat of the communist strengthened U.S. conception 
of collective defence. Second, the discussion of the MSA at the hearing, the Senate 
Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee were held right in front of 
Congress, which “helped to popular the idea of U.S.-Latin American military 
cooperation”. Third, as far as the Mutual Security Act is concerned, Francis indicated 
that “the terms were tied to a bill that was certain to be passed in one form or 
another…. [so] the passage of the provisions is procedural”.12 Francis also added that 
                                                        
11 Fifth progress report on status of U.S. policy toward inter-American military collaboration. United 
States: National Security Council, 13 Sept. 1951. U.S. Declassified Documents Online. Web. 20 Nov. 
2013. Implementation of U.S. policy toward inter-American military collaboration. United States: 
National Security Council, 18 Mar. 1952. U.S. Declassified Documents Online. Web. 20 Nov. 2013. 
12 Francis, op. cit., pp. 391-392. 
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the MSA was different from the Economic Cooperation Act of 1949 and the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Act
 
as it could precisely define the demand for military aid. As for 
the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), there were no specific criteria to 
implement.
13
 
 
By examining the historical background of the MSA, it is clear that military 
collaboration and the economic program buttress the defence capability of Latin 
America against the threat of communism. Truman’s foreign aid program was exactly 
the manifestation of the containment policy; however, congressional cuts and 
increases of the appropriation for economic, military and technical assistance to U.S. 
allies depended on the interdepartmental relations, policy adjustment and global 
conflicts. The increasing pressure on the Executive Office of the President from 
Congress to reduce military aid appropriation was what Truman and Eisenhower 
experienced particularly during their respective first term. It suggests that the role of 
Congress represented as a cycle of political pressures against the Executive branch in 
the foreign policy domain. The larger a world conflict is, the less pressure the 
Executive branch would encounter. The crucial world conflict serves as an impulse 
for the President to balance military and economic aid. Eisenhower encountered 
                                                        
13 Ibid. 
 - 71 - 
 
political pressures from Congress as Truman did but he tried to promote private 
investment in furtherance of free trade. 
 
Possibility of Private Capital and Investment 
The American investment in Latin America was enormous. The National Security 
Council on 6th March 1953 has shown the U.S. private investment in Latin America 
soared at $4.7 billion that was $1.2 billion higher than any other area (except Canada). 
This figure (dollar investments) was record-breaking over the time span from 1947-49 
and it was supposedly to grow more profits. There was a variety of businesses in Latin 
America such as “private loans, mining interests, sugar and banana plantations, 
railways, meat packing plants, public utilities, assembly plants and branch factories, 
land holdings, air, sea and other communications, and general business enterprises”.14 
The statistics have shown that U.S. private business activities in Latin America 
accounted for a large portion of benefits. Dependence theorists might easily divide the 
world into ‘periphery’ (the underdeveloped) and ‘core’ (the developed) but this does 
not demonstrate how the developed states dominate the underdeveloped states and 
what Latin American societies look like.  
                                                        
14 Latin America, United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America. Note 
by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin 
America, 6th March1953. Annex to NSC 144. U.S. Declassified Documents Online. Web. 20 Nov. 
2013. 
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One of documents annexed to the NSC 144/1 has shown that “the people of Latin 
America were becoming increasingly aware that 90% of the wealth of the Western 
Hemisphere (less Canada) was produced by one of the American republics - the U.S. - 
while 10% was produced by the remaining 20 American states”.15 Bevan Sewell has 
mentioned that the huge disparity was the root cause of popular resentment, with 
Latin American states being fermented with the ‘nationalism’ or ‘colonialism’.16 
Eisenhower made it clear about his foreign policy objectives in his annual message to 
Congress on the State of the Union on 2
nd
 February 1953. He perceived the trade and 
private investment as inseparable components to achieve economic integration. The 
following points were mentioned in his speech. First, he suggested customs 
regulations be reviewed such as whether the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) 
should be adjusted by Congress or not. The framework of free trade could not 
jeopardize “domestic industries, agriculture, and labor standards”. Second, creating a 
friendly climate favourable for private enterprises can attract more private capital. 
Third, mutual defence could be achieved by strengthening “the economical 
production of manufactured” items overseas but this should not compete against U.S. 
regular production during peacetime. Fourth, expanding the exchanging net of raw 
                                                        
15 Sewell, “A Perfect (Free-Market) World? Economics, the Eisenhower Administration, and the 
Soviet Economic Offensive in Latin America,” Diplomatic History, p. 848. 
16 Ibid., p. 849.  
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materials could make up quantities the U.S. doesn’t naturally possess.17 
 
Eisenhower’s conception of trade and private investment was essentialised in the NSC 
144/1 but the U.S. has also recognized the existing nationalistic sentiment in the area. 
The document gave an account of the growth of the nationalism either “facilitated by 
historic anti-U.S. prejudices” or “exploited by communists”.18 From my analysis, the 
document has shown a growing tendency to recognize Latin American nationalism as 
communist or anti-U.S. follower. Communism was a symbol representing a diversity 
of themes such as class revolution, socialized economy, and anti-imperialism. The 
NSC 144/1 did not identify the links between the U.S. trade policy and Latin 
American nationalism, nor did it explain the fundamental differences between the U.S. 
and Latin America such as history, culture, institution and identity. As a result, one 
could only have very superficial knowledge about Latin American nationalism. 
 
As far as Eisenhower’s economic policy is concerned, the NSC 144/1 set out the basic 
guidance, stating Latin American governments were “encouraged to recognize that the 
bulk of the capital necessary for their economic development could best be supplied 
                                                        
17 Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, February 2, 1953; available from 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9829, accessed October 7, 2013. 
18 Foreign Relations of the United States, the American Republics, “Statement of Policy by the 
National Security Council,” in Historical Documents, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IV, March 18th, 1953. 
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by private enterprise and that their own self-interest required the creation of a climate 
which would attract private investment”.19 Based on the context, Latin American 
states were encouraged to take the initiative in creating a climate favourable for the 
inflow of private capital. The more private capital flowing into Latin America, the 
more extensive the business activities are supposed to be. In this regard, it will 
facilitate international trade and reduce the trade barrier or tariff issues within the 
RTAA. The International Bank loans and the Eximbank loans would be 
supplementary to foreign private investment. In addition, the U.S. would limit public 
grant programs in Latin America. For example, the Inter-American Highway and the 
Rama Road.
20
 
 
In examining U.S. trade and private investment policy, James F. Siekmeier has 
discovered the potential theme behind the economic perspective to understand Latin 
American nationalism. When the U.S. gradually evolved its policy with power in 
Latin America, conflicts seemed to be unavoidable. Thus, economic nationalism was 
the “clash of cultures between Latin America and North America”.21 His viewpoint 
highlights the nature of the conflict that provides a firm ground to develop the 
                                                        
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Siekmeier, Latin American Nationalism: Identity in a Globalizing World, p. 15. 
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property rights approach.
22
 In this respect, nationalization is one of the most striking 
characteristics of economic nationalism as shown in the expropriation of the foreign 
oil company in Bolivia (1952), the expropriation of the United Fruit Company’s 
(UFCO) properties in Guatemala (1953) and the Agrarian Reform Law in Cuba 
(1959).
23
 
 
Even though the cases involved the process of compensation, nationalist leaders and 
U.S. investors sometimes had different criteria for indemnity. The fundamental 
problem lies in different perceptions of public ownership and privatization. The U.S. 
viewed Latin America as an area for private investment while Latin American states 
regarded economic nationalism as a foundation for social development.
24
 Based on 
the current scholarship, the role of the American government is crucial. During the 
process of compensation, did the American government carry much weight or 
exercise diplomatic mediation? Were there any independent Tribunal services that 
could provide impartial judgement on the compensation? Could the independent body 
put aside prejudices and make a fair decision agreed upon by both parties?   
                                                        
22 Jeremy Adelman, “Institutions, Property, and Economic Development in Latin America,” in Miguel 
Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves ed., The Other Mirror: Grand Theory Through the Lens of 
Latin America (Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 30-32. 
23 Siekmeier, op. cit., pp. 17-18.  
24 Ibid., p. 18. 
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Moving beyond the current scholarship, Latin America and the U.S. are different in 
many aspects. A report to the NSC by the Executive Secretary on 6
th
 March 1953 had 
acknowledged that: 
Despite divisive factors, there exists a sense of identity among Latin American 
States. This sentiment is based upon their comparable although not identical 
origins and languages, and upon their common religion, law, and processes of 
historical development.
25
 
 
 
From my observation, this report was annexed to NSC 144 but not presented in the 
NSC 144/1. This suggests that U.S. bureaucrats had recognized that Latin American 
states actually have a shared identity. The NSC 144/1 mentioned nothing about the 
concept of Latin American identity, much less its impact upon U.S. economic 
globalism. Readers may wonder why NSC 144/1 did not cover the concept of identity 
and how the President dealt with this information. This has much to do with 
Eisenhower’s foreign policy mechanism and his leadership. According to Sloan, he 
indicated:  
The President [Eisenhower] insists that conflicts be resolved before they reach 
his desk; he wants only to hear the consensus, not the discussion, of the staff… 
He expects communications to him to be in the form of neatly drafted, one page 
memos – which is probably one reason why he often shows little insight into the 
complex issues of the day.
26
 
                                                        
25 NSC staff study on U.S. objectives and courses of action regarding Latin America. National Security 
Council, 6 Mar. 1953. U.S. Declassified Documents Online, 
http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/5wC9NX. Accessed 12 Feb. 2018. 
26 Sloan, op. cit., p. 296. 
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Sloan’s statement can be verified during the 137th NSC meeting. The Under Secretary 
of State, Walter Bedell Smith, said that NSC 144/1 had been “prepared in some haste 
and represented a shotgun approach”. The NSC 144/1 only presented general postures 
of bureaucratic positions based on the U.S. outlook for Latin America. Stassen, the 
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), encouraged that Latin 
American businessmen improve their workers’ conditions and take the lead in 
facilitating economic growth of their own countries. In connection to this argument, 
he also raised some concerns about how U.S. private investors are treated in Latin 
America. Humphrey commented on the NSC 144/1 on behalf of the USDT that the 
clause specifying the proposed program given to Latin America should be carefully 
scrutinized before the President approved it. Smith added that U.S. businessmen 
should pursue “contract management” which aims to minimise potential risks between 
labour, employers and Latin American states. This approach is “a more effective way 
of doing business profitably in Latin America without giving rise to the problems which 
so often resulted in nationalization”. 27  Based on the 137th meeting discussion, 
bureaucrats perceived economic nationalism was a hindrance to the U.S. trade and 
private investment. 
                                                        
27 Foreign Relations of the United States, The American Republics, ”Memorandum of Discussion at 
the 137th Meeting of the National Security Council on Wednesday, March 18, 1953,” in Historical 
Documents, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IV, March 18th, 1953. 
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According to the 137
th
 NSC meeting, Eisenhower’s approval did not mean any 
commitment to Latin America because this would require further review of the 
Federal budget and financing priority based on international and domestic politics. 
Robert Cutler said that “the President had been extremely pleased with the present 
report and was going to use some portions of it as the basis for his forthcoming Pan 
American Day speech”.28 Eisenhower presented the notion of America instead of 
individual Latin American nations, trying to appeal to every nation against 
nationalism. Eisenhower obviously set the tone for Latin American policy from a 
multilateral perspective that was an attempt to conflate or reconcile political, 
economic and cultural differences within the framework of common interests in 
America. In addition, Eisenhower reiterated that “private investment has been the 
major stimulus for economic development throughout this hemisphere”.29 
 
Influence of Formal and Informal Mechanism 
Eisenhower demonstrated his determination to reorganize the formal policy 
mechanism to supervise his economic foreign policy on 2
nd
 May 1953 on the need to 
establish a commission.  Eisenhower met his commitments to extend a year of the 
                                                        
28 Ibid. 
29 President Eisenhower’s address delivered at the Pan American Union in Washington, April 12th, 
1953, Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, p. 173. p. 175.  
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RTAA which had been delivered on the Annual Message to the Congress on 2
nd
 
February. As a result, he said that: 
the proposed commission should be made up of members of the Congress 
appointed by the Vice President and the Speaker of the House, and members 
appointed by myself from outside the Congress. It should be representative of 
both major parties.
30
 
 
Moreover, Eisenhower reaffirmed that the commission should review the current 
legislative procedures and regulations to see whether they could buttress 
Eisenhower’s economic policy in furtherance of international trade without 
jeopardizing domestic industries. In the Annual Message, the decreasing imports also 
signified dropping exports and this might cause a negative impact upon agricultural 
markets and various industries. Eisenhower perceived trade and private investment 
could reduce allies’ reliance on grant assistance provided by the U.S. foreign aid 
program.
31
 
 
According to the Congress on the Organization of Executive Branch for the Conduct 
of Foreign Affairs on 1
st
 June 1953, Eisenhower acknowledged that the current 
executive branch did not have a specific administrative machinery to organize and 
                                                        
30  Letter to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
Recommending Establishment of a Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, May 2nd, 1953, Public 
Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 252-253. 
31 Ibid., pp. 253-254.  
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implement Eisenhower’s economic policy. There had been no central command 
structure and accountability assigned by Eisenhower to administer a large number of 
foreign aid programs that had been spread across the executive branch. Eisenhower 
announced the Reorganization Plan No. 7 to centralize further foreign aid programs 
under Stassen’s leadership and thereby established the FOA. The present Mutual 
Security Agency would be abolished and its duties would be transferred to the FOA. 
In the pursuit of technical assistance, the FOA would take over responsibilities from 
the DOS authority to administer the Act for International Development (AID) and 
American participation in various United Nations programs. The FOA would need to 
coordinate its efforts with the DOS and the DOD to perform military and economic 
programs.
32
 
 
The Randall Commission epitomized Eisenhower’s vision of restructuring 
administrative machinery for foreign aid programs. The Commission was a positive 
response to Eisenhower’s request to extend a year of the RTAA delivered on the 
Annual Message to the Congress on 2
nd
 February and it was named after Clarence B. 
Randall, who was in charge of the Board of the Inland Steel Company of Chicago. 
                                                        
32 Special Message to the Congress on the Organization of Executive Branch for the Conduct of 
Foreign Affairs, June 1st, 1953, Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 
343-345. 
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The Randall was an interdepartmental body with 17 members (5 members from the 
U.S. Senate, 5 from the U.S. House of Representatives, 5 political appointees and the 
President assigned a chairman and a vice-chairman).
33
 A large number of 
bureaucratic viewpoints have been found in the Randall report and some bureaucratic 
viewpoints even conflicted with one another. The role of the Commission was more 
like the policy forum, open for discussion. The Randall Report did not go into details 
of study in Latin America; however, there were indeed some thought-provoking ideas.   
 
Richard Simpson of Pennsylvania, Representatives Daniel Reed of New York and 
Senator Eugene Milliken of Colorado were ardent advocates of protectionism, with 
the latter presenting the most eloquent argument in the Commission. Milliken 
commented that U.S. domestic agriculture should be removed from the foreign policy 
domain. The U.S. should reduce the level of dependence upon importations such as 
zinc, lead and copper and tariff concessions could not be without reciprocal 
concessions.
34
 Unlike Milliken, Messrs. Reed and Simpson set out an approach based 
on the U.S. position as the dominant economy. This approach pointed out that tariff 
was a basic factor in the U.S. economy, which ensured the "opportunity to develop 
                                                        
33 Michael Barkway, “Mugwumpery in the Randall Report,” International Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 
(Spring, 1954), pp. 125-126. 
34 Ibid., p. 127.  
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productive facilities, products and markets within the U.S., in full and free 
competition with those whose standards of production, labor costs, and other cost and 
pricing factors were similar".
35
 They insisted that flexible use of the tariff issue be 
viewed as the “bargaining advantage” when the U.S. government dealt with other 
nations. Supposing that the RTAA requires further extension, the time limit should be 
for "no more than two years, during which no changes in tariffs could be made 
without individual study by Congress". This would ensure that the U.S. industries 
could increase the tariff as a method of protection against "low priced foreign 
competition".
36
 
 
The two Congressmen put forward that "political and economic stability of other 
countries" were preconditions for convertibility. Giving more economic aid would not 
help currency converted into other liquid stores of value. Other nations were 
encouraged to adopt the international gold standard system.
37
 Being the adviser to the 
Randall Commission from the Stanford Research Institute, Eugene Staley criticized 
that the report neglected the world’s underdeveloped countries. Rarely did the 
Commission members mention any individual underdeveloped country or 
                                                        
35 Ibid., p. 129. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., p. 130. 
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fundamental problems in the underdeveloped country. In tariff cuts, there was no 
specific explanation of the “peril point” at which import of that commodity would 
cause a seriously adverse effect on the local producers. In the framework of the RTAA, 
the U.S. would need to negotiate with Latin American countries to see in what 
conditions an “escape clause” should be applied.38 
 
In my understanding, the Randall report reflects different approaches to achieve 
economic objectives towards Latin America. Even though Eisenhower appointed 
members of the Randall Commission, he did not explicitly reveal his policy 
preferences in line with the specific bureaucrat, nor did he jump into the 
decision-making process to discuss the competing bureaucratic viewpoints. This 
highlighted Eisenhower’s third-person role in the Randall Commission; he was very 
reserved about his personal preferences. He acted more like an arbiter, who was 
inclined to use ultimate authority if bureaucratic disputes became out of control or 
domestic pressures were being imposed upon him.  
 
In addition to the formal policy mechanism, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower’s visit to South 
                                                        
38 Klaus Knorr and Gardner Patterson, A Critique of the Randall Commission Report (Princeton, NJ: 
International Finance Section and Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1954), pp. 
62-65. 
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America on behalf of the President from 23
rd
 June to 29
th
 July 1953 was considered as 
a form of informal influence in the decision-making process. His findings were 
published in the U.S.-Latin American Relations: Report to the President in November 
1953.
39
 Dr. Milton Eisenhower’s report to the President did not deviate from the basic 
principle of the Randall Commission; he recognized the importance of free trade and 
private investment. With regard to the trade, he said that U.S. trade with Latin 
America totalized $3.5 billion in 1952. This figure has shown that Latin America was 
as promising a market as all of Europe. In addition, the U.S. private investment in 
Latin America accounted for 30% and “this investment of some $6 billion is larger 
than the amount invested in any other part of the world except Canada”.40 
 
Meanwhile, he suggested that the growth of nationalism was a sign of national pride, 
which demonstrated a popular desire to raise standards of living. From this point of 
view, the nationalism is positive. On the other hand, he acknowledged that 
‘ultra-nationalism’, being fermented by communists, was a disadvantage to the inflow 
of U.S. private investment.
41
 Milton Eisenhower’s assessment suggested the growth 
of nationalism might have a serious impact upon the entrance of private capital. His 
                                                        
39 United States-Latin American Relations: Report to the President,” Department of State Bulletin, 
Nov. 23, 1953, pp. 695-696. 
40 Ibid., pp. 696-697. 
41 Ibid., p. 702. 
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preliminary research did not give an in-depth understanding of Latin American 
nationalism. Rather, his understanding of ‘ultra-nationalism’ referred only to the 
economic nationalism. The question raised here is that there were enormous variations 
in the forms of nationalism and Milton Eisenhower’s understanding was confined to 
the face value of ‘ultra-nationalism’. The simplification of his understanding also 
reflected his over-optimistic observation of cultural difference in Latin America. 
 
According to the U.S.-Latin American Relations: Report to the President, Dr. Milton 
S. Eisenhower compared the U.S. cultural diversity to Latin American cultures saying 
that the U.S. cultural diversity was built by “sufficient common beliefs, allegiances, 
and purposes among all the people to make democratic cooperation effective … 
Admittedly, the greater the differences in the cultures of nations, the more arduous 
cooperation becomes”.42 He mistakenly presented the culture of the Latin American 
countries in the following paragraph: 
It is true, of course, that the culture of the Latin American countries has until 
recently been oriented primarily toward Europe. The leaders of our neighbors to 
the South came in great numbers from Spain and Portugal, but also in significant 
numbers from England, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Ireland and other 
countries. For generations, many of them sent their children to Europe to be 
educated.
43
 
 
                                                        
42 Ibid., p. 699.  
43 Ibid.  
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This principle based on the U.S. experience also applied to Latin America because he 
falsely presented the Latin American civilization with the European orientation. As a 
result, the logic fallacy unavoidably contributed to inappropriate decisions because Dr. 
Milton S. Eisenhower’s focus was on Latin American leaders rather than local Latin 
American nationals. If the U.S. bureaucrats only conceive partial or fragmented 
understanding of Latin American histories, the U.S. policy towards Latin Americans 
would not fit in political realities in Latin America. 
 
Dulles’ initiative to promote the anti-communist resolution at the 10th Inter-American 
Conference in Caracas from 1
st
 March to 28
th
 March 1954 was another example of the 
formal policy mechanism of the Inter-American system. The anti-communism 
resolution served as a metaphorical communication to Latin American nations that the 
U.S. was the world leader. Latin America, as a regional system subordinated to the 
global context, was considered as the extension of the American power to sustain its 
global leadership against the international communism led by the Soviet Union. 
Further evidence could be found at the 189
th 
NSC meeting. Dulles revealed that 
anti-communism: 
was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to include the concept of outlawing 
foreign ideologies in the American Republics. Secretary Dulles had believed that 
if he secured general acceptance of the resolution the United States could operate 
more effectively to meet Communist subversion in the American Republics and 
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at the same time avoid the charge of interference in the affairs of any other 
sovereign state. In short, he argued that Communist subversion and subsequent 
control of any of the American Republics was tantamount to external aggression 
against such a Republic. Efforts, therefore, to counter such Communist 
subversion could not rightfully be described as American intervention.
44
 
 
Dulles’ rhetoric has confirmed that Latin America was traditionally viewed as the 
sphere of American influence. The notion of the Monroe Doctrine is indeed not a 
static concept interpreted by Dulles; however, it is interpreted by policy entrepreneurs, 
infusing different ideas or meaning into it. For Dulles, the 10
th
 Inter-American 
Conference was a great opportunity for him to politicise the communism problem and 
thereby advance the anti-communism agenda.  
 
In fact, the economic issue was one of the Latin American concerns at the 10
th
 
Inter-American Conference, hoping that “the prices of raw materials and terms of 
trade, access to U.S. markets, and capital for economic development” could be on the 
agenda of the Caracas Conference.
45
 The outcome has shown that the economic 
arrangements for Latin American nations were overshadowed by the anti-communism 
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resolution. This has proved that the U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America during 
the Eisenhower administration interlaced economic development in Latin America 
with the U.S. national security agenda, but how much of a priority economic 
development or national security should be given depended on the context and 
bureaucratic dedications. 
 
With Eisenhower, Nixon and Humphrey being present at a Cabinet Meeting on 26
th
 
February 1954, Dulles presented his strong stands against the communism even 
though he had recognized Latin American needs for economic assistance. The 
significance of this meeting revealed that Dulles perceived communism as “an 
international conspiracy” rather than as “an indigenous movement”. Meanwhile, he 
reassured the economic assistance might be given to Latin America yet “no action 
should be taken with regard to wool imports until Congress acts on the pending 
Presidential proposal and that no attempt would be made to establish controls over the 
price of coffee”.46 Eisenhower did not even say a word about Dulles’ anti-communist 
resolution, much less oppose his proposal. In addition, he considered that nationalism 
and communism was different. The communism defined by the White House was the 
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“subversive activities” potentially infiltrated by the Soviet communism, not the local 
nationalism.
47
  
 
The problem with the U.S. foreign policy was that the White House recognized the 
fundamental differences between the Soviet communism and the indigenous 
movement but Latin America was often treated as an area of Soviet infiltration. In 
reaching to Dulles’ anti-communist resolution, which has been made on the balance of 
probabilities, I note two important points. First and foremost, the area is taken into 
U.S. national security concern when the U.S. and Latin America collide, especially in 
the economic domain. Second, Latin American nationalization triggers a series of 
debates on compensation but failure to pay reasonable indemnity escalates into 
economic conflicts. Then, the communism agenda is fermented into the political 
domain when the economic disputes arise. As a result, the communism issue is highly 
politicized by the leading U.S. diplomats. My generalization closely corresponds to 
the property rights approach that could be developed in Argentina, Bolivia and 
Guatemala. Argentina and Bolivia fit in the paradigm of cooperation; however, 
Guatemala fits in the paradigm of confrontation.     
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Argentina  
As an ideological construct, Perónism was based on the grassroots forces from the 
emerging working class. A series of social reforms aimed to incorporate urban 
working class and rural poor inhabitants into an inclusive society. There was mass 
migration of over a million people from the deprived places to Buenos Aires in the 
1930s and 1940s. These migrants were longing for employment but most of them 
undertook low-skilled work such as in factories and meat-packing plants.
48
 The rise 
of popular support from the working class formed a political power and became the 
new cornerstone of the Argentine identity. In analysing Perón’s political discourse, 
Deborah L. Berhó offers metaphorical understanding of Perón’s speeches. “Politics is 
work” found an echo in the most working-class stratum of Buenos Aires, with some 
notable expressions like: 
El bienestar, la abundancia, y azln lafelicidad delpueblo, no es obra de un 
gobierno ... sino elproducto de la accidn delpueblo mismo. [The well-being, 
abundance, and even the happiness of the people are not the work of the 
government ... but the product of the action of the people themselves] and ... la 
renta delpals esproducto del trabajo ... [... the country's profits are the product of 
work...]
49
 
     
Working-class people harbour their identification with the national development 
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impelled by the metaphorical expressions. This is indeed the driving force to shape 
the Argentine identity and thus to strengthen Perón’s political power. In the 1946 
presidential election, Perón won the presidency due to the popular support from the 
working-class people. Perón’s two national objectives, social justice and economic 
independence, were the political calls for populist politics. The Instituto Argentino 
para la Promocion del Intercambio (IAPI) was a good example of state control trade 
network where the traditional farmers sell agricultural commodities to the IAPI. Next, 
the IAPI collect the agricultural products and sell them overseas. The revenues will be 
used in the specific state-sponsored enterprise and national development and the 
political technocrats will take the lead in achieving modernization. Peron identified 
himself as a 'Third Position' between capitalism and communism; however, economic 
statism was a clear contour of local nationalism.
50
 
 
Perón’s statist approach also triggered a bureaucratic conflict between the IAPI 
Director, Miguel Miranda and the Minister of War, General Humberto Sosa Molina. 
Sosa Molina’s faction represented one of the centrifugal forces on the implementation 
of state-control economy within Perón’s inner circle. The 41st U.S. ambassador to 
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Argentina, James Bruce and his assistant, Guy Ray, found that the ‘moderate’ Perónist 
might tilt the balance in Truman’s non-intervention’s favour. Unlike his predecessor 
(Braden), Bruce did not want to launch a public attack on Perón that might lead to 
accusation of intervention by the Argentines. Bruce’s tactic was to use the Argentine 
military man such as Sosa Molina to alienate Miranda from Perón’s main coalition 
since he contemplated that a public attack on Perón would not result in the downfall 
of statism but facilitate a nationalist backlash. Hence, the ‘Bruce Plan’, as labelled by 
British journalists, was to undermine the IAPI that might call for the nationalization of 
the Standard Oil Company in December 1947 and to provide small arms sales to the 
military as a sign to strengthen relations with the Argentine Army that might possibly 
trigger a political pressure to isolate Miranda from the central Perónist. Miranda was 
formally discharged from his position from the end of January 1949. Perón’s decision 
to appoint Bramulgia after Miranda and Maroglio accentuates his flexible application 
on the statist economic approach.
51
 
 
The essence of Perónism in the economic aspect intensified the notion of government 
intervention in managing economic resources that came to be the incarnation of the 
New Deal legacy during the Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) administration. However, 
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his modification of the statist economic approach should not have been likened to the 
New Deal policy because of the different social context. Ernesto Semán provides 
insight into political leadership, arguing Perón is a political opportunist who “would 
claim any identity that he considered politically profitable at the time”. To understand 
Perónist identity, the New Deal indeed presented some concepts such as “freedom, 
government intervention, some forms of subordination of property rights”.52 Perón’s 
statist approach turned out to be a pyrrhic victory for the Argentines since the 
agriculture-based economy could not be transformed by increasing public work 
projects. This would definitely incur unnecessary governmental expenditure. Other 
than that, the New Deal programs were designed to cope with the Economic Crisis in 
1929. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority not only solved the regional soil 
erosion but also generated electricity to meet the increasing consumption provided by 
Westinghouse and General Electric.
53
 The Perón coalition did not cover such a huge 
regional well-being issue, nor did its social institution fulfil the functions. Perón’s 
anti-U.S. propaganda during the early stage of his first term as a President was a 
strong manifestation against the framework of modernization but the lack of capital 
for the second Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) made him reduce the level of anti-U.S. 
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propaganda.
54
 From my viewpoint, Perón’s shift successfully reaches a cross-out 
point with the vision of U.S. modernizers, making the domestic setting accordant with 
the global setting. This contributes to the paradigm of cooperation but the coalesced 
context does not reflect causal factors between the Argentine society and Perónism in 
the U.S. global setting. Hence, this opens a wider debate on the concept of Perónism.  
 
U.S. bureaucrats perceived Perónism as fascism or communism. Braden, who was the 
U.S. ambassador to Argentina in 1945, suspected that Argentine officialdoms, 
including President Ramon S. Castillo and foreign minister Enrique Ruiz Guinazu, 
had contacts with some military officials in the Axis Powers.
55
 The image of 
communism lingered prior to Perón's first term (1946-1952).
56
 Braden also launched 
a propaganda campaign in the U.S., the Blue Book on Argentina: Consultation Among 
the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation, to weaken Perón's 
prestige during the presidential election in 1946.
57
 The American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) representative to Latin America, Serafino Romualdi, expressed his viewpoints 
of Argentine state intervention in Foreign Affairs after his return from Latin America. 
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He indicated that strong state intervention in labour conflicts gives rise to the increase 
of the minimum wage by law and the prescribed jobs are entitled to some bonuses 
every year.
58
 In most of Latin America, the basic problem arose from the production 
of wealth not the “distribution of wealth”.59 This suggests that Perónism, as a method 
of economic policy, does not increase labour production. Rather, it is to achieve 
welfare state status by governmental revenue. In other words, Perón increases 
governmental spending to advance labour’s position in the society without adequate 
revenue or labour capital. 
 
According to NIE 66, Perón appealed to the labour class by the political call: “social 
justice, economic independence, and political sovereignty” yet the current economic 
prospects worsened by the governmental expenditure of social welfare policy at the 
cost of agriculture. Perón’s economic policy has made Argentina a debt nation that 
reached almost 2.5 times since 1945. Even though the ideological intensification of 
“Third Position” competed with the U.S. for leadership throughout Latin America, 
Perón’s foreign policy known as “labor attachés” has not reached much fruitful 
outcomes. However, Perón had close contact with the MNR; therefore, they 
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developed similar local nationalism which incorporates the working class into 
society.
60
 In need of financial support for his second Five-Year Plan, Perón reduced 
the level of anti-American sentiment as a political distraction from the deterioration of 
the economy. As a result, he agreed to make more efforts against communists and to 
compensate the American and Foreign Power Company (AFP) if the indemnifications 
the provincial authorities made were inadequate.
61
  
 
From 1944 to 1946, the AFP had tried to claim the nationalized subsidiaries in the 
provincial courts as the AFP considered the compensation was not enough to cover 
the loss. The case though taken to the Supreme Court in 1946, the result still stood 
(rejection). The AFP was aware that the nationalized properties would be used to 
generate more energy capacity within the framework of the First Five-Year Plan. The 
AFP’s investments in Argentina came to a halt in 1946, hoping that the Argentine 
government could take over the rest of the properties since it would need to compete 
with the Argentine government.
62
 All follow-ups were suspended until the 
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Ambassador, Albert F. Nufer, met Perón on 3
rd
 September 1953. Nufer mentioned the 
AFP’s problem with local government in Mendoza. President Perón agreed to resume 
the negotiations about the expropriated company’s properties. He proposed a better 
investment law for foreign investors, along with the Argentine state oil agency, 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF). Based on this, the Argentine Supreme Courts 
would reassess the values of properties with wider participation of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).
63
 
 
This meeting was a catalyst for the betterment of Argentine-U.S. relations as it 
provided a cross-out point between the conservative nationalist and the U.S. 
modernizer. From 1946 to 1952, the local identity of Perónism challenged the 
conceptual framework of modernization but it did not succeed. The meeting helps us 
gain a better insight into Perón’s policy change. First, “Third Position” was neither 
with communism nor with the U.S. Perónism was viewed as a local nationalism from 
labor support within the Inter-American system. The cooperation with the U.S. on the 
anti-communism agenda meant that U.S.-Argentine relations were not continually 
bound by one ideology. Second, Perón’s disposition to work with the U.S. on the YPF 
project indicated that he could compromise economic sovereignty and loosen the oil 
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requirements for private U.S. capital. This proved to be a sign of embracing 
modernization visions. Third, Perón’s consent to help the AFP with the provincial 
authorities in Mendoza suggested that the judiciary was defected if not sound – 
depending upon the Argentine Executive probably.
64
  
 
Bolivia  
In April 1952, the MNR won the National Revolution, undertaking sweeping changes 
in social reforms, including women suffrage and nationalization of the tin mines. The 
latter served as the remarkable political objective that the MNR achieved. Prior to the 
revolution, the Bolivian economy had been dominated by the Patiño, Hochschild and 
Aramayo. Despite Bolivia’s sovereign rights, the Bolivian government could not have 
the so-called ‘economic independence’ and effectively exercise political governance. 
Charles H. Weston Jr. argues the “National Revolution” epitomized the integration 
process, which consisted of the Indians, middle-class, miners, workers and elites. This 
approach reshaped the Bolivian identities based upon its vision of modernity. 
Therefore, the National Revolution underlined the political ramifications of social 
tensions against economic inequalities imposed by foreign enterprises. It is the 
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socio-economic context that facilitates the surge of local nationalism.
65
 
 
The U.S. response to the Bolivian Revolution was not fierce, nor did it have a 
concrete idea of local development. In reviewing Bolivian history, the first Nationalist 
Revolutionary Movement led by the MNR in 1943 was depicted as Nazism by the 
State Department. The Villarroel regime was followed by a smear campaign circling 
in the U.S. Government. Walter Lippman, who was a famous political reporter, 
commented that “the Putsch had been prepared by a conspiratorial group whose 
leaders were in contact with Berlin”.66 The U.S. constructed the image completely 
from its World War II experience and projected onto the whole of Latin America. The 
image was created to understand the complexities of the world in an approach of the 
reductionism and has been replaced by a new image out of fear and distrust of 
international communism within the Cold War narrative.
67
 The image of communism 
was not used so often until Paz Estenssoro’s return as President in 1952 during which 
agrarian reform to nationalize the tin industry was the hottest issue around the circles 
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of tin barons.
68
  
 
The legal effect upon the future nationalization is tremendous in terms of political and 
legal aspects. First, the idea behind it underlines the potential conflict between U.S. 
identity and Bolivian identity; that is to say, state control of economy prevents the 
inflow of private investments - the very antithesis of capitalism. Second, as far as 
international law is concerned, Surya P. Subedi provides the “Hull formula” for 
compensation in the host countries. The idea of “prompt, adequate and effective” 
compensation is necessary if the nationalisation is not for “a public purpose” but there 
is no universal principle of “prompt, adequate and effective” upon compensation.69 
On one hand, foreign investors generally accept a widespread belief that full value 
compensation requires interest and a reasonable rate for current land value. On the 
other hand, the host nation might try to invoke the Calvo Doctrine to protect their 
political sovereignty. There is much wiggle room with regard to political negotiation. 
On what legal grounds should the host state invoke nationalization? What legal 
resolutions should be used for the compensation process?
70
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This gap between the principle and the practice for compensation remained disputed 
in the 1950s. In most cases, the compensation process involved outstanding issues 
such as property valuation, insurable interest and potential loss. For most Americans, 
the conception of ‘just compensation’ originates from the Fifth Amendment – a 
well-known principle accepted in revolutionary and colonial America.
71
 If a case was 
postponed or unresolved by the local authority, the role of U.S. government in the 
nationalization process was important. One month before the nationalization, the 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, skilfully created economic tension against the 
Bolivian nationalization. He explained the U.S. position: 
If the Bolivian Government could pay prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation upon nationalization, [tin] contract would probably have to contain 
broad escape clause giving RFC [Reconstruction Finance Corporation] right to 
terminate contract or stop purchases upon nationalization.
72
 
 
As a diplomatic technique, economic tension also included a propaganda campaign 
organized by tin barons in the U.S. The private and public network is the key to 
understanding the truth of politics in the event of compensation. Patiño, Hochschild, 
and Aramayo paid the Nathanson Brothers, a public relations firm, to launch a 
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campaign against the Bolivian nationalization.
73
 Bolivian ambassador, Victor 
Andrade, revealed that Stanley Ross (a newsman), who had been writing much about 
the communist movement in Bolivia, tried to sell the information to Andrade before 
publishing. Andrade engaged much in U.S. public relations to counterattack any 
smear campaign that might possibly hurt U.S.-Bolivian relations. Andrade, while 
being in the U.S., denied any allegation that Bolivia had any financial connection with 
the Soviet communism. Moreover, his personal network with U.S. officialdoms also 
helps a lot in achieving a settlement of compensation in further arbitration 
processes.
74
 
 
It is apparent that the Bolivian investors could gain an agreeable settlement on 
compensation by leveraging further tin contracts. In fact, the U.S. has been the main 
market for the Bolivian tin exports since the Korean War. There has turned out to be 
continuing demand for the domestic tin outlet which provides the U.S. an opportunity 
to employ tin purchasing contracts as quid pro quo for the compensation settlement.
75
 
By comparison with Guatemala, Bolivia was taken - if not forced - to a negotiation at 
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the national level thanks to Victor Andrade. In a Telegram from the State Department 
to Andrade, Andrade agreed that the Inter-American Convention for Arbitration 
Pecuniary Claims should be the foundation for further compensation. Both 
governments agreed to submit the case to the Arbitral Tribunal (one from the Bolivian 
government, one from the U.S. and the President from the International Court of 
Justice). This decision would stand effective and therefore the general principle in 
international law – ‘the exhaustion of local remedies’– could not contradict thereof.76  
 
James F. Siekmeier has developed ambassador’s individual influence to convince U.S. 
congressmen and the public that the Bolivian Revolution was not a communism 
conspiracy. However, his work does not analyse much on the compensation process, 
which triggers distinct entities between the U.S. and Bolivia.
77
 Paying “prompt, 
adequate and effective” compensation indeed realized the modernization vision yet it 
widened the gap within the MNR factions. It is indeed political and social issues that 
facilitate the compensation process rather than international law perspective. 
Ambassador’s individual influence in this case has an enormous effect upon U.S. 
attitude while Guatemala by contrast represents political and economic confrontations 
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within the Cold War narrative. 
 
Guatemala  
The overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz in 1954 marked a high point throughout the Western 
Hemisphere which justifies U.S. intervention policy in the event of alleged contact 
with international communism. The CIA involvement in the covert action against the 
Árbenz government presented Eisenhower’s reassertion of an anti-communism 
principle linking to Moscow that had been addressed during the Tenth Inter-American 
Conference.
78
 Followed by the Cold War narrative, Rabe has contended that the 
USSR would take advantage of the uncertainties of economic and security issues in 
Latin America that “the Truman administration had neglected”. Thus, Latin America 
was incorporated into Eisenhower’s global strategy against international communism. 
According to NSC 144/1, one course of action was to promote a climate conducive 
for private investment and to reduce the level of communist threat or possible 
anti-U.S. elements in Latin America.
79
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In Guatemala, Jacobo Árbenz undertook power from March 1951 with a strong 
determination to carry out agrarian reforms (it was officially implemented on 26
th
 
February 1953). The U.S. again unfolded its foreign policy by propaganda machinery 
simply classifying the reform movement in Guatemala as the representation of 
communism. Ambassador Guillermo Toriello Garrido of Guatemala was worried 
about the meaning of this policy being distorted by “Our Times” as a communist. John 
Moors Cabot replied it “was not an official government publication”. 80  Being 
diplomatic, Cabot did not ease Toriello’s doubts, much less answer his question. 
Cabot, in his trip to Latin America, was contemptuous of the Guatemalan Foreign 
Minister saying “he’s a complete jackass who talked endlessly without making any 
sense”.81 In a talk with President Árbenz, John Peurifoy, who was U.S. ambassador to 
Guatemala, determinately believed that “if he [Árbenz admitted] is not a communist, 
he will certainly do until one comes along”.82 Through the previous two case studies, 
I summarize that Guatemala was depicted as a communist traveller by Washington 
bureaucratic ideologues from early 1953 to the end of 1953. Similar to Argentina and 
                                                        
80 Foreign Relations of the United States, The American Republics, “Memorandum of Conversation, 
by John W. Fisher 1 of the Office of Middle American Affairs,” in Historical Documents, FRUS 
1952-1954, Vol. IV, March 25th, 1953. 
81  John Moors Cabot, First Line of Defense: Forty Years’Experiences of a Career Diplomat 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown School of Foreign Service, 1971), p. 87.   
82 Foreign Relations of the United States, The American Republics, “The Ambassador in Guatemala 
(Peurifoy) to the Department of State,” in Historical Documents, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IV, December 
17th, 1953. 
 - 106 - 
 
Bolivia, the U.S. described Latin American nationalism as communism by means of 
the public and bureaucratic propaganda.  
 
The UFCO had very strong connections with the public relations in the U.S. prior to 
the Guatemalan coup d’état. Its headquarters was located in Massachusetts where 
Henry C. Lodge served as a Senator and John McCormack served as Representative. 
Both worked ardently for the UFCO as lobbyists during the Truman administration. 
They did not emphasize their ties with the UFCO to the public. Rather, they did what 
Edward Bernays often said to the public that “they presented the facts, letting the cold 
war ethos do the influencing for them”. 83  From 1953 onwards, the 
business-bureaucratic network broadened; Allen Dulles, who was the CIA Director, 
had been a partner with Sullivan and Cromwell. John Cabot, who was the Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs in 1953, had a large amount of stock in the UFCO. 
Thomas Dudley Cabot, who was Cabot’s brother, was the Chief Executive Officer of 
the UFCO. Sinclair Weeks, the director of the bank, was the Secretary of Commerce. 
Being professional lobbyists also exercised much bureaucratic influence in the 
conduct of foreign policy. Communism was nothing more than propaganda that the 
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bureaucrats employed with a view to selling to the public.
84
 
 
I further argue that communism was not the sole account that resulted in the 
Guatemalan coup d’état. In addition, it was Árbenz’s determination to nationalize the 
UFCO’s properties in Guatemala that triggered the covert operation. Because of the 
nationalization policy, the Guatemalan government and the UFCO could not reach a 
consensus in terms of indemnification practice. For the Guatemalan government, it is 
the Agrarian Reform in 1953 which changed the long-standing economic structure 
dominated by the UFCO. From the Western perspective, the UFCO perceived that the 
expropriation of private lands was almost impossible and thus it would be considered 
unlawful. However, the concept of “adequate, effective and prompt compensation” is 
the traditional Western view in the event of expropriation. This principle, known as 
the Hull Formula, was applied in the Mexico compensation in 1938 and has become a 
universal principle to cover all compensation cases since then.
85
 The UFCO tried to 
appeal to the Guatemalan Supreme Court but this case was turned down on 18
th
 
March 1953.
86
 Seeking a local remedy epitomizes the practice of international law 
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but apparently the UFCO did not consider that the Guatemalan government offered an 
equal treatment in terms of the legal system. The central issue is whether the legal 
institution of the Guatemalan government functions similar to the counterpart of the 
U.S. government. The dispute of valuing the expropriated land is the main cause that 
drives the two parties into a high level of conflict. 
 
The Guatemalan Government agreed to pay the UFCO “$627,572 in bonds, based on 
United Fruit’s declared tax value of the land” but the UFCO considered that they had 
undervalued the expropriated land. The compensation that the Guatemalan 
Government could offer was “about $2.99 per acre while the Department of State 
wanted over $2.99 per acre”. The UFCO employed lobbying influence within the U.S. 
politics until Árbenz was overthrown.
87
 According to the Aide-Memoire on 28
th
 
August 1953, the State Department resorted to International law based on the Case of 
P.W. Shufeldt 1928: 
[Decree No. 1544 - Guatemala] may be quite true from a national point of view 
but not from an international point of view for it is a settled principle of 
international law that a sovereign cannot be permitted to set up one of his own 
municipal laws as a bar to a claim by a foreign sovereign for a wrong done to the 
latter’s subject.88 
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There was a huge gap between the Case of P.W. Shufeldt 1928 and the compensation 
policy in Guatemala. The case has set a precedent that the general principle of ‘soft 
law’ in international law is more applicable to claiming compensation than any 
municipal law. The Guatemalan government argued the contract in 1922 was invalid 
since the Legislative Assembly did not approve it. However, the American claimant, 
Shufeldt, acted upon his contractual rights until the 22
nd
 May 1928. The Arbitrator, Sir 
Herbert Sisnett, recognized that Shufeldt’s compliance with the contract had already 
constituted a valid contract. The Guatemalan President issued the decree on 7
th
 July 
1928 that was tantamount to the deprivation of his contractual rights. Finally, the 
Arbitrator concluded that Shufeldt had “the right to claim pecuniary indemnification” 
due to the “cancellation of the contract” by the Guatemalan government.89   
 
The U.S. inferred the same conclusion and principle from the Case of P.W. Shufeldt 
1928. For most Americans, they take cognizance of the property rights in the Fifth 
Amendment thereof. “Just compensation” literally means the obligation to pay 
“prompt, adequate and effective” compensation.90 The State Department, on behalf of 
the UFCO, raised the issue of “just compensation for the properties taken”. The U.S. 
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urged that the Guatemalan government negotiate with the UFCO or the U.S. 
government. Alternatively, this case should be taken to an international tribunal. 
However, the Guatemalan government did not reveal its intent as to which methods it 
considered proper to resolve the issues.
91
 In my analysis, the interrelation between 
economic activities and social behaviour outlines the cultural differences. It is a 
general belief that the U.S. and the U.K. belong to a common law system while most 
Latin American states use a civil law system. This interpretation is too simplified 
because the fundamental issue behind this is that the pecuniary indemnification made 
by the Guatemalan government did not live up to the inherent belief in the protection 
of property rights held by Americans. The compensation dispute did not reach a 
satisfactory end until the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état. 
 
The stronger the economic nationalism grows, the more fervent the ideological 
invocation – such as the Monroe Doctrine – would be employed by conservative U.S. 
bureaucrats to conquer internal contradictions. One month prior to the 1954 
Guatemalan coup d'état, the Department of State Bulletin revealed on 15
th
 May 1954 
that the Guatemalan government was believed to import armaments from the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by the ship Alfhelm. The armaments would be 
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unloaded at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala.
92
 At the 199
th
 meeting of the NSC, Secretary 
Dulles considered that “Guatemala’s military establishment was three times as large 
as the military establishments of all its neighbors put together”. The import of arms 
from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was viewed as an aggression in Latin 
America. Bureaucrats, who participated in the meeting, urged to revise the current 
policy.
93
 
 
The 199
th
 NSC meeting was top of the NSC agenda as demonstrated by the presence 
of the following bureaucrats to review the integrated policy. The Attorney General, 
Herbert Brownell, Jr., suggested sending someone to discuss the matter with the New 
York Times to justify U.S. adjustment. Moreover, he proposed all suspected vessels 
should not be stopped in the high sea because international law had no merit in the 
high sea. Allen Dulles suspected that ammunition might not be simply imported from 
the Iron Curtain, and probably some countries also supplied the arms secretly. Stassen 
instructed that the Monroe Doctrine should be expanded to prohibit shipment of 
weapons to Latin American countries.
94
 For example, Dulles and Stassen both used 
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the Monroe Doctrine to stress that Latin America was under the American influence 
against international communism. The metaphorical communication suggested 
American morality and legality to protect Latin America from the communist threat.  
The NSC 5419/1 made the Guatemalan government the infiltration of communism in 
the Hemisphere, concluding the importation of armaments from Czechoslovakia “as 
an armed attack against all American states under Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Rio 
Treaty, and constitutes an imminent threat to the security of the United States”.95 The 
Guatemalan case represented the eradication of a purported communist regime in 
Latin America. This has served as a legal ground for the U.S. intervention in 
Guatemala through a covert action. The ideological impulse strengthened U.S. 
morality and reaffirmed the stable visions of modernization maintained by the U.S. 
Soon after Carlos Castillo Armas took power in military junta, a General Agreement 
for Technical Cooperation was signed between the U.S. and Guatemala on 2
nd
 
September 1954.
96
 The Armas regime was very tough regarding communism and he 
was also very much pro-U.S. This again provided a stable political environment for 
the current businesses in Guatemala. But the question is did this pro-U.S. regime 
really care about Latin American welfare and economic development? 
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U.S. Foreign Policy after the Guatemalan coup d’état   
James C. Hagerty, who was responsible for Eisenhower’s press, revealed 
Eisenhower’s response to the overthrow of the Árbenz regime by the CIA. Shortly 
before the press conference on 30
th
 June 1954, Hagerty recapped his conversation 
with Dulles:  
Dulles said that the President could take great satisfaction from the trend of 
events in Guatemala where Red agents and fellow travellers were fleeing the 
country. He [Dulles] suggested that the President say that the Guatemalans were 
resuming to take charge of their own affairs.
97
  
 
Readers might wonder what Eisenhower actually said about the Guatemalans since 
Dulles simply reported what he knew; however, this suggests that Dulles had a strong 
personal connection with Eisenhower. In examining Eisenhower’s News Conference 
on 30
th
 June 1954, Eisenhower was asked about the communist beat-down in 
Guatemala by Norman Carignan, who represented the Associated Press: “I wonder if 
you would give us your views on the significance of what we have witnessed 
[communists] there, the struggle that we have witnessed there?”98 Eisenhower replied 
that “you have asked me a different kind of a question; the significance could be very 
deep, it could be very local. I think it has not yet been analyzed carefully enough so 
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that we know all of its significance”.99 
 
Eisenhower did not provide any local information about the communism in 
Guatemala, nor did he convince the news media by the hard evidence. He tactfully 
passed the buck to Dulles in his conversation through circular logic saying that: 
I understand Secretary Dulles is going on the air this evening to give a rather full 
explanation of the whole occurrence, as we understand it. I did hear this morning 
my report was that the Communists and their great supporters were leaving 
Guatemala. If I would try to conceal the fact that that gives me great satisfaction, 
I would be just deceitful. Of course it has given me great satisfaction.
100
 
 
There were two problems in Eisenhower’s words during the President’s Conference. 
First and foremost, the Guatemalan coup d’état took place from 18th to 27th June 1954 
that was prior to the President's News Conference on 30
th
 June 1954. There were a 
series of formal and informal meetings about the CIA activities in Guatemala before 
the Guatemalan coup d’état. Information was substantial but evidence was incomplete. 
The problem was not the Árbenz’s regime infiltrated by the international communism 
but his political intent to form an alliance between his government and the 
Communist Party, with the latter affiliated with the labour confederation. They 
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demonstrated strong determination to implement the Agrarian Reform.
101
 Second, 
searching through many NSC meetings, Eisenhower relied heavily on certain 
bureaucrats such as Dulles for advice. In addition to the NSC, the CIA was authorized 
by the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to conduct the covert operation 
(code-named Operation PBSUCCESS). To integrate related agencies under 
Eisenhower’s command, the PSB was replaced by the Operations Coordinating Board 
in accordance with the Executive Order 10483. The chairman of the Board would be 
the Under Secretary of State, who represented the DOS.
102
 Dulles should have been 
aware of all the covert operation procedures. If not, what were other covert actions 
during the Eisenhower administration? For example, when Eisenhower met the 
Churchill government to discuss the wily nationalist regime governed by Mohammad 
Mosaddegh, Churchill made a speech in the Commons saying “the British lion was 
being poked at and shoved” in Iran and Eisenhower only said “Girded by 
Guatemala!” 103  Presumably, Eisenhower could have been aware of the covert 
operation when taking his office in 1953. This was known for the Iranian coup d'état 
in 1953. 
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The covert operation was a unique mechanism in the foreign policy domain. To define 
whether it is a formal or informal foreign policy mechanism, one needs to know the 
OCB was interdepartmental but the CIA was in charge of the policy operation for 
most of the time. Because of the secrecy, it could clear unnecessary disputes from 
other participating bodies. The covert operation incurred the DOS objections at its 
earliest planning stage. According to the review in 1952, the DOS found it 
“improbable that the Communists will gain direct control over the policy of any Latin 
American state, at least during the next several years. The Soviet Union had no 
presence in Guatemala”.104 As a result of this, Allen Dulles, when given “extremely 
high operational priority”, determined to overthrow Árbenz and completely controlled 
the action lest further objections from the DOS would arise.
105
 In this regard, 
Huntington’s claim to the tensions between American ideals and foreign policy 
institutions can explain this political phenomenon.
106
 Most bureaucrats recognized 
that cleavage but accepted it. Bureaucrats articulated different political values in 
foreign policy goals and tried to build a pro-American nation by different methods.  
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After the Guatemalan coup d’état, some bureaucrats pursued different values in the 
foreign policy domain. At the 212
th
 meeting of NSC, Stassen perceived that the 
Eximbank and the International Bank should liberate their loan restrictions, and make 
more public funds to Latin America. His assumption was that the economic conditions 
in Latin America would improve as a consequence of U.S. public funds. Based on a 
favourable climate, private capital would be more attractive. Smith, who represented 
the DOS, agreed with Stassen but his concern was that Congress was prudent with the 
appropriation of money. However, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew N. 
Overby, dissented from Stassen’s ideas, especially public loans from the Eximbank 
and the International Bank. Overby argued that both banks could only finance 
economic projects in Latin America, rather than make public loans to the countries.
107
 
 
NSC 5432/1, issued on 3
rd
 September 1954, was a compromise between the FOA and 
the DOT. This new policy document superseded NSC 5419/1 and NSC 144/1. NSC 
5432/1 was the combination of U.S. economic policy and rethinking of the communist 
threat in terms of the security line. This document has repeated the threat of 
communism in Latin American states and U.S. commitments against communism 
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according to Resolution 93 of the 10th Inter-American Conference. To maintain 
security in America, the U.S. would not only seek support from the OAS as collective 
security but also resort to unilateral action as sanctions.
108
  
 
NSC 5432/1 has also set a brief guidance to promote trade and investment policy. 
Interestingly, the U.S. mentioned broadening a variety of cooperation with Latin 
America such as labor, business, agriculture, finance and technical fields. In addition, 
the document recommended that the U.S. gradually lower tariffs and barriers on 
certain goods with a view to the trading policies toward Latin America. The 
Eximbank could provide loans on the condition the loan is:  
(1) in the interests of both the U.S. and the borrowing country, (2) within the 
borrower’s capacity to repay, and (3) within the Bank’s lending capacity and 
charter powers, be prepared to assure such financing of all sound economic 
development projects, for which private capital or IBRD financing is not 
available.
109
 
 
NSC 5432/1 reflected Stassen’s and Humphrey’s ideas. Eisenhower’s role in the 
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formal policy mechanism became clear. As an arbiter, Eisenhower juxtaposed both 
bureaucrats’ viewpoints with the NSC 5432/1. In my analysis, I do not think 
Eisenhower exercised much his presidential power to persuade in this scenario. 
However, Eisenhower would have the final say on trade policy and any soft loan to 
Latin American countries. The economic development through developmental loans 
should not go against U.S. foreign policy goals and U.S. interests in Latin America. 
Could the U.S. political values articulated in NSC 5432/1 really fit in most Latin 
American societies?  How much could this bureaucratic advice sustain the political 
reality in Latin America within the Cold War context? This brings us to the next 
chapter in order to discuss the U.S. interaction with the Latin American nations with 
the Soviet ideology. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Soviet Economic Offensive: A Stimulus to Public Funds 
 
The Cold War was initially constructed while the Soviet Union was engaging its 
power across Eastern Europe after the Second World War. With the Soviet domination 
of Eastern Europe and the formation of NATO, the international system was 
conspicuously polarized by the U.S. and Soviet Union. The conflict was not limited to 
the European continent but throughout the Third World. Therefore, tensions arose as 
long as either side undertook propaganda in a global context. Chapter Three proposes 
that the expanding Soviet economic activities in the underdeveloped countries 
challenged the U.S. ‘trade and aid’ policy which raises the reappraisal of security 
concerns. The increase in Soviet trade with the underdeveloped countries would not 
limit U.S. economic foreign policy. Rather, it represented an impulse to consider a 
shift in policy and challenged the U.S. commitments in neutral countries. The Soviet 
economic approach was determined by an ideological narrative, which served as a 
political propaganda with the purported intents to influence the emerging nations 
through trade expansion and military assistance. 
 
It is assumed that Eisenhower’s strategic conception against the Soviet communism 
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lay in the traditional values of the American society - economic growth, military 
strength, divine individualism and Republicanism - to maintain world peace. In other 
words, he perceived the American society as an organism of unity. Others should 
champion these values and work towards world peace. These basic values were 
clearly addressed at the Annual State of the Union message on 6
th
 January 1955 by 
Eisenhower.
1
 This strategic conception was also applied to the Hemisphere. 
Eisenhower uttered in 1955: 
Just as nations of this Hemisphere, in the historic Caracas and Rio conferences, 
have closed ranks against imperialistic Communism and strengthened their 
economic ties, so free nations elsewhere have forged new bonds of unity.
2
 
 
In this context, Eisenhower emphasized the importance of the collective defence 
traditionally bound with the Rio Conference and the 10
th
 Inter-American Conference 
in Caracas even though President Eisenhower did not invoke the Monroe Doctrine as 
often as Dulles did. However, Eisenhower’s words per se were very close to Kennan’s 
containment policy. Latin America was incorporated into the global context against 
the Soviet communism; the Soviet communism was presented to the public as fait 
accompli. What are the connections between the Soviet communism and local 
communism? 
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According to a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report on 6
th
 December 1955, 
this point was mentioned one month before the SEO propaganda but the connection 
between the Soviet communism and the local communism was ill-defined. It 
reassured the Congress position in 1952, which confirms “the Communists have no 
present prospect of gaining control of any Latin American state by electoral means, 
nor even of gaining direct participation in national politics equal to that which they 
formerly enjoyed in Guatemala”.3 For the Soviet communism, the document on the 
other hand has found: 
The USSR and its Satellites have shown a markedly increased interest in Latin 
America in recent years. This has been reflected in a great increase in 
Communist-sponsored trips of Latin Americans to Communist countries, an 
expansion of Soviet Bloc diplomatic representation, and a growing interest in 
expanding trade, including arms.
4
 
 
In short, Latin America had been the potential target prior to the SEO. The Soviet 
tactic to expand its influence was not limited to the military arms but to the 
international trade and diplomatic ties. The connection between the two was the issue 
whether the Soviet communism could advance a nationalist aspiration in local Latin 
America through the different offers provided by the Soviet communism. In fact, the 
Executive had buttressed the position that any infiltration or subversion from the 
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Soviet threat was probable while Congress had considered that there was fat chance 
for the local communism to gain the power and reach ideological convergence with 
the Soviet Union in the global context. 
 
The White House was still suspicious of the Soviet motives and its new offer to the 
underdeveloped nations one month after the SEO. According to the memorandum by 
the NSC Planning Board on 13
th
 February 1956, the Planning Board acknowledged 
the technological progress would cause “a serious short- and long-term challenge” but 
also recognized the focus shifted to the underdeveloped nations and the Soviet pursuit 
to reach convergence of “local aspirations” to “foster trends toward neutralism”.5 The 
memorandum recommended that: 
The current Communist political, economic and diplomatic offensive, involving 
widespread offers of technical, developmental and military assistance on a ‘trade 
not aid’ basis, both bilaterally and through UN agencies, confronts the United 
States with one of its most serious challenges. Despite substantial assistance 
programs, the United States has not succeeded to date in developing an 
affirmative sense of community of interests with the underdeveloped countries. 
Hence their complex drives for improved conditions and status are effectively 
exploited by the new Communist offensive.
 6
 
The focus point was what attitudes the U.S. took towards the underdeveloped 
countries. Did the U.S. government treat them differently or alike?  Did the U.S. 
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government literally prioritize the underdeveloped countries and what Latin America 
should be put under? According to NSC 5602/1, the document, finalized on 15
th
 
March 1956, outlined a national security that was intended to prioritize the 
underdeveloped countries. It affirmatively emphasized that “the United States cannot 
afford the loss to Communist extremism of constructive nationalist and reform 
movements in colonial areas in Asia and Africa”.7 As for Latin America, the U.S. 
placed a different emphasis, which continues economic growth in some Latin 
American nations. It is suggested that the NSC 5602/1 perceived Asia and Africa as 
two areas susceptible to the international communism. However, Latin America was 
considered as an area for the framework of modernization. Altogether, the White 
House prioritized Asia and Africa in its foreign policy agenda in the face of the Soviet 
communism whereas Latin America was given the economic priority rather than the 
Soviet communism.
8
  
 
In addition, NSC 5602/1 specified that the Executive Branch should be given 
authority for the extension of any economic projects and programs “over a period of 
years”, the modification of economic programs or terms and conditions granted and 
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the flexibility in organizing foreign aid assistance.
9
 The Executive Branch was almost 
given a predominant position in the foreign aid programs and future projects for 
economic resources. From 1954 to 1955, the White House began to increase the level 
of foreign aid commitments as specified in NSC 5432/1. This contributes to 
Kaufman’s theoretical analysis in chapter three - transition from the ‘trade not aid’ 
policy to ‘trade and aid’ policy.10 The question is whether the SEO tilted the balance 
for foreign aid policy or not. This depends on whether Latin America, as part of the 
Third World, was the main target of the SEO. From the White House perspective, Asia 
and Africa was given high priority in the face of the Soviet communism. The question 
is did all bureaucrats in the Executive Branch hold that point in concert. The 
following paragraphs focus on how bureaucrats interpreted the implications of the 
SEO. 
 
Debate over Mutual Security Acts Funds 
On 7
th 
March 1956, President Eisenhower expressed his views concerning the SEO 
during a News Conference, urging for the policy reappraisal between the Executive 
Branches and Congress. In developing his strategy, he made the following points in 
response to the new economic tactics. First and foremost, the U.S. national security 
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was based on the strong military and the U.S. allies. Secondly, the economic 
assistance given to allies could buttress the desirable military development. Thirdly, 
the U.S. should be flexible with the economic aid but very discreet about the decision. 
This requires an in-depth study on foreign aid programs.
11
 Remarkably, Eisenhower 
outlined the U.S. strategy against the SEO in the public conference but mentioned 
little about Latin America. James B. Reston, who was a journalist from the New York 
Times, asked Eisenhower whether the Middle East was where the Soviets would 
proceed with the new offensive. Eisenhower’s answer was positive. This suggested 
that the Executive Branches did not consider Latin America as the main target in the 
face of the Soviets at the initial stage.
12
  
 
President Eisenhower made the SEO the theme of his message to Congress on the 
mutual security program. World peace, as he contended, was based on the military 
capacities and economic development in the free world.
13
 The Soviet move to 
strengthen trade relations was a challenge to the U.S. leadership. In response to the 
SEO, the U.S. would not only “continue to stimulate the expansion of trade and 
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investment in the free world” but also “build the productive capacities of free nations 
through public loans”.14 Eisenhower requested Congress to use the mutual security 
program for Fiscal Year 1957: 
Congress authorize appropriations of $4,672,475,000 in accordance with the 
schedule attached. In a separate letter to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, I am requesting the appropriation of $4,859,975,000 for the 
same fiscal year to cover these recommended authorizations together with 
authorizations granted but not fully used in prior years.
15
 
 
Eisenhower reaffirmed that the special funds would be given to Africa and the Middle 
East. Defined by the Mutual Security programs, $100 million should be used for 
non-military purposes. Furthermore, the President's Fund about $100 million was 
authorized and given to Asia and Eisenhower would request a further $100 million. In 
Latin America, Eisenhower concluded that the U.S. would carry on with the technical 
assistance through the Organization of American States (OAS), utilize the Mutual 
Security Program as provisional funds unless the World Bank and the Eximbank 
could not offer necessary loans in the critical situations and provide military aid (e.g. 
standardized military equipment, training and maintenance already provided).
16
 
 
Although Latin America had not been given high priority compared to Africa, the 
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Middle East and Asia, some bureaucrats tried to bring the focal point of military 
assistance in Latin America upfront to advance military interests in Latin America. On 
16th April 1956, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Robert. D. Murphy, indicated 
that military assistance, based on the reimbursable basis, would not impose any 
additional military expenditure. This approach could improve the worsening military 
relations between the U.S. and Latin America. Murphy explained that politically 
speaking the U.S. military sales and grants to Latin America could bring about 
positive effects upon sea lines of communication and strategic access to raw materials. 
Latin American nations could be best served by a reimbursable assistance program, 
which would tilt the balance for political and military interests of the U.S. in Latin 
America. Murphy’s rationale was that the U.S. supply of military assistance would 
replace the European suppliers and keep the European military influence from Latin 
America.
17
 In my view, motivated by the military interests, Murphy gave too little 
weight to whether military aid on a reimbursable basis and a modest amount of credit 
would endanger economic growth in Latin America. The tensions between economic 
development of Latin America and military aid programs to Latin America emerged 
within the U.S. foreign policy. 
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Murphy’s assumption was challenged by the USDT, Humphrey, who considered that 
Latin American nations should not purchase military equipment in excess of their 
economic capabilities to support from the very beginning of the administration. In this 
regard, Joseph M. Dodge, who was the Special Assistant to the President, provided 
some recommendations on the U.S. military assistance and economic development in 
Latin America. For the reimbursable assistance, Dodge recognized that credit and 
cash sales contributed not only to internal security in Latin America but also to 
collective security in the Hemisphere. Yet, the DOD would need to review individual 
Latin American nations and identify the outcomes the credit and cash sales could 
bring in addition to the contribution defined by the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program (MDAP). In principle, the DOD and the USDT urged Latin America to 
minimize unnecessary military expenditure. For the grant assistance, Dodge suggested 
that Nicaragua and Honduras not be considered further grant assistance because there 
was no political need for both countries. The DOD might reconsider carrying on the 
program for both countries based on an active basis.
18
 The question is what did other 
bureaucrats or agencies think about the deterioration of U.S. military assistance to 
Latin America proposed by Murphy? 
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According to a letter from Gordon Gray to Murphy, he, serving as the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, requested the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) to make an assessment on the feasibility of establishing long-term military 
aid.
19
 The JCS assessment found that the U.S. grant aid and military reimbursable 
programs would discourage Latin American countries from seeking other suppliers 
that would impact the economies in many Latin American countries. Gray uttered that 
the reimbursable aid should not be given a limit; Latin American countries did not feel 
constrained to any military facilities essential for hemisphere defence. They would 
pursue other foreign alternatives once their purchases were turned down by the U.S. 
and this is definitely opposite to military standardization. To facilitate the 
reimbursable military program, Gray suggested that each request be taken into 
account case by case given that individual Latin American states would have different 
conditions to the U.S. pricing and credit and Latin America was differently prioritized 
in accordance with the U.S. military allocation to Latin America. There would be no 
funds given to the FY 57 and therefore the fund in the FY 58 would be created 
following Gray’s submission.20 Gray and Murphy’s recommendation was crystallized 
into NSC 5613/1 on 25
th
 September 1956 paragraph 33, which says “we [the U.S.] 
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should provide the minimum military equipment, on a grant basis if necessary, 
required by Latin American governments for the maintenance of both internal security 
and hemisphere defense”.21 
 
Tensions also appeared between the Executive Branches and the JCS at the 296th 
NSC Meeting about the diplomatic sentence presented in NSC 5613/1 by the JCS. 
The original sentence had been written by the Planning Board before NSC 5613/1.  
Paragraph 16-e read as follows: 
If a Latin American state should establish with the Soviet bloc close ties of such 
a nature as seriously to prejudice our vital interests, be prepared to diminish 
governmental economic and financial cooperation with that country, when such 
action seems likely to weaken the Soviet ties; doing so, however, without 
necessarily relating those measures openly to the country’s attitude.22 
 
Eisenhower considered that the “JCS’s language used above was seemed to him 
simpler,” but he preferred to change. However, Dulles explained that the JSC’s 
languages were too broad to get the guidance across to the related authorities in 
executing the policy. For the President, he said “this issue struck him as largely a 
matter of semantics”. He and Dulles agreed to make changes: “If [conditional remains 
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same], be prepared to employ appropriate political, military and economic measures, 
in order to weaken the Soviet ties”.23 In my view, the NSC is an interdepartmental 
policy mechanism where the DOD, DOS and Congress drafted policy 
recommendations. All recommendations would go through the Planning Board for 
policy review and idea refinement prior to final approval by the President. Thus, 
policy recommendations would be coordinated and be integrated further. The SEO 
triggered a series of policy discussions where the leading bureaucrats arranged a 
policy agenda and advocated policy objectives in accordance with the organizational 
interests. The next section describes the role of Congress in the conduct of foreign 
policy as a different policy advocate.  
 
Congress’s Dedication to the Foreign Aid Program: Smathers Amendment 
Unlike the Executive approach, Congress presented concerns for social welfare of 
Latin America through the Smathers Amendment. The development fund, aiming to 
provide Latin America with a small portion of public funds to improve social 
infrastructure in addition to the DLF, was named after the Senator of Florida, George 
A. Smathers. According to R. Harrison Wagner, he showed that Congress 
demonstrated particular interest in Latin America and accentuated this in the Senate 
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Banking and Currency Committee in 1954 but members of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee just came to grips with hemispheric affairs. Smathers 
successfully convinced the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to amend the 1956 
foreign aid bill in 1956.
24
 Therefore, Congress’s attempt to promote the inflow of 
public capital to Latin America amicably accorded with Latin American requests for 
more public capital. Congress’s dedication to the foreign aid program presented one 
of the forces for public capital within the foreign policy mechanism.  
 
Tensions came to the front with the Smathers appropriation of $100,000,000 
(50,000,000 in grants and 50,000,000 in loans) for Latin America in the next five 
years. According to a memorandum on 15
th
 June 1956, Henry F. Holland, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, reaffirmed the general attitude 
of the Executive branches. He did not consider it necessary to give any loan or grant 
to Latin America. If Congress determined to appropriate more funds, it should be 
done with the “loan funds to the Eximbank and grant aid funds as a contingent fund to 
be managed by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA)”. 25 Moreover, 
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Holland acknowledged that he was yet to receive a letter clarifying different views 
between the ICA and the State, or words to that effect. This letter had been sent to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee but he was not consulted. Holland said “If they 
are as reported to me I disapprove the letter and feel it would be a serious political 
mistake to send it”.26 Holland referred to Smathers’ disposition claiming that: 
Senator Smathers is offended by the terms of the letter referred to and that he is 
determined to press his proposal. I am further advised that it might be possible to 
persuade Senator Smathers to abandon his existing proposal for something more 
reasonable such as a considerably smaller appropriation for something like 
exchanges of persons.
27
 
 
 
Smathers demonstrated his strong determination to propose a developmental fund for 
Latin America while Holland contemplated current loan funds managed by the 
Eximbank and grant aid funds administered by the ICA would be adequate. In 
Eisenhower’s foreign policy mechanism, even though tensions intensified between the 
Executive Branches and Congress, Smathers’ efforts to increase public capital to Latin 
America were never thwarted. The question is whether Smathers’ efforts were 
incorporated into Eisenhower’s policy? How did Eisenhower or other bureaucrats 
settle interdepartmental differences? 
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In the face of Smathers’ requests, Robert C. Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Congressional Relations, explained half of the developmental funds ($37,500,000 out 
of $50,000,000) “would be available for loans and the remainder for grants”. The 
DOS reaffirmed that Latin American countries seek public loans through the 
International Bank and the Eximbank, with the latter having more experienced 
personnel and more familiar loan responsibilities and procedures in Latin America. 
Hill commented that the current loans and money were sufficient to “meet all present 
and foreseeable needs during the coming fiscal year in the fields to which they 
relate”.28 As a result, the DOS suggested that any loan or contingency fund set by 
Congress be managed by the ICA. Supposing that Congress efforts could be 
incorporated into an integrated policy review, whether the Smathers Amendment 
should be managed by the Eximbank or by the ICA has become the root cause of 
interdepartmental differences. 
 
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Rubottom, identified possible economic 
needs for Latin America, beginning with a carry-over ($29 million) at the end of FY 
56 - Congress appropriated up to $37 million for FY 57. Approximately $15 million 
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would go for the Smathers Amendment in FY 58. About $108 million would be given 
to Bolivia and Guatemala. He did not estimate any appropriation for FY 59 with 
regard to the Smathers Amendment owing to its “uncertain future”. His comments 
were worthy of attention: 
It need not figure in our discussion at the moment, especially if we are successful 
in placing it under the Eximbank for administration - actually, we should not 
forget that, whoever administers it, we [U.S.] are not limited in our loan 
authority to just 75 per cent of the $15 million, but could actually loan more than 
75 per cent and up to the full amount, if we so decided.
29
 
 
The DOS expected that the Eximbank could take over the Smathers Fund while 
Congress contemplated the ICA being able to handle it. The chairman of the 
Eximbank, Sam Waugh, showed no inclination to managing the fund.
30
 The director 
of the ICA, John B. Hollister, agreed with Congress that this fund should be 
administered and put under the responsibility of ICA but he could not agree that it 
should be limited to “the kind that the Export-Import Bank is now financing”.31 On 
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30
th
 October 1956, Rubottom concluded that “the Fund would have to be administered 
by the ICA with the Eximbank acting as agent for ICA as it does in the case of other 
loans made by the latter agency”.32 From my observation, the role of Rubottom was 
much like a coordinator; the U.S. economic policy toward Latin America was 
coordinated by different agencies and joint efforts, recommendations of which were 
reviewed and refined by the Executive Branches.  
 
In a meeting with Senator Smathers on 26
th
 March 1957, Rubottom commented that 
the Administration benefited to the greatest degree from the current trade and 
investment policy. Yet, a gap has been identified because the Administration has not 
done so much for public welfare like education, health and agriculture. The U.S. 
technical cooperation program could partly bridge the gap. Another gap arising from 
Guatemala, Bolivia and Haiti has been filled by the grant aid used for specific 
purposes like emergencies or crises. Senator Smathers articulated that his program 
aimed to bridge the gap that could not be filled by loans or private capital. In addition, 
Rubottom showed that one-third of Latin American countries would be supplied by 
the agricultural assistance, P.L. 480. The U.S. would move towards “a more liberal 
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loan policy and redouble efforts to encourage responsible, honest and efficient 
government administration in Latin America”.33 This document has revealed that 
liberal bureaucrats like Rubottom and Smathers demonstrated a high level of idealism 
in bridging the policy gap, urging the expansion of the aid program must go down to 
Latin American nationals but they recognized dishonesty in the management of the 
government such as political corruption and nepotism in the military.
34
 In my analysis, 
the U.S. economic policy oscillated between economic liberalism and operational 
feasibility, which constrains the development of Latin American policy in the future.   
 
The Smathers Fund was the first attempt for Congress to expand the flow of public 
capital but not the last attempt. It was seen as a prelude to the DLF. In 1957, 
Eisenhower encountered a struggle with Congress over a revision of the MSA for 
1958. Eisenhower advocated a policy shift through the MSA and Congress created the 
DLF within the U.S. economic foreign policy.
35
 According to the memorandum from 
Holland to Hoover, the memorandum raised concerns of limited public capital to 
Latin America operated by the Executive Branches. Currently, only Paraguay, 
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Honduras, Bolivia and Haiti fitted into the eligibility of the DLF operations but other 
Latin American countries were not considered. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee reported that the individual Latin American country being excluded from 
its application had much to do with issues of its economic condition and its own 
financing capacity as shown in the history. The report has revealed that either the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House Foreign Affairs Committee urged 
that the DLF liberate the loan restrictions and make Latin American countries gain 
“equal access with other nations of the world to the Development Loan Fund in 
accordance with criteria established for the DLF”.36 The expansion of the public 
capital came from two sources; one was from the Smathers Fund and the other was 
from the DLF. Both demonstrated high levels of Congress participation to meet Latin 
American requests. What was the administrative consideration in dealing with these 
two public funds when making appropriation? 
 
According to a memorandum from Rubottom to Dillon on 20
th
 December 1957, either 
MSA or the Smathers Amendment could provide a loan to improve public 
infrastructure. The appropriation of $25 million for that purpose was not made by 
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Congress partly because Senator Smathers and other Congressmen considered that the 
efficacy of the Smathers Amendment could be achieved by the DLF and MSA Special 
Funds. Moreover, the Executive Branches did not support the appropriation of funds 
out of the Smathers Amendment for the same purpose.
37
 William P. Snow, the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, said before the House 
Appropriations Committee: 
We do not consider this a necessary provision to make because the type of loan 
contemplated by Senator Smathers is also contemplated under the new 
Development Loan Fund … and that the sort of loan contemplated would come 
under that Fund.
38
 
 
In my analysis, the fallout of the SEO could be summarised into three points. First 
and foremost, Eisenhower advocated an adjustment on the defence assistance within 
the MSA. Although Latin America was not the major target of the SEO, it motivated 
the DOD to standardize Latin American military equipment through the reimbursable 
basis. Second, the SEO gave Congress an impulse to expand public capital to Latin 
America. The Smathers Fund was the first attempt that Congress made to Latin 
America, which was a prelude to the DLF. Third, Congress’s expansion of public 
capital was definitely opposite to Humphrey’s philosophy. Humphrey did not support 
any liberation of loan restrictions for public capital, nor did he agree with the DOS to 
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put the Smathers Fund under the Eximbank. The shift in aid policy following the SEO 
aimed to win support from neutralist leaders in the Third World nations in the context 
of Cold War tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.  
 
Nonalignment and Neutralism: the Emerging Nations in the Third World  
The rise of nationalist sentiment in the Third World triggered the struggle for 
decolonization against the Cold War context. The newly emerging nations in Asia, 
Africa and Middle East offered a new perspective to understand the Cold War 
dominated by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Nonalignment has become the rising 
force to challenge the influence of the superpowers. The Asian-African cultural and 
economic cooperation, known as the Bandung Conference, was held from 18
th
 April 
to 24
th
 April 1955 with a diversity of political orientations such as “neutralism, 
communism, socialism and democracy”.39 The principle of the self-determination 
was the core value of local aspirations, which strengthens the importance of 
sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. According to Jason Parker, he 
argued that the Eisenhower administration undertook the “psychological Cold War” 
against communism through the alliances and proxies. His analysis of the Bandung 
Conference was summarized into the following points. First, the neutralist in the 
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Third World was considered as a potential shift in the international milieu. Second, 
China’s participation in the Bandung Conference signified communist expansion in 
Asia. In this respect, China’s motive was suspicious lest Nehru’s neutralism would be 
challenged by the rising position of China. Either the first or the second point 
presented a threat.
40
 
 
The Bandung Conference highlighted the contradictions in the U.S. global foreign 
policy; that is to say, the U.S. would irritate its colonialist allies in Europe such as 
France, the U.K., and the Netherlands if the U.S. appealed to Third World nations and 
favoured their political value of self-determination. The Conference definitely 
contributed to “the American conclusion that European colonialism was becoming 
more a Western liability than an asset”. However, no specific action has yet been 
generated from the abstract conclusion.
41
 The White House formed a “working group” 
on the Afro-Asian conference from various organizations like the Office of 
Intelligence Research (OIR), the CIA, OCB, DOS, DOD, and USIA to launch 
propaganda against Soviet-Chinese communism, which was based on Dulles’ 
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initiative.
42
 In addition, the Bandung Conference reflected consciousness of racial 
tensions. Thomas Borstelmann indicated that the Conference was the convergence of 
racial issues such as the Ghanaian independence in March 1957, Suez in October 
1956 and the Little Rock crisis in September 1957. The U.S. unfolded its strategy 
with caution to articulate U.S. friendly attitude and to convey the impression that 
communism should be the new form of colonialism.
43
 
 
In my view, the neutralist nations in Asia or Africa were more likely to side with one 
of the superpowers on a specific agenda than to stay with either forever. Both the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union appealed to the neutralist nations in the Third World by 
providing military and economic assistance as an incentive. In this respect, alliances 
would be formed by their respective interests rather than ideology. The concept of 
neutrality might have an impact on the international system dominated by two 
superpowers. The alliance ties tend to be of short duration - often determined by a 
political agenda and any other form of incentive. For the U.S., the shift from Third 
World nations to the Western bloc visualizes the rollback strategy against the Soviet 
communism. However, with China’s participation in the Bandung Conference, 
Chinese communism was the new target and China identified itself with Afro-Asian 
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nations under a neutralist against colonialism. The Bandung Conference in Indonesia 
prioritized the U.S. agenda arrangement, putting Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 
over Latin America. 
 
Eisenhower’s invocation of neutrality aimed to create a political advantage without 
paying a heavy cost among non-communist countries. According to the 277th Meeting 
of the National Security Council, Eisenhower observed that neutrality was loosely 
used and he “explained that it was erroneous for people to charge that there could be 
no genuine neutrality in the world between the Communist and the Western 
nations”.44 Eisenhower observed that some nations were subject to communism threat 
since they “made military commitments to the U.S.” The definition of morality, as 
perceived by Eisenhower, means “a moral, spiritual and possibly a political to our [the 
U.S.] side but not necessarily a military commitment”.45 Therefore, the U.S. must 
fortify economies and military strength via the Mutual Security Program both in 
Eastern and Western blocs. Eisenhower considered trade as a centrifugal force of the 
Soviet bloc given the fact that some Latin American countries expected more 
economic aid from the White House. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Reuben B. 
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Robertson, added that many countries on the borders of the Soviet Bloc would not be 
willing to join one or the other blocs. Rather, they preferred to stay neutral, 
welcoming assistance from the U.S. provided they did not have to take sides to qualify. 
Stassen expressed economic assistance on a regional basis was the method to strike 
back the new Soviet tactics. He criticized that the current policy should strengthen 
“the ideas of extending U.S. aid on a regional rather than an individual country 
basis”.46  
 
The Bandung Conference preceded the SEO in Asia as a watershed to represent a 
potential change of the international milieu - Chinese communism tried to strengthen 
its influence in Third World nations and alienate nonaligned nations from the U.S. and 
the Soviet communism. According to Harold M. Vinacke, he put forward three 
reasons to explain why Asian neutralists conceived of a nonalignment principle in 
their diplomatic tactic. First, geopolitically speaking, those neutralist nations were 
close to China and of much significance. Second, their economic development moved 
towards socialism; their domestic policies went against communism. Third, 
neutralism could be viewed as a claim to be politically independent from the U.S. that 
positively pursued a mutual security program to help them. On the other hand, “the 
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Soviet Union had not yet entered the competition to assist under-developed 
countries”.47 It seems to me that the neutrality means to get rid of the traditional 
ideologies in the Cold War context, putting aside ideological differences and pursuing 
their own national objectives. They were not militarily committed to either blocs, nor 
did they actively get involved in a world conflict.  
 
The third point is the most interesting point. Presumably, the Soviet’s foreign program 
to the Third World did not compete with the U.S., did the following SEO 
fundamentally challenge the U.S. national security in Third World nations? To what 
degree were Third World nations subject to ideological appeal? It is assumed that U.S. 
relations to Third World nations are subject largely to concrete advantage but not to 
any ideological appeal. For example, U.S. economic relief programs to Third World 
nations, trade tariffs and strategic values of the Panama Canal and military accessories. 
Economic interests and sea lines of communication all belong to the definite 
advantage. It is necessary to examine how the U.S. foreign assistance policy fits in the 
following cases.  
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Mexico: Bureaucratic Disputes over Approaches to U.S. Interests  
U.S. loans to Mexico were conditional; that is to say, the Mexican government would 
have to meet certain requirements. In a memorandum with the Mexican President, 
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Eisenhower expressed his vision of loans and funds towards 
Mexico. His position on foreign loans never deviated from the general economic 
policy, suggesting that the Mexican businessmen get external funds through the 
channels of the World Bank and the Eximbank or American businessmen so long as 
the Mexican government encouraged this. He reaffirmed that the U.S. did not intend 
to get more “allies against communism” at this meeting and there was a probability of 
the Soviet communism engaging in disruptive activities in Mexico.
48
 It seems to me 
that it is very hard to calculate the probability of the Soviet threat and it is indeed 
subjective. The Soviet communism acting as an ideology to win the Cold War was 
clear; however, would the U.S. be generous with economic aid if there was no distinct 
world conflict?  
 
Whether to use economic aid to achieve ends, the DOS and the Eximbank had 
disputes over a $26 million loan to Mexico. According to a memorandum, the Deputy 
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Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Herbert V. Prochnow revealed that he 
had a call from the chairman of the Eximbank (Waugh) complaining about the DOS’s 
decision to postpone the loan for ‘Fundidora de Fierro y Acero de Monterrey’. He 
personally considered $26 million was large and this would need a proper review. 
From Waugh’s viewpoint, putting off this credit would “give the Bank a bad 
reputation”. He said “it is a mistake to delay a credit to a private company in 
Mexico”.49 In fact, the DOS did not refuse the Mexican requests; however, it was 
concerned about the Mexican policy. The deferral would give the U.S. valuable time 
to clear some issues between the U.S. and Mexico.
50
  
 
The dispute was brought to the National Advisory Council (NAC) for discussion with 
the presence of Marshall M. Smith from the Department of Commerce (DOC). He 
indicated that the DOC did not oppose the credit but agreed with the DOS’s decision 
to postpone for reconsideration.
51
 In my analysis, one of characteristics during 
Eisenhower’s administration is the interdepartmental review of the policy. Even 
though there were bureaucratic disputes, this foreign policy mechanism could at least 
                                                        
49 Foreign Relations of the United States, the American Republics, “Memorandum From the Deputy 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Prochnow) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover),” 
in Historical Documents, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VI, April 17th ,1956. 
50 Foreign Relations of the United States, the American Republics, “Editorial Note 224,” in Historical 
Documents, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VI. 
51 Ibid. 
 - 149 - 
 
act as a resolution before serious conflicts. Meanwhile, the disadvantage was that the 
interdepartmental meeting was held by dominating bureaucrats that often politicized 
the original agenda. 
 
The DOS indeed drew some outstanding issues between the U.S. and Mexico such as 
broadcasting, aviation and business agreements. Apart from this, an unfriendly 
environment for the U.S. investment suggested a less collaborative attitude towards 
U.S. national interests. Foreign investors were allowed to do labor intensive industries 
like mining and power while other industries like commercial and manufacturing 
sectors were largely funded by Mexican capital. Even though President Ruiz Cortines 
recognized the importance of foreign capital, he did not take measures to adjust the 
current policy unfavourable to foreign investment. U.S. investors, for one reason or 
another, were worried about the economic development in Mexico. The DOS showed 
that the credit loan of $26 million would be possible if President Ruiz Cortines could 
be more cooperative.
52
 From my judgement, U.S. economic interests overshadowed 
its security concern; in other words, the ideological influence was less important than 
a more favourable environment for U.S. investors. That the U.S. used foreign aid to 
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advance its economic interests was evident; however, the DOS and the Eximbank 
took different approaches to achieve U.S. goals. Still, more incentives could be used 
as political leverage to advance U.S. objectives in Latin America.    
 
As far as the agricultural industry was concerned, P.L. 480 was the program where 
Mexico could sell surplus agricultural products abroad through the local currencies 
accrued to dollars. This was another method where the U.S. could exercise its 
influence on Mexico to advance political objectives. It was not until March 1957 that 
the Mexican Minster of Agriculture inquired about the P.L. 480 (500,000 tons of corn). 
The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs and Agriculture made a joint response that the Title 1 funds aimed 
to supply those countries with more severe foreign exchange difficulty; this made 
Mexico’s request unlikely. The Minister of Finance suggested Mexico seek another 
approach with a low interest repayment such as credit resources. In this respect, 
Rubottom did not agree but argued “U.S. interests could be best served if the U.S. 
could accede to Mexico’s request”.53 In my judgement, the U.S. goal was to weaken 
the Soviet influence; however, bureaucrats took different means to achieve this goal. 
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The SEO was nothing more than propaganda causing indirect impact on Latin 
America. Being neutral did not mean generosity of economic aid from the U.S.   
 
The Mexican government also demonstrated its interests in acquiring military aid on a 
reimbursable basis. There were a series of discussions about this from the January of 
1957. The Mexican government considered that the normal military aid on a 
reimbursable basis was three years – and it should be longer. From a 
collective-defense concern, the NAC agreed to look over it.
54
 According to the NIE 
report on 13
th
 August, $10 million was given to the Mexican government to buy 
military facilities and equipment on a reimbursable basis.
55
 No matter what methods 
were used to advance the U.S. objectives in Mexico, it is important to look at its 
society and analyse why Mexico was less vulnerable to the Soviet propaganda. First 
and foremost, Mexico was constitutionally a federal government that demonstrated 
“political maturity and economic viability” through the one-party system. President 
Ruiz Cortines was reactive to the large population. Second, Mexico was in the process 
of modernization encouraged by the increasing middle class. Bound by the 
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constitutionalism, the military was inactive in politics. Third, Mexico and the U.S. 
embraced the concept of collective security in the hemisphere. Fourth, the liberalism 
was fused with Marxist socialism during the Mexican Revolution. Local communists 
played little influence.
56
    
 
Panama: Nationalization of the Suez Canal and Its Impact on the Panama Canal 
When Bulganin launched ideological propaganda, the belief that the Soviet infiltration 
might prevent U.S. sea lines of communication and strategic access to raw materials 
was deepened by military bureaucrats such as Murphy. As discussed earlier, Murphy 
emphasized that U.S. sea lines of communication and raw material supply were 
vulnerable to the Soviet penetration when tensions rose between the U.S. and the 
Soviet communism.
57
 The most valuable line of communication in the Caribbean Sea 
was the Panama Canal. On 14
th
 June 1956, the Panamanian government was informed 
of radar installations on two hilltop sites with the primary purpose of protecting the 
Panama Canal but this request was turned down by the Panamanian government in 
May 1955 as a result of differences of interpretation of Article II of the 1936 Treaty. 
However, the Panamanian government demonstrated willingness to carry on 
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negotiations for a new treaty regarding the use of these sites.
58
 The dispute arose 
from differences of interpretation of Article II of the 1936 Treaty from both sides. The 
Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty 1903 was one of the most important documents in the 
history of U.S.-Panama relations.  
 
According to Charles D. Ameringer, he observed that on 19
th
 January 1904, 
“Philippe-Jean Bunau-Varilla assured Hay that Article II of the Treaty gave the U.S. 
all the land and water it needed for the canal and its appurtenances, and there were no 
restrictions on sanitation measures”.59 In this case, the Department did not want to 
meet the Panamanian government halfway and refused to get into any further formal 
treaty on radar installations. Hence, the Department was ready to “negotiate an 
agreement limited to a lease governing the sites, as was done in 1942 and 1947”.  
The Panamanian Assembly would review it for ratification or approval. In accordance 
with Public Law 161, the Secretary of the Army was authorized to build up military 
facilities, site preparation, and other public utilities that totalled about $223,993,000. 
The negotiation would concentrate on radar installation and the Panamanian 
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government would need to carry it through to the end without delay.
60
 
In a conversation with Eisenhower, President Arias used this opportunity to arouse 
attention about U.S.–Panama relations that were normally overlooked by the U.S. 
President. Despite the disputes over Article II, there were more issues between the 
U.S. and Panama such as the “equal pay” wage scale. Arias proceeded with a series of 
issues: 
the Zone residents are exempt from most of the Panama tax. Smuggling liquor 
from the Zone to the Republic is growing. He said it is no problem for him to get 
a case of whiskey from friends in the Zone.
61
 
 
 
In this context, taxation seemed to have become the issue between the U.S. and 
Panama but that was all a façade. The underlying theme behind it was the matter of 
political sovereignty; taxation was used as a tactic to negotiate for political gains. 
Arias’ effort was considered as a test of U.S. attitude towards the Canal management. 
If Eisenhower weakened the U.S. claim to the Canal management, the Panamanian 
government could gain a relative degree of sovereignty over the Panama Canal. For 
Arias, the conversation had one implication; that is, he actually tried to strengthen the 
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level of his influence to bargain in the negotiation.  
 
The U.S. attentively responded to this issue indicating that the U.S. had been granted 
the right to import items into the Canal Zone without Panamanian duty. FDR issued 
the Executive Order of 1935 that granted Panama a monopoly to sell liquor within the 
Canal Zone in accordance with Panamanian taxation. Given the fact the taxation 
accrued was to excess, the Panamanian government decided to make a 75% taxation 
reduction in the 1955 Treaty if the U.S. could keep buying goods from Panamanian 
merchants. The smuggling problem came from “the availability of alcoholic 
beverages at a reduced price when sold for importation into the Canal Zone”.62 
Apparently, there was a faint chance for the Panamanian government to gain any 
bargaining advantage at the negotiation through the smuggling issue. The Panama 
Canal was strategically important to the U.S. but Panama’s claim to the Panama Canal 
never ceased. Arias tried to escalate the issue when Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized 
the Suez Canal. 
 
The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 could lead to a wave of eventual 
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internationalization or nationalization of the Panama Canal. The Memorandum of a 
Conversation on 9
th
 August 1956 has confirmed that there were two possible courses 
that the Panamanian Government might take - one was to compare the Panama Canal 
to the Suez Canal and the other was to bypass the Suez problem and to wait for a 
more opportune time to advance Panama’s national interests. For the first course, 
Panama would be asked to take a position either with the U.S. or with Egypt if 
Panama were to take part in the London Conference. Panama’s position to embrace 
Nasser’s nationalistic policy would be described as a move against U.S. goodwill on 
the one hand but on the other hand the government should incur domestic pressures 
from leftists if it identified itself with the U.S. position.
63
 From the U.S. perspective, 
there was no analogy between the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal as far as the 
treaty right was concerned. 
 
In terms of the treaty status, there were three differences. First, the Panama Canal was 
run by the Isthmian Canal Commission, a governmental agency. The Suez Canal, 
however, was held based on a private concession known as the Suez Canal Company. 
The U.S. was granted the perpetual sovereignty to exercise broad rights over the 
Canal area against any purported claim to its exercise of power by the Panamanian 
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government. Second, the Suez Canal was composed of a multilateral treaty while the 
Panama Canal was based on bilateral treaties. Therefore, the contracting parties in the 
Suez Canal were the U.K. and France but the U.S. had exclusive jurisdiction over the 
Panama Canal.
64
 Panama’s aspiration to invoke the nationalization of the Suez Canal 
was another move to counteract the U.S. claim to exercise sovereignty rights over the 
Canal area. It is important to note that drawing the Suez Canal was an outlet for 
domestic pressure from Panamanian leftists. The disputes of sovereignty over the 
Panama Canal broadened as global tensions arose due to the struggle between the U.S. 
and the Soviets engaging in the Suez Canal. With the rise of nationalistic sentiment in 
the Suez Canal, did the U.S. meet the Panamanian government halfway on the 
sovereignty of the Canal? 
 
If the public of the U.S. was fervently worried about the fallout of the Suez crisis at 
this moment, it would be a good chance to effect radar installations contiguous to the 
Canal Zone. As a result, “the effect on the public and Congress of the U.S. would be 
very favorable”.65 Whether to install radar on two hilltops nearby the Canal Zone or 
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not, there were different positions on radar sites in Panama within the Department of 
the Army. According to the memorandum of a conversation on 3
rd
 October 1956, 
Charles C. Finucane, who was the Under Secretary of the Army, was concerned about 
the necessities of installing radar nearby the Panama Canal while the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Army, Edward Bacon, considered that radar sites in Panama would be 
required in the long run. Finucane said that technology has improved rapidly and the 
U.S. request for radar sites was outdated.
66
 No matter what kind of program and 
military facilities the U.S. were to establish in the Panama Canal, the sovereignty 
dispute grew and manifested in the Canal management connected with the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal. The Suez Crisis presented an analytical framework 
from state level to understand its impact on local politics. 
 
Nicaragua: Request for Limited P.L. 480 Sales 
U.S. military and economic assistance was the determinant in the Nicaraguan struggle 
for national leadership. Those who received foreign aid programs from the U.S. 
tended to convince the public of U.S. support but Latin American national leaders 
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walked a fine line between the local nationalists and the U.S. policy objectives.
67
 The 
U.S. was also careful about when it came to dole out foreign aid programs to 
Nicaragua. Even though Anastasio Somoza García ran Nicaragua from 1950 to 1956 
and had close relationships with the U.S., this did not mean Nicaragua could get the 
foreign aid program for which it asked. This section argues that the essence of 
partnership was defined by favourable purchases not against U.S. marketing under a 
P.L. 480 agreement. As a result, the U.S. could only provide partial help in P.L. 480 
because most products the Nicaraguan government required would possibly displace 
the usual market defined by its import requirement.
68
  
 
The Nicaraguans would not be able to buy white corn and red beans from the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) if it did not have permission. Neither white 
corn nor red beans were available in CCC stocks. The U.S. recommended that the 
Nicaraguans utilize ordinary commercial channels to acquire them as El Salvador did. 
The Nicaraguan government did not meet the requirements for the following four 
reasons. First and foremost, no clear discrimination had been made by the Nicaraguan 
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government between “imports through usual commercial channels and purchases 
required under a P.L. 480 agreement” that would “displace the usual commercial U.S. 
marketing”. Second, the dollar revenues of cotton and coffee were expected to fall and 
the Inter-Agency Committee would not consider it proper for the program. Third, the 
unlimited production of cotton would continually displace corn and beans even if P.L. 
480 sales were allowed. Fourth, Nicaragua was not listed as allowed “the loan of local 
currencies”.69 
 
In January 1956, Nicaragua’s request to buy red beans and white corn from the U.S. 
surplus stocks was not through Title I of P.L. 480. The application was therefore 
turned down by the Inter-Agency Staff Committee on 24
th
 April. However, the Bureau 
of American Republics expected that the Government of Nicaragua could get at least 
limited amounts of surplus commodities under Title I of P.L. 480. From the DOS 
perspective, limited amounts of purchase would not conflict with usual marketing on 
these items as Nicaragua was normally self-sufficient and even an exporter at times. 
Thus, “a small sales program under P.L. 480 (in the neighborhood of US $700,000) 
would provide funds for U.S. uses and market development, but would probably not 
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allow any funds for development loans”.70 The Department of Agriculture (DOA) 
suggested that Nicaragua be more expeditious in getting P.L. 480 sales upon a credit 
basis. According to the DOA, it revealed that: 
[the Department of Agriculture] is temporarily confronted by a shortage of 
appropriated funds with which to finance outstanding Title I, P.L. 480 programs 
to which the United States has committed itself by opening negotiations with 
certain countries or otherwise.
71
 
 
Obviously, P.L. 480 Title I aimed to support countries with difficulties of foreign 
exchange but Nicaragua was not the area to be financed on local currencies. However, 
Nicaragua would still be considered under P.L. 480 Title I on credit terms. On 25
th 
April 1956, the DOA provided an export credit program under the CCC stocks to 
handle Nicaraguan purchases, indicating the Nicaraguan government should not have 
any problem in finding guarantees to “qualify under the CCC export credit 
program”.72 Under such a favourable circumstance, the Nicaraguan government was 
supposedly on its track to get P.L. 480 assistance on a credit basis. But, the reality was 
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that the DOA did not have adequate resources to support Nicaragua. According to 
Wollam’s letter to the Ambassador in Nicaragua, Park F. Wollam, who was the Officer 
in Charge of Nicaraguan Affairs, argued that: 
Agriculture has over-expended its allotment for P.L. 480 transactions by about 
$80 million. It is impossible to get any action on the Nicaraguan request under 
these circumstances. Additional funds are being sought, however, and it is 
expected that the P.L. 480 program will be back in business in a few weeks.
73
 
 
The sharp turn of the DOA’s approach did not deteriorate bilateral relations. First, the 
temporary postponement did not mean that there was no chance for the Nicaraguan 
government as long as the P.L. 480 program came back. Second, other funds were still 
available, such as the Corinto Port loan and the Eximbank loan, with the latter 
contributing to their share of the Inter-American Highway cost. The Nicaraguan 
government could seek additional funds so it would not be empty-handed.
74
  
 
Venezuela: Military Aid and the Purchase of Oil Pipe 
President Eisenhower had congenial relations with Venezuelan President, Marcos 
Pérez Jiménez. Not only did Jiménez demonstrate his tough position against 
communism but he also supported investment policy favourable to U.S. private 
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enterprises. Venezuela was often praised by the leading bureaucrats as a good example 
among Latin American nations. Holland told Congressmen in the hearing in 1956 that 
“Venezuela is a sort of showcase of private enterprise and it had a standard of living 
that far exceeded that of any other Latin American country”.75 Dulles commented that 
“if other nations emulated Venezuela in creating a climate which is attractive to 
foreign capital… the danger of Communism in South America, of social disorder will 
gradually disappear”.76 In Venezuela, national security and foreign investment were 
two themes to understand the interactions between the U.S. and Venezuela. 
 
First of all, during the 1950s, the U.S. provided Venezuelan soldiers with military 
training, equipment and maintenance under the MSA that granted Venezuela credits to 
buy military arms.
77
 On 28th August 1956, the DOS bureaucrats discussed the sale of 
arms to Venezuela, adding up to 400 million dollars credit. Holland listed two main 
concerns. First, a commitment had been made to grant up to three years of credit or 
longer terms and the question was whether the U.S. was to fulfil the commitment. 
Second, there was no need to keep the Venezuelan security domestically through the 
sale of arms. The threat that the Venezuelan government had was a palace revolt by 
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the armed forces rather than any popular uprising. Holland added “a substantial 
increase in the armed strength of Venezuela will surely set off a chain reaction leading 
to arms increases in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Chile. The same chain reaction 
would extend through Brazil and Argentina”.78 Holland’s statement pointed out that if 
the internal security in Venezuela presented no security concern, should the U.S. fulfil 
or rebalance the commitment?   
 
In March 1956, Venezuela had requested a large amount of U.S. equipment over more 
than ten years and the duration for repayments lasted for ten years. Venezuela was 
convinced that the U.S. would make a commitment to furnish Venezuela with the 
military equipment. For that reason, the final decision would be taken as an indication 
of whether the U.S. wanted to improve bilateral relations.
79
 In December, Rubottom 
spoke to César Gonzalez, who was the Ambassador of Venezuela to the U.S., on the 
issue of military equipment. The decision to extend the $180 million program over the 
next ten years hinged on two criteria - one was the yearly “Congressional 
appropriation to finance the military equipment” and the other was the “annual 
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approval of the NAC”. Rubottom added that even though some bureaucrats 
considered the granting of military credit could possibly lead to an arms race in Latin 
America, he held that the approval of the military equipment would be beneficial to 
the U.S.-Venezuela relations.
80
 In addition to the military aid, U.S. policy towards 
Venezuela was influenced by a greater degree of U.S. investment in oil resources. 
 
The connections between national security and foreign investment lay in the U.S. 
strategic access to oil resources. According to Rabe, U.S. policy objectives in 
Venezuela were largely advanced by an “adequate supply of petroleum for the U.S., 
especially in time of war”. The DOS would need to ensure that Venezuela’s oilfields 
were free from external challenge of military threats and sabotage. In addition, the 
Venezuelan economy would flourish if its government could continue the current 
policy of privatization of oil resources held by foreign investors.
81
 Jiménez’ policy 
was favourable towards foreign enterprises and they could “remit dividends without 
restrictions”. For example, the oil companies made a profit of $3.79 million, earning 
about $828 million in 1957. These statistics “represented the best year the oil 
                                                        
80 Foreign Relations of the United States, the American Republics, “Memorandum of a Conversation, 
Department of State, Washington,” in Historical Documents, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VII, December  
12th , 1956. 
81 Rabe, The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976 (Texas, 1982), p. 
120. 
 - 166 - 
 
company would ever have in Venezuela”. Furthermore, half of the dividend income of 
the Standard Oil of New Jersey came from its subsidiary, the Creole Petroleum.
82
  
 
Jiménez’ dictatorship was further strengthened by U.S. foreign aid support, even 
though social mobility was blocked by military rule. The U.S. military and economic 
assistance was the crucial factor in Jiménez’ national leadership. The U.S. foreign aid 
program was often viewed as economic progress by military dictators in Latin 
America and was equivalent to a sign of modernization. However, U.S. national 
interests were not all the way identical to those of Venezuela. In October 1956, the 
Venezuelan government attempted to secure the loans from the Eximbank to sponsor 
“the gas pipeline from the Anaco Field in Venezuela to the Petroquimica Plant”. The 
Department believed that Venezuela should raise the necessary capital to finance the 
pipeline through private sources because this project was 100% controlled by the 
Venezuelan government. As a result, this request was turned down on 8th November 
as U.S. public funds could not be used to help finance this project.
83
 From my 
observation, ‘Fundidora de Fierro y Acero de Monterrey’ was a privately owned entity 
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in Mexico but its $26 million loan from the Eximbank was put off.
84
 Compared with 
Venezuela, Mexico should have been granted the $26 million loan rather than a 
deferment. Did the U.S. have standard criteria for giving loans? Should the project be 
a private or public entity to meet the requirements?   
 
Brazil: Request for Refunding Loan and Development Credit 
The Bulganin’s offer to engage in the underdeveloped countries through diplomatic, 
cultural and trade arrangements included technical assistance and trade missions. The 
new trade pattern did not fundamentally compete with the U.S. in essence within the 
Cold War context. Willard L. Thorp analysed the rationale behind the Soviet’s trade 
arrangement - they began a low degree of trade with underdeveloped countries and 
the political impact was greater than the new trade pattern.
85
 In support of his 
argument, he provided some trade statistics with the underdeveloped countries:  
In 1955, the Sino-Soviet bloc purchased more than 10 percent of the exports of 
nine countries: Iceland (27.8 percent), Egypt (26.7), Finland (25.8), Turkey 
(21.8), Iran (15.2), Yugoslavia (13.8), Burma (12.0), Austria (10.2) and 
Afghanistan (estimated at 50 percent). Only five countries purchased as much as 
10 percent from the bloc: Finland (27.0), Hong Kong (24.2), Iceland (22.2), 
Turkey (18.3) and Afghanistan (exact percent not known).
86
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As discussed, Asia and Africa were given high priority in the face of Soviet 
communism. Latin America did not gain as much attention as the two areas, nor did it 
gain lots of U.S. security concern in the face of the SEO. Would the trade relations 
between the Soviet Bloc and Latin American countries pose an immediate security 
concern? Indeed, the SEO challenged U.S. ‘trade and aid’ policy but it did not 
dissolve Latin American economic partnerships with the U.S. Therefore, trade with 
the Soviet Bloc did not prevent Latin American countries from requesting loans from 
the U.S. The lending bodies from the U.S. would not loosen loan restrictions in the 
face of the SEO. It is essential to examine this assumption by using Brazil as a case 
study. 
 
Communism was ideologically opposed by most Brazilians while the trade expansion 
with the Soviet Union was practically buttressed by Brazilians. According to the paper 
prepared by the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, in 1955, 
there was a striking increase over the 1954 total of $42,000,000, accounting for 1.5% 
of total Brazilian trade with the Soviet bloc. Among Soviet bloc countries, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia were two countries having diplomatic missions in Brazil and the 
Soviet Union stood a chance of re-establishing diplomatic relations through the 
trading relationships. The U.S. concluded that “there will be some additional increase 
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in Brazil’s trade with the Soviet bloc”.87 This document has confirmed one important 
point - the international communism did not fundamentally affect the Brazilian way of 
life, and thus, the Soviet ideological offer was unlikely to stop Brazil from gaining 
foreign aid from the U.S. 
 
Brazil turned to the U.S. for foreign aid of nearly $1,200,000,000 at Juscelino 
Kubitschek’s inauguration. Brazil technically tried to cut the amount of money down 
to “a request for refunding of existing Eximbank loans”. The bank would consider this 
as long as Brazil could fulfil some contractual obligations. Whether Brazil could meet 
its obligations in the present contract became a determining factor for new loans. 
Based on banking and an economic perspective, this was a fair decision but this 
resulted in a bureaucratic debate. Holland argued that the implication of refusing the 
Eximbank loan might force Brazil to the Soviet bloc. He claimed the U.S. would not 
lose anything if the current refunding proposal was granted. He further justified his 
argument saying that “it will amount to an extension to Brazil of the 14-year payment 
term which the U.S. has accorded to Argentina rather than the 7-year payment term 
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now exacted of her”.88 In response to Holland, the Director of Eximbank, Hawthorne 
Arey examined the historical documents between the bank and Brazil saying: 
Brazil’s request for refunding outstanding balances on both its $300 million loan 
and $75 million credit from the Eximbank. More than $75 million of the former 
credit had been repaid, and that only $45 million of the $75 million credit had 
been drawn. The Brazilians wanted the Bank to refund the balance of the $300 
million credit over a 20-year period.
89
 
 
Refunding would not facilitate any payments on “any future long-term credits 
received” in the Brazilian development program but “only postpone payments to the 
very period”. As long as the Bank continued to provide credits, Brazil could reach its 
objectives. If the short-term debt could be liquidated by Brazil, it would stand a 
chance of the long-term development loans in 1960. According to the minutes of the 
246th Meeting of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and 
Financial Problems, the Bank revealed that:  
the latter would carry as one condition a waiting period on principal repayments 
until about 1960, which would be in line with the Bank’s usual practice 
pertaining to development loans where only interest is collected during the 
construction period.
90
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In this context, Brazil needed to follow the general lines that the Eximbank proposed. 
The problem was whether the Eximbank should refund outstanding balances of a 
$300 million loan. As a result, if the Eximbank refunded, the question was what the 
rate of interest should be? Brazil’s credit was not very good, and it would definitely 
need to re-establish a credit system on its request for refunding the loan. However, it 
would take a long time to deal with the Brazilian request.  
 
Chile: P.L. 480 and the Klein-Saks Commission to Ease Inflation   
Chile was the case to present the theoretical deficiency of the modernization theory 
with U.S. foreign aid assistance. The Under Secretary Foreign Minister, Carlos 
Vassallo, explained that “Argentina and Brazil for surplus commodities value $30 to 
$40 million and providing liberal repayment over 30-40 years” through the P.L. 480 
program. The President of Chile, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, expected that P.L. 480 
could also apply to Chile. Vassallo assumed that the program could help to control the 
indispensable commodities at a low price and “peso proceeds surplus commodity 
loans and dollars saved would in part be used for public works to take up 
unemployment slack resulting austerity measures”. Vassallo understood that the U.S. 
would limit or prioritize some items to reach its interests; the P.L. 480 was not the 
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only method to ease the rise of inflation in Chile.
91
  
 
P.L. 480 was supplementary to the Klein-Saks mission whose immediate prospect 
aimed to stabilize the Chilean economy. Other than economic inflation, Chile suffered 
a trade deficit and yearned for foreign loans to make it up. Vassallo commented that 
Chile would need excess commodities from the U.S. to support its economy, 
observing that:  
usual marketing requirements P.L. 480, he felt sure they would present no 
difficulties in view expected reduced wheat harvest Chile and inability Argentina 
and perhaps other suppliers satisfy demand wheat and for other commodities.
92
 
 
The commodities that Chile required must not displace the normal market of U.S. 
commodities. According to the U.S. Embassy in Chile, the following amounts and 
items were considered innocuous to the U.S. usual marketing. These items were 
“edible oils - 40,000 tons; cotton - more than 60,000 bales, 30,000 of which to be for 
dollars; wheat - 150,000 tons, 40,000 of which to be for dollars; dried milk - 20,000 
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tons; clover and alfalfa seed - 5,000 tons each”.93 In my analysis, the Klein-Saks 
mission and P.L. 480 were all external resources to alleviate the Chilean inflation but 
at the same time, Chile increased the level of dependency on U.S. technocracy. Could 
Chile eradicate inflation and achieve modernization? How far could President Carlos 
Ibáñez del Campo go with the U.S. assistance?  
 
Ibáñez came under domestic pressures from Congress, organized labours (Central 
Unica de Trabajadores de Chile, CUTCH) and conservative cliques. CUTCH had just 
launched a massive strike opposing price-wage bill. Moreover, the Executive and 
Congress often reached an impasse, which made the government unable to move. 
Consequently, the U.S. would like to use P.L. 480 out of expediency to fortify 
Ibáñez’s leadership and gain much influence over his anti-inflationary programs from 
Congress. From the U.S. perspective, P.L. 480 was as much an economic program to 
assist other nations as a political propaganda of U.S. position to resist domestic 
pressures in Chile.
94
 It seems to me that both programs served as a political tool to 
advance American political intents. This case helps readers to examine the basic 
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assumptions of modernization theory that Latin American nations could benefit from 
the guidance of Western civilization. In Chile, U.S. economic programs seemed to 
serve U.S. political interests rather than solve economic inflation. The root cause of 
economic inflation in Chile was complex; however, political instability was one of 
many.  
 
The exchange reform, as the Chilean Government claimed, was the issue requiring 
collaboration between the Executive Branch and the National Congress of Chile. 
Anti-inflationary policy was formulated by groups; “institution of the exchange 
reforms” was indispensable to the tax reforms supported by Congress. According to 
the Memorandum from the Director of the Office of South American Affairs to the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, it sketched out what position 
the U.S. would take with regard to the Chilean request for International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and U.S. financial assistance: 
the IMF favored a standby loan or similar arrangement which would permit tight 
control of drawings and would put the IMF in a position to influence the Chilean 
Government to adopt and vigorously execute other stabilization measures on 
which the IMF Mission report says the success of the exchange reform is 
dependent.
95
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As a result, if the President of Chile could not coordinate with Congress, what would 
the Klein-Saks mission do? Anti-inflationary measures should be coordinated through 
Congressional cooperation. From the IMF perspective, the Chilean Government 
suggested to take other stabilization measures. Was it possible to implement exchange 
reform without Congressional support but with U.S. support? There was more to 
discuss on the U.S. presence in Chile and the role of the Klein-Saks mission. 
 
Costa Rica: U.S. Ambivalent Attitude to the President of Costa Rica 
U.S. decision-makers felt ambivalent about José Figueres Ferrer; there were subtle 
variances in the Costa Rica-U.S. relations in 1956. Figueres recognized the merits of 
private investment from an economic perspective but he did not take a strong position 
against the growth of local communism in Costa Rica. In fact, he had pleased the 
global anti-communism agenda as his stand for U.S. support during his presidency in 
1948. However, Figueres’ enemies, like Somoza, described him as a communist due 
to his social programs and his assistance to leftist movements in Cuba, Venezuela, the 
Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.
96
 In examining the Costa Rican case, one needs 
to know how the Figueres regime came into being which had profound ramifications 
on the Costa Rica-U.S. relations. 
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During the Costa Rican Civil War of 1948, Figueres, the commander of the National 
Liberation Army, revolted against the Government of President Teodoro Picado 
(1944-1948). The Civil War happened because the result of the 1948 election had 
been obtained by fraud and petitioned Congress. The politics of Costa Rica was torn 
by indirect intervention of neighbouring powers. Figueres was in close connection 
with the Guatemalan Revolutionary Government, Juan José Arévalo, who sponsored 
him to gain presidency whereas Calderón’s force (1940-1944) was firmly supported 
by Anastasio Somoza García, who gave Calderón asylum and attacked Costa Rica. 
Picado aligned himself closely with Calderón’s force and the Popular Vanguard Party 
(PVP) to deny the results and call for a new election. Even though the U.S. considered 
Figueres ambivalent, the U.S. did not provide assistance to Picado. Figueres kept 
away from Arévalo when he seized power in order to get U.S. support.
97
 
 
Picado, Calderón and the PVP were viewed as communists; the coalition culminated 
their power between 1940 and 1943. Figueres won the civil war and prohibited the 
PVP activities by law so the PVP did not pose a threat to the Figueres government. 
Even though the government officially claimed to be fighting against communism 
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“neither the Government nor the public was militarily anti-communist”. For example, 
he did not take an effective stance against the continuing communication between the 
PVP and the Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL).
98
 
Consequently, Figueres’ plea of communism was a tactic to gain U.S. support. He 
recognized the differences between global communism and local communism but 
from the U.S. perspective both were almost the same. Hence, this is the reason why 
Figueres was accused of not being tough against the local communism.     
 
Figueres sometimes criticized alleged U.S. support for Latin American dictators 
because of his hostility toward the Caribbean dictators. Figueres’ disengagement in 
Central American affairs was exacerbated by the border row with Nicaragua. Soon 
after Nixon’s trip in Nicaragua on 19th February 1956, Figueres agreed to accept a 
peace agreement between the two countries and agreed to meet Somoza “more than 
halfway” on the border dispute. In addition to this political settlement, Figueres 
praised the UFCO for its efforts “to stabilize the prices of bananas and coffee” and 
“he was pleased to announce that the company and his administration were 
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cooperating to improve economic conditions”.99 From my perspective, Figueres’ 
ambition to advance his influence in Central America suggested the rise of Figueres’ 
nationalism against the dictatorship supported by the U.S. 
 
According to the paper prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), the 
Partido Liberacion Nacional (PLN) was the foundation of Figueres’ nationalism that 
incorporated labour groups and the lower class but most PLN leaders were from 
middle and upper classes. The party machine of the PLN firmly supported social 
reform and was ideologically resistant to communism. However, the recent political 
call launched by the PVP known as “National Democratic Front” appealed to wider 
social groups such as the intellectuals, the workers, the peasants and the bourgeoisie. 
PLN and PVP alike had almost the same targeted groups of people and as a result the 
PVP did not pose an immediate threat to the Figueres government.
100
 The question is 
what was the direct linkage with the international communist agenda such as the SEO? 
From the context, the local communism sought to enhance the local aspirations rather 
than to meet with the global appeal of the Soviet communism.   
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Overall Assessment on U.S. Foreign Policy from 1956 to 1957 
In the above mentioned cases, economic development in Latin America could be 
facilitated by the inflow of private investment, and economic nationalism might be 
countered by encouraging private investors to finance privately-owned projects as in 
the Fundidora case in Mexico. This approach was applicable to the purchase of pipe 
for the gas pipeline from the Anaco Field in Venezuela to the Petroquimica Plant. Any 
state-owned enterprise should finance the loans through private sources rather than 
Eximbank unless its projects were receptive and favourable to U.S. private investors. 
This is the practice of early modernization theory but the rise of nationalism, precisely 
defined by economic nationalism, resists the American vision of a free trade 
framework. In my analysis, before moving to a full-fledged communist society, 
nationalism is the driving force for the aspiration of social justice such as nationalized 
ownership against privatization. 
 
In a broad discussion of trade policy, the SEO not only challenged American ‘trade 
and aid’ policy but also presented as a political shift for neutral nations. For the former, 
it triggered a response to do a reappraisal of military standardization in Latin America. 
For the latter, it motivated Congress’s efforts to the foreign aid program based on 
public capital like the Smathers Fund. The inadequacy of public funds had been 
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constantly emphasized by Latin America since Eisenhower took office in 1953. 
Through the careful examination of all cases, they would be more receptive to change 
or maintain their attitudes in accordance with the economic incentives that could 
improve their economic conditions than the SEO ideological appeals. In Brazil, 
Kubitschek needed a foreign aid program of up to $1,200,000,000. Brazil was trying 
to cut the amount of money down to a request for refunding of existing Eximbank 
loans but this triggered a debate between the DOS and the Eximbank. The SEO did 
not limit Latin American nations from continuing business activities with the U.S.  
 
Eisenhower made the disposal of food surpluses abroad a major part of its foreign aid 
program. P.L. 480 Title 1 aimed for those Latin American countries who suffered 
foreign exchange problems with the U.S. This approach made Mexico different from 
Nicaragua. By comparison with Nicaragua, the convenience of foreign exchange 
between the Mexican peso and the U.S. dollar facilitated the acquisition of corn stock 
on a credit basis. Because of this, Mexico could repay the U.S. at low interest over a 
period of twenty years that made Title 1 unlikely. Although Nicaragua was not a 
country where P.L. 480 could be found for the loan of local currencies, the U.S. could 
only offer the Nicaraguans partial support. Nicaragua could be partly financed by the 
CCC stocks under the P.L. 480 Title 1.    
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In Chile, P.L. 480 was a supplementary anti-inflation program to the Klein-Saks 
mission. However, the efficacy of this approach was still controversial because both 
P.L. 480 and the Klein-Saks mission were auxiliary to the Chilean domestic politics 
from the U.S. perspective. A simple question, could they be independent from the 
political entities in Chile? Thus, whether or not the Executive branch and the Chilean 
Congress could coordinate concerted efforts for the stabilization measures was the 
main concern. Despite Chile’s inflation, the presence of a foreign sector in Chile 
would definitely incur political impact on Chile’s politics; that is to say, the accusation 
of U.S. intervention, no matter whether direct or indirect, would be another focus 
point of the research. This could be viewed as an economic intervention.  
 
To identify how military security relates to economic interests, it is necessary to 
define what the U.S. security is in an individual Latin American country. In Panama, 
the U.S. security interests lie in the Panama Canal where access to military facilities 
was described as “perpetual sovereign rights” binding upon two parties based on the 
Article XVIII of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. The new radar installations on two 
hilltops adjacent to the Canal Zone had to be achieved without political repercussions. 
The challenge thereafter was that the nationalization of the Suez Canal might set a 
precedent for the Panamanian Government to follow. Thus, a new construction 
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program could create more job vacancies to ease bilateral tensions arising from the 
Canal management.  
 
In Central America, the rise of Figueres’ nationalism in Central America was another 
challenge. The U.S. did not expect any ambitious national leader to get excessive 
political power since this would pose an immediate danger to the regional stability. 
The ambivalence towards Figueres from the White House resulted from Figueres’ 
policy that oscillates between his inconsistent attitude toward communism and the 
pursuit of his expanding power. From my point of view, Figueres was a real political 
opportunist who could tactically manipulate U.S. anti-communism policy and appease 
the growth of domestic nationalism. Interestingly, the U.S. recognized that the PVP 
did not present a threat to Figueres’ government; why did U.S. bureaucrats often 
highlight the threat of international communist? The image of communism was 
misused and this issue was often politicized when the Cold War tensions were 
tightened by the Soviet propaganda.   
 
However, what Eisenhower had advocated soon after the SEO and what he had done 
were really far from what Latin Americans actually needed. This problem was pointed 
out even in the NSC 5432/1 but little had been done in terms of public capital. After a 
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comprehensive diagnosis of the U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, the OCB 
noticed that the desire for more rapid economic progress and higher standards of 
living was now a major political issue in Latin America. As shown in NSC 5613/1, it 
depicted that the U.S. should provide constructive economic programs:  
The maintenance of friendly relations with Latin America requires us to assist the 
other American Republics in carrying forward their constructive economic 
development programs and to become associated in Latin American thinking as a  
partner in economic progress.
101
 
 
Still, it was Eisenhower’s firm belief that economic prosperity could be achieved “by 
private initiative of sturdy, self-reliant economies in Latin America which do not 
require continuing grant assistance from the U.S”.102 What Latin American countries 
needed was public capital but Eisenhower implemented his policy with an emphasis 
on the inflow of private capital. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Buenos Aires Conference: 
Widespread Discontent, Nixon in Latin America, Pan Americanism 
 
The fourth chapter of this thesis demonstrates that Latin American demands for public 
capital were continuously neglected even though those demands were brought upfront 
in the Buenos Aires Conference in 1957. The collision between the U.S. and Latin 
America was manifested in the economic domain. Consequently, Latin American 
nations seized this opportunity to gain economic control upon their initiative in 
Eisenhower’s economic policy towards Latin America. Before the Buenos Aires 
Conference, there had been personnel changes in cabinet members of Eisenhower’s 
administration. For example, Robert Anderson and Rubottom were newly appointed 
as the USDT and the Assistant Secretary of State. Mann and Dillon took up the 
position as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Deputy 
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs. The new replacement of personnel 
represented the rise of liberal approach in Eisenhower’s policy. The U.S. foreign 
policy towards Latin America underwent the rising tension between liberal approach 
and conservative protectionism, with the latter adding impetus to the local economic 
nationalism.   
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The impact of the Buenos Aires Conference on the U.S. foreign policy was not 
immediately recognized; however, it triggered a rethinking of the policy as to whether 
the U.S. should set a centralized body to promote public funds. The U.S. foreign 
policy was characterized by bridging the gap between the established policy made by 
the senior bureaucrats and continuing idealism to promote Latin American social 
welfare. The continuing neglect of Latin American demands for public capital 
encountered backfire on Eisenhower’s policy when Nixon visited South America in 
May 1958. The effect of Nixon’s visit along with regional pressure, remarkably 
Kubitschek’s idea of Pan Americanism represented the Brazilian nationalism that 
safeguards Latin American identity against the influence of modernization. Therefore, 
the constant neglect of Latin America’s demands left the anti-American sentiment in 
ferment. This was the driving force to sustain Operation Pan America that tilted the 
balance in liberal ideas in U.S. policy. 
 
Rubottom encouraged an adjustment of U.S. foreign policy to reach convergence of 
interests with Latin America because this would essentially strengthen political and 
economic influence of the U.S. in Latin America. The economic differences included 
“the feasibility of an Inter-American Bank, commodity marketing and pricing 
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problems and economic integration”. 1  The Buenos Aires Conference was the 
continuance of economic disputes from the Rio Conference in 1954; there has been a 
huge gap between Latin American demands and U.S. economic policy since then. 
Economic relations between U.S. and Latin American nations have deteriorated 
sharply from U.S. protectionism against lead and zinc imports from Latin America, 
and the rise of economic sovereignty in Latin America against the inflow of private 
capital. The following paragraphs will explain these two economic disputes. 
 
First, Eisenhower was opposed to tariff increases with regard to zinc and lead in 1954. 
Rather, he advocated a stockpile program without imposing duties. The proposal to 
raise tariffs would have a very negative effect upon U.S.-Latin American relations. 
According to the Memorandum from Rubottom to the Secretary of State: 
the proposal runs directly counter to the broad policies of the Administration 
regarding reduction of duties, fostering of competition, and expansion of 
international trade which will also be under discussion at Buenos Aires. We have 
urged these policies upon the Latin American countries with some success. A 
departure from them will endanger our position of leadership in the commercial 
policy field and our ability to protect the interests of U.S. exporters in the rapidly 
growing Latin American market.
2
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It was the domestic concerns from the U.S. producers that required reconsideration of 
the U.S. free trade policy. Tariff reduction was the basic principle of the free trade 
policy but the Latin American imports might adversely affect the U.S. lead and zinc. 
The basic question is would the domestic pressures limit the U.S. free trade policy? 
From Rubottom’s perspective, adjustment of the free trade policy would imperil 
American credibility in its economic policy.
3
 
 
Second, the U.S. promoted the inflow of private capital but the important point is who 
was supposed to have jurisdiction over investment disputes, host countries or 
investors’ home countries? What would happen when investors were denied a verdict 
made by the local courts? This has drawn much attention to whether the legal 
counterpart in Latin America could offer fair treatment. Not all Latin American 
countries held the same view of the Calvo Doctrine. The focus point was to examine 
how it operated in Latin America and any collision between the private investors and 
local authorities. 
 
Discussion of Calvo Doctrine 
The Calvo Doctrine proposes that foreign investors are subject to the local jurisdiction 
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where their investment is located. With this principle, diplomatic protection is 
prohibited unless local remedies have been exhausted. This concept contributes to the 
debate between local jurisdiction and customary international law. Whether the 
institution of diplomatic protection should be applied to the transnational investment 
disputes is the focal point; in this respect, the Calvo Doctrine highlights the 
institutional differences between investors’ own countries, host countries and possibly 
an international legal body.
4
 In my analysis, the Calvo Doctrine serves as a political 
means to strengthen local economic sovereignty against the trends of U.S. 
modernization. This manifests the tensions between the modern international law and 
the legal tradition of Latin America. The underlying theme behind the Calvo Doctrine 
represents the rise of Latin American nationalism in the context of U.S. hegemony - 
the increasing local forces to counteract U.S. domination. 
 
This has brought the sovereignty issue upfront and challenged the sovereign states. 
Claudio Grossman asserts that even though Latin American countries were viewed as 
“the weaker states”, they needed to exert their powers in an international world. For 
this reason, Latin American countries would invoke the “Calvo” Doctrine to protect 
basic sovereignty. He made it clear that investment disputes or payment of debts 
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between foreign investors and a state would cause a conflict between “the capital 
importing (weaker) country and the capital exporting (stronger) country”. The Calvo 
Doctrine covered a variety of areas such as the struggle for political power, 
contractual obligations and constitutional conventions. The consciousness of 
sovereignty safeguards local values, cultures, societies, or Latin American interests to 
that effect against the U.S. global hegemony.
5
 From my perspective, the 
nationalization of private lands and properties for public use was realization of social 
justice for Latin American nations whereas the U.S. investors considered the 
nationalization policy as a violation of property law. U.S. private investors like the 
UFCO required compensation after the nationalization in consequence. The question 
is what was the historiography of the Calvo Doctrine? How did the concept evolve? 
 
The Calvo Clause was named after Carlos Calvo, who was a jurist in Argentina. The 
correlations between the state and foreign investors were crucial as to whether the 
Calvo Clause was viewed “as a bar to U.S. diplomatic interposition” or not. Its 
evolution depended upon political conditions rather than international law norms.
6
 
Amos S. Hershey has examined the historiography of foreign intervention in 
                                                        
5 Claudio Grossman, “Latin American Contributions to International Law,” Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting, Vol. 94 (April 5-8, 2000), p. 45. 
6 Donald R. Shea, Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), pp. 6-7. p. 16.  
 - 190 - 
 
hemispheric affairs, observing the differences between the Drago Doctrine and the 
Calvo Doctrine. On 29
th
 December 1902, Señor Luis M. Drago, who was the 
Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, created the Drago Doctrine urging that foreign 
powers (Germany, Great Britain and Italy) could not force Venezuela to repay her 
debts by force. This position was clearly stated in a diplomatic memorandum to the 
Argentine minister to the U.S., Señor Mérou. Starting from the sovereignty ground, 
Drago cited Alexander Hamilton’s statement to develop his argument - “contracts 
between a nation and private individuals are obligatory according to the conscience of 
the sovereign and may not be the object of compelling force”.7 
 
The Drago Doctrine was indeed the narrow interpretation of the Calvo Doctrine. From 
Hershey’s observation, Drago criticized the use of armed force as a legitimate 
rationale for public debts while Calvo rejected the diplomatic protection as a legal 
claimant for all private claims. In other words, Drago denounced the forcible means 
used for Latin American states; however, Calvo fundamentally denied the right of a 
claimant to secure diplomatic mediation in nature. In Calvo, the government should 
not bear the responsibility for indemnity upheld by foreigners.
8 
In my analysis, Drago 
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 - 191 - 
 
highlights the sovereign will of a state and Calvo strengthens the sovereign authority 
of a state. Both indeed serve Latin American interests but it is impossible just to 
follow Latin American patterns during the process of global integration.   
 
Drago considered that recovering debts by force not only went against the equality of 
sovereignty but also violated the Monroe Doctrine. As a result, President Theodore 
Roosevelt commented that the Monroe Doctrine would not be served as protection for 
“small bandit nests of a wicked and inefficient type such as he saw in Venezuela”.9 In 
1904, the Roosevelt Corollary was issued by the U.S. in response to the Drago 
Doctrine. The Roosevelt Corollary asserted the right of the U.S. to intervene in Latin 
America in the interests of American business and Latin American independence from 
European powers. It had been an effort to thwart Cipriano Castro’s default on 
international debts in late 1902, the U.S. succeeded in justifying U.S. intervention 
throughout the hemisphere if the debtor state did not carry out the decision of an 
arbitration commission.
10
 From the U.S. perspective, the development of the Drago 
argument was improper because the unilateral statement made by Drago did not 
fundamentally reflect Roosevelt’s mindset, nor did Roosevelt deem it politically 
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necessary to endorse Latin American behaviour of debt. 
 
With continuous efforts to promote private investment in Latin America, the U.S. 
dedicated itself to negotiating with Latin American countries to create a desirable 
environment favourable for the inflow of foreign capital. When interests of private 
investors could not be safeguarded by Latin American authorities, the use of the Calvo 
Doctrine to protect Latin American interests became controversial. The doctrine could 
be employed in different business fields but not all Latin American countries 
employed it. One could not leave out political significance acting upon economic 
policy yet every Latin American country had its interpretation in terms of the Calvo 
Doctrine. However, it brings attention as to whether the Calvo Doctrine is in line with 
the U.S. efforts to create a better climate favourable for foreign investment by giving 
investors a greater level of economic security. By examining the Calvo Doctrine, one 
could not exclude the interactions with foreign powers because this would mean not 
discussing its face value. Thus, it is of much importance to examine how the 
following Latin American countries make use of the Calvo Doctrine.  
 
Current Utilization of the Calvo Doctrine  
To what extent the Calvo Clause was utilized as a constitutional mechanism against 
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the diplomatic protection could be the basis to evaluate the incorporation of the Calvo 
Clause into the Latin American national constitution or private contracts. There were 
three generalizations of the Calvo Clause in Latin America - full incorporation, 
flexible incorporation and incorporation with special conditions. Full incorporation 
meant that foreign investors could only resort to the local courts; flexible 
incorporation denoted that the Calvo Clause did not have to be inserted into a private 
contract; and incorporation with special conditions stood for the Clause being applied 
to specific industry or a special article of the Constitution. 
 
Panama belonged to the full incorporation because its constitution prohibited 
foreigners from claiming diplomatic protection. According to the Panamanian 
constitution, Article 21 provides that “all Panamanians and foreigners are equal before 
the law”. In addition, Article 164 of the Administrative Code clearly defines the 
relations between the foreign persons, the Government, companies and individuals in 
accordance with the contractual laws, which states “the duties and rights arising out of 
the said contract shall be exclusively established by the judges and local courts”. 
There were some exceptions where the Calvo Clause could be exempt from the 
contracts such as “the case of denial of justice”.11 The term means that foreigners are 
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refused from getting access to the local courts. The question is to what extent or how 
precise denial of justice is delivered to define underlying illegal activities.
12
 Would it 
be impartial? 
 
Costa Rica fell into the flexible incorporation which means that the Calvo Clause 
would not necessarily be included in all contracts between the government and 
foreign investors. According to Shea’s report on 16th July 1954, he expressed that the 
Compañía Petrolera de Costa Rica, the Northern Railway Company and the Compañía 
Bananera de Costa Rica had contracts with the Costa Rican government but the 
Compañía Bananera de Costa Rica was the only company that had the Calvo Clause 
in its contract. Once the Calvo Clause was inserted to contracts, its effect remained 
valid. In the case of Costa Rica, it is expected that the government would possibly get 
into negotiations with the U.S. government as a mediator for private companies. The 
flexible incorporation highlights the interactions between the government and the 
investor’s company rather than institution itself.13 
 
Nicaragua was the full incorporation; the Calvo Clause was applied to the contracts 
                                                        
12  Hans W. Spiegel, “Origin and Development of Denial of Justice,” American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Jan. 1938), p. 79. 
13 Shea, op. cit., pp. 272-273. 
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between the foreign investors, government, companies and individuals in accordance 
with Nicaraguan law. According to official information obtained from the U.S. 
Embassy in Nicaragua, Shea reported “no dispute where the Calvo Clause has played 
any role has risen in many years”.14 The full incorporation of the Calvo Clause was 
also applied to the Honduran government in accordance with Article 19 of the 
constitution of March 1936. Still, it made denial of justice possible, which did not 
simply “mean an executed verdict unfavourable to the claimant.” Shea commented 
this Clause was not universally utilized and no economic disputes have been found 
concerning it.
15
 In sum, the Calvo Clause was applied to Nicaragua, Honduras and 
Panama but there was a different interpretation of denial of justice in each case. Could 
the interstate arbitration system strengthen access to justice and bridge the gap 
between international customary law and local judicial body? What if the Latin 
American states refuse to accept the final verdict made by the interstate arbitration? 
 
In Guatemala, the Calvo Clause had been used in all petroleum concessions given to 
foreigners prior to the 1954 Guatemalan D'état. Even though the overthrow of the 
Árbenz regime was the main political episode in Guatemala, the Calvo Clause would 
                                                        
14 Ibid, pp. 273-274.   
15 Ibid, p. 274. 
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continuously be exercised in different form.
16
 After the overthrow of the Árbenz 
regime, the Armas administration negotiated with the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala on 
labour and relations with American companies. On labour, Armas would “cooperate 
with the U.S. government in eliminating communists and setting up free unions” to 
improve relations with labour. On relations with American companies, UFCO and the 
International Railways of Central America were ready to make some concessions to 
government in their contracts and “detailed negotiations might be undertaken soon”. 
The role the U.S. government between the Guatemalan government and foreign 
investors was more like a mediator.
17
 
 
Peru was the representation of the third generalization where the Calvo Clause was 
invoked otherwise it was specifically stated. According to the special article of the 
Peruvian Constitution of 1933, Article No.17 clearly states: 
Mercantile companies, whether national or foreign, are subject without any 
restrictions to the laws of the Republic. In all contracts between the Government 
and aliens, or in concessions granted to aliens, their express submission to the 
laws and tribunals of the Republic and their waiver of diplomatic interposition 
must be expressly stated.
18
 
                                                        
16 Ibid, pp. 274-275. 
17 Foreign Relations of the United States, The American Republics, “the Ambassador in Guatemala 
(Peurifoy) to the Department of State,” in Historical Documents, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IV, September 
2nd, 1954. John Peurifoy was U.S. ambassador to Guatemala from 4th November 1953 to 2nd October 
1954. 
18 Shea, op. cit., p. 275. The content was an English version translated by U.S. Embassy to Peru. 
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The degree of the Calvo Clause used in Peru varies probably contract by contract. 
Whether tribunals are included depends on the bilateral approval made by contractual 
parties. In my analysis, the right to secure diplomatic mediation derives from the 
contractual law that is legally enforceable in most countries. In Peru, the duties and 
rights of private investors are bound or governed by the agreement. Whether the 
contractual parties would observe the formality is another issue.  
 
The Calvo Clause was fully incorporated in Colombia and Mexico. As stated in 
Article 15 of Law 145 of November 26, 1888, the Colombian Government required 
that foreigners have no recourse to diplomatic channels in contracts with the 
government. The Calvo Clause was often included in contracts with foreign 
corporations in early years. Shea concluded that “the Law of 1888 was still 
technically in effect… and there apparently have not been any recent instances of the 
invocation of the Calvo Clause in disputes or disagreements”.19 Mexico was the most 
devoted supporter of the Calvo Clause but most Mexicans were more ready to 
internalize the protection of property rights than any other Latin American state. The 
Constitution of 1917 under Article 27 interprets that Mexico, as a nation, originally 
owns materials and lands within its boundaries. The nation has the right to transfer the 
                                                        
19 Ibid.  
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ownership to private parties, which is the important component of private property. 
Lowenfeld indicated that Mexico had developed a sound framework for private 
property and land reform out of the Mexican Revolution in 1910. Expropriations of 
private property must be accompanied by reasonable compensation and be used for 
public utility (school, infrastructure, road construction and so on).
20
 
 
 
In Bolivia, diplomatic protection was written in the Constitution of Bolivia only in 
case of a denial of justice. Therefore, Article 18 of the Constitution states: 
Foreign subjects or foreign enterprises are, with regard to property, in the same 
state as Bolivians, and in no case can they invoke an exceptional situation or 
appeal to diplomatic interposition, except in case of denial of justice.
21
 
 
The expropriation of the Standard Oil in 1937 was a great presentation of the Calvo 
Clause. The company had been granted a variety of concessions in the State of Salta 
in Argentina, reaching 6,000 tons from 1930 to 1932. Due to the oil resources in the 
Chaco area, the Bolivian government required the company to speed up oil production 
and finance the war against Paraguay. In 1936, the Bolivian government established a 
state-owned company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) and 
expropriated the company in 1937. This case reached the Bolivian Supreme Court and 
the decision was made against the company. The nationalization did not give rise to a 
                                                        
20 Lowenfeld, op. cit., pp. 471-472. 
21 Shea, op. cit., p. 276. 
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war between Bolivia and the U.S. However, the company withdrew their facilities and 
personnel.
22
 From my observation, this case presents a good defense in using the 
Calvo Doctrine but this did not fit in the succeeding nationalization case in 1952 
during which Andrade negotiated “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation and 
gradually moved to the Inter-American Convention for Arbitration Pecuniary 
Claims.
23
  
 
Latin American countries used the Calvo Clause in different degrees. Shea has given 
detailed elaboration of the Calvo in some Latin American states but his analysis 
touched little upon the role of foreign powers. For example, he described too much 
about Articles of the Constitution in a Latin American state. This leads to partial 
explanation of the Calvo Doctrine, especially its effect upon the future cases. By 
examining all cases above, we should have found that the Calvo Clause was too loose 
to function effectively. The crux of the problem does not lie in the Calvo Clause per se 
but the enforcement with which every Latin American state is engaged. It calls 
attention to the performance of the justice sector in Latin America.  
 
                                                        
22  Wolf Radmann, “Nationalizations in Bolivia: Gulf Oil Investments Negotiation Patterns and 
Settlement Agreements,” Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1972), pp. 
277-278. 
23 The nationalization of mining company has been mentioned in this thesis, pp. 101-102.   
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Jorge L. Esquiroi put forward ‘failed law’ discourse to understand the political 
rationale behind the relations between institutional efficiency of legal systems and 
limitations of reform arrangements. The basic account for this phenomenon is that 
“state law in the region appears mostly ineffective and inappropriate; national 
judiciaries look inefficient and corrupt; and the rule of law and its enforcement seem 
practically non-existent”. In order to identify the ‘failed law’ discourse, it is essential 
to construct the notion of ‘legal fiction’ in Latin American culture, which means the 
inherent gap between “written and practical law”. The limited effects reflect its 
operational difficulties and the issues of governance to launch workable social 
reforms.
24
 The next paragraph will explain how operational difficulties and the issues 
of governance contribute to the ‘failed law’ discourse.   
 
The operational difficulties refer to ‘functional failure’ (such as system breakdown, 
lack of enforcement, inefficiency of legal procedures and transactions, insufficient 
capacity and training of legal professionals), ‘legal failure’ (such as charges of 
antiquated law, legal formalism, law disconnected from society, the gap between law 
in theory and law in practice, inefficient laws and institutions) and ‘policy failure’ 
(such as law and development reforms in Latin America scarcely address policy 
                                                        
24 Jorge L. Esquiroi, “The Failed Law of Latin America,” The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
Vol.56, No. 1 (Winter, 2008), pp. 76-80. 
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questions in a transparent way). The issues of governance mean ‘the un-rule of law’ 
and ‘lawlessness’. The former considers there is no agreeable mechanism to resolve 
the tension between individual and governmental behaviours during the legal 
decision-making. Even though Latin American states emulate the U.S. model, the 
society fails to achieve the balance of the rule of law. The latter emphasizes that Latin 
American laws are vulnerable to politics run by a small group of elite. Even though 
some states have gone through the process of institutionalization, political values and 
social norms are still in limbo.
25
  
 
It is obvious that deficiencies of Latin American legal systems cannot guarantee legal 
procedures or justice despite the narrative of the Calvo Clause. Whenever denial of 
justice takes place, the U.S. government - probably U.S. embassies in Latin America - 
would be invited to take part in the negotiation between the local government and 
private business. Such action is often viewed as an economic intervention through 
diplomatic channels in the event of expropriation without due compensation. The 
encouragement of sound private U.S. investment in Latin America was the central 
theme of Eisenhower’s economic policy. Yet, the economic paradox in the 
encouragement of private investment was the legal systems’ capacity to function as 
                                                        
25 Ibid., p. 80. p. 82. p.84. p. 86. p. 88.  
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law. However, the economic paradox in the free trade policy lay in domestic pressures 
from which the U.S. domestic industries had been suffering. As a result, the U.S. 
adjusted its trade policy in 1957 to prevent the domestic lead and zinc industries from 
import competition, which means there is no pure free trade policy/market.  
 
Economic Controversy over Lead and Zinc Imports 
When the Korean War took place, the U.S. encouraged the increased production of 
lead, zinc and other critical metals for fear that there would be a shortage of metals. 
According to the report of Commissioners Brossard, Talbot and Schreiber “the U.S. 
assisted lead and zinc producers in 13 countries with both development loans and 
long-term contracts for purchases of lead and zinc at floor prices”.26 Consequently, a 
stockpile program was designed to take some lead and zinc off the world markets so 
as to sustain prices. Domestic pressures sprang from home producers, who had great 
influence in the Republican Party and in Congress, and wished to increase tariffs on 
foreign imports from Australia, Canada, Mexico, and Latin America as relief. The 
House Ways and Means Committee had even proposed “a provision for quotas or 
import taxes on lead, zinc, and other products”.27  
                                                        
26 Charles J. Walsh, “U.S. Economic Foreign Policy and the Escape Clause,” Review of Social 
Economy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March, 1959), p. 14. 
27 Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961, p. 38. 
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Rising tariffs on lead and zinc strained the tensions between Eisenhower and 
Republican Congressmen from mineral-manufacturing states. The latter urged that 
Eisenhower protect domestic industries from foreign imports under the escape clause 
of the Trade Agreements Act. If not, there’s little chance for Eisenhower to extend that 
legislation in Congress. In 1954, following an escape clause investigation, the Tariff 
Commission recommended that tariffs on lead and zinc be increased to protect the 
domestic mining industry.
28
 The President tried to finesse this sensitive issue by 
raising purchases of zinc and lead by means of stockpile and applying to voluntary 
export restrictions recommended by the DOS and the DOC.
29
 
 
The basic principle in international trade was that no increase of imports shall ever 
displace home production and hurt the domestic market. It is the Commission’s 
responsibility to evaluate “whether or not there has been serious injury or threat of 
serious injury to domestic producers of like or similar articles”. The Commission 
recommended the President, at his discretion, identify this as the public interest by 
inserting an escape clause in the Executive Order.
30
 To go further on this point, I 
believe that the public interest is tantamount to national economic interests, which 
                                                        
28 Ibid., p. 39. 
29 Ibid., p. 118. 
30 Walsh, op. cit., pp. 4-6. 
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further explains that the domestic industries should not similarly be ignored or 
overridden. The question now is what is the difference between the import tariffs on 
lead and zinc in 1954 and the import tariffs on lead and zinc in 1957 within the 
definition of national interests?  
 
Rubottom indicated the U.S. attempt to impose tariffs on zinc and lead in 1957 was a 
signal of deteriorating U.S.-Latin American relations, which was more serious than 
that in 1954. The stockpile program was issued soon after Eisenhower refused to 
increase tariffs on zinc and lead. The tariff issue was brought upfront during the 
Buenos Aires Conference but Rubottom expressed this might contradict the existing 
free trade framework and gradually result in competition. For this reason, a change 
from the current economic policy would threaten U.S. leadership in the commercial 
area. Moreover, he said U.S. relations with Peru and Mexico were heightened by the 
current export policy in cotton. Based on this point, tariff increase on zinc and lead 
would have a negative effect on U.S.-Latin American relations.
31
 As I see it, 
Rubottom was opposed to depart from the current free trade policy; his mindset was 
Pro-Latin America rather than Pro-American enterprises. This indeed represents 
                                                        
31 Foreign Relations of the United States, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 
“Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the 
Secretary of State,” FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VI, May 7th, 1957. 
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policy tensions between the foreign policy objective and the interests of domestic 
producers. One of the striking characteristics in U.S. foreign policy is to bridge the 
gap between foreign policy objectives and political reality.  
 
Rubottom’s mindset did not reflect the real politics in the U.S. domestic market. 
Charles J. Walsh revealed that in 1956 75% of U.S. mine output of lead and 72% of 
mine output of zinc came from ten companies that dominated major zinc and lead 
refinery or smelter in the U.S.
32
 Even though the U.S. was still the world’s largest 
producer of these metals, the mining of lead and zinc was indeed on the wane in the 
U.S. due to “the depletion and exhaustion of domestic ore reserves”. Walsh analysed 
“many of our [U.S.] mines were high-cost producers”.33 In the face of this problem, 
Eisenhower could not disregard the recommendations that the Tariff Commission was 
continuously to make on next investigation. Besides, lead and zinc production 
slackened during 1957-58. The Tariff Commission concluded, given the fact that lead 
and zinc quotas in U.S. declined, the Tariff Commission should take the responsibility 
under the escape clause legislation. Finally, Eisenhower imposed tariffs on lead and 
zinc higher than those in 1954 in order to protect the domestic industry.
34
 This has 
                                                        
32 Walsh, op. cit., p. 13. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., pp. 15-16.  
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shown that the White House could not have its way with the Randall Commission 
Report on Foreign Economic Policy as it had in 1954.  
 
With regard to lead and zinc quotas, Rubottom analysed that the Executive Branches 
faced “the strong position being taken by the Congress as a result of the adverse 
effects of the weak metals market in the mineral-producing states”.35 This was the 
message that he conveyed to the Mexican Minister of Finance, Antonio Carrillo 
Flores on 6th August 1957. Carrillo Flores recognized the U.S. problem yet he 
considered the imposition of tariffs on lead and zinc “would be like a slap in the face 
to virtually all of Latin America” if this was effective before the Buenos Aires 
Economic Conference.
36
 The conversation has shown that Rubottom tried to inform 
the Mexican Minister of Finance about the U.S. position but to what degree would the 
imposition of tariffs on lead and zinc affect the Mexican mining industry?  
 
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 81-57) presented the outlook for Mexico 
identifying the major Mexican interests in the U.S. domestic market. It concluded 
that: 
                                                        
35 Foreign Relations of the United States, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 
“Memorandum of a Conversation, American Embassy, Mexico City,” FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VI, 
August 6th, 1957. 
36 Ibid. 
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The Mexican mining industry, with government support, strongly opposes the 
recently proposed increase in U.S. import duties on lead and zinc and fears 
severe retrenchment if the increase is effected. Lead and zinc have accounted for 
about 12% of the value of Mexican exports, and 75% of these metal exports have 
been sold in the U.S.
37
 
 
 
According to the statistics, the U.S. was the major market of most Mexican metal and 
the imposition of tariffs on lead and zinc would definitely affect the future trend and 
impact on the Mexican domestic exports to the U.S. The more tariffs the U.S. 
increased, the more unfavourable the Mexican mining products would be. This has 
placed Eisenhower’s free trade policy for discussion - would the counterpart domestic 
industries be one variable factor to limit the free trade policy? If one brings U.S.-Latin 
American economic relations into an in-depth analysis, the basic question might be is 
there absolute gain in the international relations?  
 
In addition to Mexico, Peru was another state vulnerable to the enactment of new 
tariffs on lead and zinc. Dillon noticed that U.S. ambassador to Peru, Theodore C. 
Achilles, had been wholeheartedly supporting the DOS’s line. Achilles would have a 
difficult problem explaining the action to the Peruvian government. The Peruvian 
press devoted major attention to the issue of U.S. lead and zinc duties. Pro-U.S. La 
                                                        
37 Foreign Relations of the United States, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 
“National Intelligence Estimate,” FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VI, August 13th, 1957. 
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Prensa this time changed to attack the U.S. lead and zinc policy on headline. U.S. 
policy was depicted as a “mortal blow” to the Peruvian economy, questioning the 
reality of the “good neighbor policy”.38 This would lead to probable termination of 
stockpiling and deteriorating relations with Peru. What was the Peruvian response to 
the enactment of new tariffs?  
 
During 1956, economic growth in Peru was satisfactory, while the economic prospect 
was less promising by mid-1957 because of the decline in world prices of copper, lead 
and zinc (accounting for one fourth).
39
 In the Peruvian Prime Minister’s Call on 
President Eisenhower, Eisenhower replied to Dr. Manuel Cisneros: 
[He] was very much aware of the impact of the lead and zinc problem on Peru. 
The best solution would be for prices to move upward, but so far this had not 
occurred. The affected interests in the U.S., while relatively small, have brought 
great pressure to bear on the members of Congress and senators from several 
states. Finally, he gave no indication as to the outcome of the matter.
40
 
 
Mexico and Peru were two main countries suffering from U.S. lead and zinc duties. 
Eisenhower pursued the free trade policy on one hand but on the other hand, he 
                                                        
38 Foreign Relations of the United States, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 
“Editorial Note,” FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VII, Document 535. 
39 Foreign Relations of the United States, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 
“Current Economic Developments,” FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VI, November 26th, 1957. 
40 Foreign Relations of the United States, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 
“Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington,” FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VI, Oct 
14th, 1957. 
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needed to alleviate domestic pressures from U.S. Congress and domestic mining 
industries. This constituted the economic paradox that free trade policy reduces all 
trade barriers. With domestic concerns, Eisenhower would definitely need support 
from Congress to continue the Trade Agreements Act and thus, the decline in 
domestic mining forced Eisenhower to adjust his policy. The connection between 
them is the Executive Order escape clause designed to protect domestic industries.  
 
Preparation for the Buenos Aires Economic Conference 
The Conference started from 15th August to 4th September 1957. On 14th February 
1957, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA–ECOSOC) had set the 
agenda for the Buenos Aires Conference: “general economic agreement, economic 
development, foreign trade, technical cooperation, and transportation”. The DOT was 
doubtful whether the U.S. should follow the agenda setting proposed by the 
Secretariat of the Pan American Union at the request of the IA–ECOSOC. The DOT 
considered the draft text included language that “went far beyond that which the U.S. 
has ever agreed to in the past or conceivably could agree to in the future”. The 
Treasury representatives raised questions about the order of the agenda, saying that 
“the agreement should really be the last item rather than the first item on the Agenda 
since the subsequent items were all included in the agreement text as chapters or 
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subordinate headings”.41 The DOT recommended that the U.S. “decide position, and 
negotiate with Latin American countries as strongly as possible”.42  
 
The first item on the agenda was a proposed General Inter-American Economic 
Agreement. According to Summary Notes of a Meeting of the Subcommittee on the 
Buenos Aires Economic Conference, political bureaucrats discussed the various forms 
that an economic agreement might take, and there were at least three possibilities: 
(a) An executive agreement, 
(b) A treaty to be submitted to the Senate for consent to ratification (or it could be 
an agreement for approval by joint resolution of both Houses of Congress), or 
(c) A declaration of principles which would have the status merely of 
recommendations to governments.
43
 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Eisenhower’s foreign policy is the outcome of 
interdepartmental discussions, coordinating with different agencies. Most participants 
contemplated different options but thought it was too early to make an economic 
agreement. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi 
indicated that “the draft was a one-side proposal which was not likely to be supported 
                                                        
41 Foreign Relations of the United States, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 
“Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of the Treasury, Washington,” FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. 
VI, May 23rd, 1957. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Foreign Relations of the United States, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 
“Summary Notes of a Meeting of the Subcommittee on the Buenos Aires Economic Conference, 
Department of State, Washington,” FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VI, May 28th, 1957. 
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by the Senate”.44 The draft contained ambiguous commitments, and the U.S. was in 
an unfavourable position to accept it. 
 
The agreement was unbalanced because it required many concessions from the U.S. 
and very little from the Latin American countries. Mr. Kalijarvi anticipated that Latin 
American countries would attack the imposition of quotas on the imports that 
included lead, zinc, woollen textiles and linen towelling.
45
 Rubottom agreed with 
Kalijarvi but he proceeded to point out that the U.S. referred to creating an 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) to finance Latin American economic 
development but the U.S. had not made even one loan to Latin America since then. 
The Director of the ICA, Rollin S. Atwood, agreed with Mr. Kalijarvi that “the draft 
agreement was weighted in favor of the Latin American countries, and he 
recommended that the U.S. request concessions to compensate”.46 The subcommittee 
discussion did not reach a conclusion but apparently bureaucrats, especially Rubottom, 
tended to bridge the gap in the public capital domain. However, some bureaucrats 
continuously encouraged or even expanded the U.S. private investment in Latin 
America such as making improvements to conditions favourable for private 
                                                        
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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investments. 
 
The Under Secretary of the Treasury, Warren Randolph Burgess, provided better tax 
incentives to stimulate new investment abroad on 4th June. “Taxes spared” was used 
to replace rapid amortization. The former was a provision allowing “a credit against 
U.S. tax liability for the amount of taxes given up by a foreign country”. This method 
was designed to avoid “double taxation” by entering into conventions with other 
countries which will remove various obstacles to the flow of trade and investment. Yet, 
the latter was supported to promote U.S. domestic investment. “This device could not 
be used in the defense program, except in the case of very restricted types of 
construction and equipment occupying the highest military priority”.47 Burgess’s 
position at the Buenos Aires Conference was strikingly different from that of 
Rubottom but they could develop their respective ideas independently within the 
Eisenhower foreign policy mechanism. 
 
The U.S. position was taken on 24th July 1957 as recommended by the Randall 
Commission. With regard to the Inter-American Economic Agreement, the U.S. could 
                                                        
47 Foreign Relations of the United States, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 
“Letter From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Burgess) to Milton S. Eisenhower,” FRUS 
1955-1957, Vol. VI, June 4th, 1957. 
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only make a resolution or declaration to alleviate the tensions strained by divergences. 
According to the Letter from Rubottom to Randall, the Commission commented that: 
the U.S. strongly supports bilateral tax agreements to eliminate tax obstacles to 
the formation and flow of capital. The US has a broad and positive policy toward 
public investment in Latin American economic development. A new institution is 
not necessary. The Eximbank, the IBRD, and the IFC constituted a broad 
framework toward public investment in Latin American economic development. 
The Smathers Fund and P.L. 480 lending were additional sources of public 
financing.
48
 
 
The context has shown that the bureaucrats reiterated the established foreign policy 
towards Latin America but were also welcome to an influx of intellectual philosophy 
to advocate the inflow of public capital. One of the characteristics during the 
Eisenhower administration aimed to make different foreign policy objectives work 
effectively as a whole. Interdepartmental differences would be coordinated before 
being presented to the OCB or even further to the NSC. Eisenhower’s 
decision-making role was like an arbiter who finally picks up a piece of 
recommendation or advice he likes and crystallizes into a policy. 
 
From the Latin American perspective, Latin Americans envisaged economic 
prosperity could be upheld by regional market, free trade and the international 
                                                        
48 Foreign Relations of the United States, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 
“Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Chairman 
of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Randall),” FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VI, July 24th, 1957. 
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commodity agreements. Yet, the U.S. did not support international commodity 
agreements - except sugar and wheat - to stabilize prices for primary Latin American 
exports. The current tariff imposition on lead and zinc though affecting Latin 
American sales, the U.S. would maintain the cornerstone of trade policy such as 
“reciprocal, gradual, selective reduction of tariffs and other barriers” and focused 
“low or non-existent U.S. duties on major Latin American exports”. 49 With regard to 
the current P.L. 480 program, the U.S. would need to ensure that P.L. 480 would not 
displace the usual market.
50
 The U.S. position was set by its domestic concerns and 
therefore it was impossible to reduce the trade barriers and put U.S. domestic products 
or mining in a highly competitive market with Latin American imports.  
 
Significance of the Buenos Aires Conference   
Two different kinds of views were expressed during the Conference. Dillon, on one 
hand, envisaged “full-scale integration as the end result of the process” but it might be 
impossible to reach it immediately. However, he saw a chance to develop the common 
market based on a “selective commodity” basis. On the other hand, Raúl Prebisch, the 
Executive Secretary at the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), voiced 
that he was strongly opposed to arrangements developing a larger regional market in 
                                                        
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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Latin America for primary Latin American exports which would lead to a monopoly. 
If monopolies were allowed to develop, or regional trade were not fostered on a free 
enterprise basis, this would ruin the whole concept of the common market.
51
 
 
Dr. Prebisch said that the reason for confining the common market proposals to 
“individual commodities and to capital goods industries which were now in existence, 
was essentially political”. There were some problems. First, bilateral trade balancing 
agreements were viewed as obstacles to inter-American trade. Second, the level of the 
external tariff was the issue to be discussed. For example, “the ECLA people were 
thinking that a rate for tractors and automobiles as high as possible roughly 30 to 
40%”. Pursuant to the Memorandum of a Conversation, it summarised that “markets 
for the automotive industry were established, the 30-40% tariff would be the only 
restriction on imports from the outside”.52 
 
The economic disputes not only happened to the U.S. and Latin American countries 
but also existed within the hemispheric countries. With regard to a general economic 
agreement, Urzua Merino of Chile supported “a formal agreement on broad principles; 
                                                        
51 Foreign Relations of the United States, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 
“Memorandum of a Conversation, Alvear Palace, Buenos Aires,” FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VI, August 
16th, 1957. 
52 Ibid. 
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not inflexible on this point if others approve a resolution or manifesto in general 
terms”. Vasconcellos of Uruguay anticipated a general agreement on broad principles 
could come out from this Conference. Durón of Honduras did not want a treaty at all. 
Despradel of the Dominican Republic went along with “the U.S. view on a general 
statement of principles”. Serrano of El Salvador insisted that “the general agreement 
should consist of a formally signed treaty even though brief and based on general 
principles”. Alvarez Restrepo of Colombia favoured “a general agreement on broad 
principles that could later be amplified”.53  
 
Regarding economic development, Urzua Merino considered a new institution to run 
the Inter-American Development Fund essential. Durón expressed “no special interest 
in an Inter-American Development Fund”. Restrepo was in line with the U.S., hoping 
that Eximbank and World Bank aid could upsize their lending capacity. Despradel 
said the Dominican Republic had not yet used the Eximbank, the IMF and other 
agencies quite so often. Serrano held the view that El Salvador supported an 
Inter-American Fund because the government considered it conducive to economic 
integration in Central America. Cubans called for the dividing up of the negotiations 
among the other committees, and a Cuban proposal for serious study for the eventual 
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establishment of an inter-American financing system.
54
  
 
In relation to trade policy, Urzua Merino put forward that Chile relied much on copper 
but its price fluctuated in the world market. Chile could not rectify the economic 
situation itself to get fair prices. So far, the Chilean Government has taken the 
austerity measures suggested by the Klein-Saks mission to stabilize the economy and 
combat inflation. Vasconcellos strongly advocated Uruguay supported the promotion 
of a common market plan to be obtained from Anderson. Durón stated that Honduras 
would “go along with any plan for promoting Inter-American trade acceptable to the 
majority”. Restrepo said that “Common market idea should receive greater study and 
more sympathetic consideration”. Despradel aired “no views about a common market 
program”. Serrano of El Salvador limited his discussion of foreign commerce to an 
observation that “the Central American economic integration program might prove a 
success in promoting commerce in that area”.55  
 
Other than the said economic disputes, the U.S. was concerned most about “bilateral 
tax agreements to eliminate tax obstacles to the flow of capital”. The U.S. had 
demonstrated the willingness to interpose “tax-sparing” provisions in private 
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treaties.
56
 However, the U.S. was unwilling to make any economic concessions to 
Latin American countries. Would it be possible for the U.S. to promote private 
investments in Latin America along with tax-sparing provisions? Pursuant to Minutes 
of a Cabinet Meeting on 22nd August, Anderson believed that “tax-sparing was 
regarded as an inducement to capital investment and compensation for private 
property confiscated by governments”.57 Having elaborated the point on private 
investment, the U.S. might be able to discuss trade policy. There were two resolutions: 
(a) the establishment by the IA-ECOSOC of a permanent committee on basic 
product commodities;  
(b) developing international commodity agreements for dealing with the 
problem of price instability.
58
 
 
The U.S. agreed the first resolution but abstained from the second on the grounds that 
international commodity had nothing to do with price instability.
59
 In analysing these 
two resolutions, one needs to be clear with the U.S. position during the Buenos Aires 
Economic Conference. The U.S. refuses to make a regional agreement for Latin 
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American countries. Consequently, establishing a permanent IA-ECOSOC committee 
to study basic product commodities would serve U.S. interests. The U.S. was aware 
that Latin American countries needed more development capital. Relying simply on 
private funds would not be adequate so the U.S. had a broad and positive policy 
toward public investment in Latin America. The Economic Conference of the OAS 
comforted Latin American countries:  
Intensification of efforts, individually or through international financial 
institutions, to expand the flow of public capital to the countries of the American 
continent through the extension of credits for the sound financing of investments 
considered essential to development, and to encourage private investment therein, 
in order to promote their economic development and strengthen mutually 
beneficial economic relationships among the American countries.
60
 
 
This economic declaration was made by the OAS rather than the U.S. individually. 
Eisenhower said the Economic Declaration of Buenos Aires was an outstanding 
statement that the OAS could justly be proud of: 
It calls especially for a freer flow of trade, for cooperation on the problems of 
basic commodities, for expansion of the flow of private and public capital, and 
for the effective support of scientific and technical cooperation programs, all 
within the framework of our respective laws.
61
 
 
Dillon added that the Economic Declaration strengthened “economies of the 
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participating countries and the improvement of the living standards of the peoples of 
the Americas”.62 Dillon’s liberal thoughts reflected the effect of the OAS to function 
some national or regional plans that may contribute to the acceleration of economic 
development and the improvement of the standards of living of the peoples in Latin 
American countries. Rubottom identified Latin American countries’ demands to 
increase additional governmental funds for economic development as political intents 
which reinforce Latin American countries’ position to gain economic control 
themselves. Most Latin Americans supposed that private investors were not likely to 
be able to supply the major portion of the foreign funds needed for development. 
Foreign private enterprise might exercise an undue influence on the economic and 
political life of the host country. Hence, Latin American representatives required a 
new financial institution to provide such funds during the Buenos Aires Conference - 
not just depend on private enterprise.
63
  
 
Rethinking the U.S. Approach from Bilateralism to Multilateralism   
Economic cooperation as mentioned in the Economic Declaration of Buenos Aires 
implied more inter-American economic activities in the economic and social fields 
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would be assigned to the OAS. The aftermath of the Buenos Aires Conference was to 
rethink the U.S. fundamental approach in Latin America within established policy 
lines. The effect of the Economic Declaration of Buenos Aires was to spark a debate 
about the U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America. The new policy initiatives were, 
more often than not, described as ill-formed and grudging, introduced in response to 
bitter requests raised by Latin American countries. Overstating the efficacy of U.S. 
private investment in Latin America as the solution to perplexing problems was an 
Achilles' heel in Eisenhower’s economic policy. 
 
In the first place, Dulles adhered tightly to the idea that the inflow of private 
investment could bring in a ripple effect on economic development in Latin America. 
Dulles commented that: 
the U.S. is the principal source of economic assistance and the twenty Latin 
American countries generally share a position seeking such assistance, the 
question of what kind of economic cooperation can suitably be carried out 
through multilateral channels and what kind through bilateral channels remains 
to be clarified.
64
 
 
In his personal opinion, bilateralism was more realistic an approach to an individual 
Latin American country than multilateralism. Although multilateralism provided an 
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effective channel to satisfy Latin America as a whole, its efficacy was easily 
exaggerated by its significance.
65
 In my analysis, Dulles’ bilateralism suggests 
long-standing cooperation with an authoritarian government or a military junta. This 
approach has often overlapped with the anti-communist agenda; a potent justification 
in the Cold War to overcome dissents in Eisenhower’s NSC advisory machinery. 
 
In the second place, a notable achievement of the Buenos Aires Conference was to 
arrange economic reservations for further study. The U.S. was about to extend 
economic cooperation to other members of the OAS such as undertaking a broad 
program of economic cooperation to consider public loans for the economic 
development of Latin American countries. The appeal to increase public loans had 
been conceptualized but an inter-American economic agreement was definitely not 
what the U.S. could offer at this moment.
66
 Obviously, the U.S. could not shift from 
the potential benefits of modernization theory to a broad economic approach as a 
positive response to Latin American economic requests.  
 
Although Rubottom stuck firmly to the U.S. position during the Buenos Aires 
Conference, he had noticed that the focuses of the Conference would be quite similar 
                                                        
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
 - 223 - 
 
to those persistently recurring at inter-American meetings on economic subjects.  
Rubottom suggested that the tariffs on zinc and lead deteriorated U.S.-Latin American 
relations. As a result, efforts towards the Latin American countries should be 
redoubled based on an individual basis and should reconsider “all pending 
applications” and orient “Paraguay and Honduras into proper channels for early 
approval of Development Loan Fund (DLF) projects”.67  
 
As far as the DLF was concerned, Congressmen, like Senator Smathers, expressed 
their interest in undertaking extension of loans for Latin American projects. The DLF, 
as part of a revision of the MSA, was run by the ICA with its aim to provide capital 
projects to foreign countries, and recipient countries could repay by means of the local 
currency. In a Memorandum from Rubottom to Dillon, Rubottom asserted that:  
The Executive Branch officers concerned with DLF operations may consider 
only Bolivia, Honduras, Paraguay and Haiti in Latin America eligible for access 
to the Fund and discourage other countries from submitting proposals to it. As a 
corollary to this attitude there appears to be a disposition arbitrarily to define a 
sound economic project.
68
 
 
Rubottom made two important recommendations annexed to the DLF. Firstly, nearly 
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20% ought to be reserved in public sectors like education, health, sanitation and 
resettlement as contemplated in the Smathers Amendment. Secondly, some Latin 
American countries might suffer from deteriorating export earnings that limited their 
abilities to get credit from existing institutions to finance a sound project, and the U.S. 
should recognize that.
69
  
 
The Smathers Amendment was used to finance projects in public sectors like 
infrastructure; unfortunately, U.S. Congress rejected the $25 million authorized for 
this purpose partially because the sponsor of the Amendment and others were led to 
believe that “its objectives would be attained through MSA Special Assistance funds 
and the DLF”. The Executive Branch, in fact, opposed the appropriation of funds 
under the Smathers Amendment on these grounds. Thus, Mr. Snow commented before 
the House Appropriations Committee:  
We do not consider this a necessary provision to make because the type of loan 
contemplated by Senator Smathers is also contemplated under the new 
Development Loan Fund … and that the sort of loan contemplated would come 
under that Fund.
70
 
 
Because of the falling prices in the market, tin, lead, zinc and copper suffered a blow. 
This unfavourably affected the balance of payments (BOP) positions of several 
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important Latin American countries and reduced their credit worthiness. According to 
the Memorandum from Rubottom to Dillon, the likelihood is “many of these countries 
would soon approach the limits of credits available from existing institutions, 
particularly when account is taken of their existing repayment obligations”.71  
 
One of the most striking characteristics in Eisenhower’s advisory machinery was an 
influx of contradictory objectives. Eisenhower was fascinated by the positive 
outcomes of well-organized structure in foreign policy. Eisenhower, secretariats and 
primary NSC advisers at the top of the organization always attached the coherence of 
policy to emphasizing implications for national security. However, they for the most 
part overlooked the internal pressure from second-tier economic liberals which 
limited policy malleability towards Latin America. Hence, they lived in an illusion of 
coherence. For example, there were two different approaches within the DOS. Dulles 
supported the utilization of bilateralism whereas Rubottom and Dillon advocated the 
employment of multilateralism. The two approaches were integrated into 
Eisenhower’s grand strategy within his advisory machinery. Apparently, the 
machinery could not meet all ideals since they were contradictory to one another.  
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Rubottom urged Dulles to make a visit to Latin America in February 1958 because the 
economic situation in Latin America had compounded U.S.-Latin American relations. 
Also, communists might take advantage of these economic troubles. In a January 19 
memorandum to Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Dulles said:  
he thought U.S. economic policies in relation to Latin America were “too 
negative”, that U.S. policy concerning trade between Latin America and the 
Soviet bloc was too restrictive, and that there should be a re-examination of the 
U.S. policy of opposing quota arrangements on commodities.
72
 
 
Dulles did not think that the U.S. was in a good position to resist the SEO when prices 
for raw materials fell and the demand decreased.
73
 In this context, Dulles was 
concerned about the implications of the SEO while Rubottom highlighted the 
widespread discontent in Latin America marked by lack of public funds into the area.  
 
There was considerable latent incoherence in Eisenhower’s overall strategy. First, 
U.S.-Latin American relations were negative mainly because the U.S. could not agree 
with an Inter-American Bank, trade policy with regard to import taxes on lead and 
zinc, commodity marketing and pricing problems, and economic integration. Second, 
strategic access to raw materials means another counterforce to the SEO. Among 
these economic reservations, only the commodity issue might have implications with 
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the SEO. The U.S. had got strong bilateral relations with some Latin American 
countries since the Second World War. The influence of the SEO in Latin America 
was relatively limited. In policy operation, the economic objectives would be more or 
less distracted when mingled with a national security theme - let’s say - the potential 
threat of the SEO. Although Dulles was an advocate of Eisenhower’s economic policy, 
he was not opposed to engaging in a multilateral study. 
 
Nixon’s Visit: A Wake-Up Call for Policy Change 
Nixon’s visit to South America was not so much viewed as a goodwill trip as 
portrayed as a “holding trip”. The outcome of this visit has shown that U.S. foreign 
policy did not help Latin American countries to improve economic development, and 
thus, anti-Americanism was widespread throughout Latin America. U.S.-Latin 
American relations in 1958 hit rock bottom as Nixon was heavily humiliated during 
his visit to Latin America though unhurt. Milton Eisenhower’s visit to Central 
America was to collect some information; however, the situation was still not good by 
August. Although Milton S. Eisenhower was not an official diplomat, his 
recommendations really gave food for thought upon the established policy. It is fair to 
say that Nixon’s visit and Milton S. Eisenhower’s visit convinced Dulles to take a 
regional approach to the problem of providing financial support for Latin American 
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development. 
 
On 6
th
 March 1958, Dulles, in a letter to Nixon, set out an itinerary for Nixon. Nixon 
was supposed to visit Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia, starting from 27th 
April to 15th May 1958. With regard to Venezuela, Marcos Pérez Jiménez had been 
deposed by a coup lest U.S. special economic and strategic interests might be 
threatened. As for Uruguay, the U.S. had raised its tariffs on wool and meat imports, 
exports that Uruguay heavily relied on. The government had expropriated the Swift 
and Armour meat packing plants, fearing that the American companies were planning 
to close them.
74
 The primary purpose of this visit was to attend the inauguration of 
Arturo Frondizi, the popularly elected president with whom the U.S. would like to 
build a good relationship right after the overthrow of Juan Perón. Bolivia was 
recommended because the Soviet Union unexpectedly dumped 10,000 tons of tin on 
the world market, and the sharp drop in price had severely strained the Bolivian 
economy.
75
  
 
Nixon’s visit did not receive positive feedback. That inter-American relations were 
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cordial and solid as Eisenhower had imagined was an irony. Irwin F. Gellman 
commented that: 
On 28th April, as the motorcade drove into the capital of Uruguay, a small group 
of protestors tossed anti-American leaflets at Nixon’s limousine…Uruguay 
recently concluded a barter agreement with the Soviet minister: Uruguayan wool 
for Soviet oil.
76
  
 
Then, Nixon headed for Argentina but he missed Frondizi’s inaugural ceremony 
because of large crowds and heavy traffic. He spent two days in Bolivia, refusing 
Hernán Siles Zuazo’s demands to stockpile tin and finance loans through the IBRD 
and Eximbank. On 7th May, he received the coolest reception in Peru where the U.S. 
had planned to increase U.S. tariffs on zinc and lead. One of the protestors spat on 
Nixon’s cheek when he tried to return to his hotel from San Marcos University.77  
 
Eisenhower sent Nixon a radiotelephone message to encourage him. According to 
Gellman, the radiotelephone message stated “your courage, patience and calmness in 
the demonstration directed against you by radical agitators have brought you new 
respect and admiration in our country”.78 Things came off badly when he moved to 
Ecuador where some Ecuadorans passed out leaflets saying “Nixon Go Home”, and 
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for the first time, there was graffiti on walls: “Death to Nixon”. Nixon received a 
relatively positive reception in Colombia where he talked privately with Alberto 
Lleras Camargo about the falling price of coffee.
79
  
       
Returning to Washington, Nixon briefed the Cabinet that slogans, placards and 
techniques were all tactics of communist conspiracy but he particularly emphasized 
that the outcomes of the Buenos Aires Conference had its consequences which lead to 
political complaints against the U.S. (the tariff increase and coffee price). He hoped 
that “his trip would have effect in dissipating naiveté to Communist influence in these 
countries”. Thus, he suggested promoting non-governmental exchange such as group 
leaders, university leaders and communications people. The U.S. should devote most 
to “raising the standard of living of the masses”, rather than “protecting the privileges 
of a few”.80 
 
 
Dulles stated his agreement with the analysis of the problem, then pointed to the 
“difficulty of dealing with it since democracy as we know it will not be instituted by 
the lower classes as they gain power - rather they will bring in more of a dictatorship 
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of the masses”. Hence, non-official contacts would help. Nixon then highlighted “the 
importance of educational exchanges and his hope that our exchange programs could 
be at least doubled”.81 Eisenhower started to focus on Latin America earnestly and to 
propose new initiatives as a result of the aftermath of Nixon’s visit.  
 
Milton S. Eisenhower’s trip to Central America followed the episode of Nixon’s visit 
to South America. He pointed out that Eisenhower’s approach did not reach public 
sectors such as housing, education and public health. Milton S. Eisenhower left 
Washington on 12th July, for a fact-finding trip to Panama, Honduras, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, and returned to Washington on 1st August. 
Milton S. Eisenhower said:  
No matter how voluminous the flow of credit might be, no matter how successful 
the U.S. might be in helping promote economic growth within the prevailing 
order, the masses did not benefit from prosperity.
82
 
 
 
The main objective of this visit was to identify the key issue that hinders the standard 
of living of the masses, which was a bit different from that of Nixon’s visit. He was 
pretty much motivated by what he had seen in Panama where President de la Guardia 
outlined Panama’s need for capital to finance schools, roads, piers, and, above all, 
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houses in Panama City. Milton S. Eisenhower conceived the solution to the demands 
for public housing:  
[the possible solution] for low-cost houses was to use monthly payments from 
employees to cover interest and amortization that could be deducted from their 
salaries, making the loan from the U.S. for the total cost a fairly safe 
investment…83 
 
Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and El Salvador were rife with illiteracy, low 
infrastructure, low per capita income and awful public health. On 24th July, Milton 
Eisenhower flew to Puerto Rico where he studied “self-help housing projects, 
industries, and agriculture”. Average per capita income had increased five times since 
he visited Puerto Rico in 1938. It is impossible to compare Puerto Rico with other 
independent Latin American countries but Puerto Rico indeed set a good example for 
Latin American countries. Therefore, he recommended that the U.S. initiate a program 
of low-cost housing, “starting with the 35 hundred Canal employees”. The 
recommendation was likewise reported to the head of the DLF and “urged a 
cooperative effort by the Fund and private credit institutions in initiating the housing 
experiment”.84 
 
According to the Department of State Bulletin on 25th August 1958, Milton S. 
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Eisenhower urged that the U.S. review its economic policies toward the Central 
America area upon his arrival in the U.S. In a preliminary report to the President on 
1st August, he suggested policy and program improvements that dealt with: 
(a)  the imperative need for bankable loans, not grants, in every country visited;  
(b)  the response which the U.S. should make to the appeal of Latin American 
nations for more stable relationships between raw commodity prices and the prices 
of manufactured products;  
(c)  the urgent and immediate need to bring about throughout the hemisphere a 
clear, accurate understanding of U.S. policies, purposes, programs and 
capabilities.
85
 
     
The follow-up on Milton S. Eisenhower’s visit was Dulles’ visit to Brazil in early 
August which further convinced Dulles that it was essential for political reasons to 
take a regional approach to the problem of offering financial support for Latin 
American development. Liberal officials, such as Milton S. Eisenhower, Rubottom, 
Dillon and Anderson, gain much weight and influence soon after the said visits to 
Latin America. Allcock pointed out the role of Rubottom and Dillon in the 
decision-making process; they gained much influence in the preparation of the 
Buenos Aires Conference.
86
 
 
However, the next part would not challenge the scholarly premises proposed by 
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Allcock and Bevan Sewell but it would strongly argue that Brazil is the case that 
attempts to revise the U.S. loan position through the framework of “Operation Pan 
America” before and after Nixon and Dulles’ visits.87 Following the disastrous end to 
Nixon’s trip in 1958, Kubitschek attempted to align Brazil with U.S. interests to get 
more foreign aid control. 
 
Dulles’ Visit to Brazil: Pan Americanism 
Dulles’ official visit to Brazil from 4th August to 6th August 1958 was defined as the 
process to “Operation Pan America”, which envisaged Marshall Plan-like funds to the 
masses of Latin America. According to the Telegram from the Department of State to 
the Embassy in Brazil, it suggested: 
Brazil have recourse to gold pledge was not principal recommendation of 
Anderson letter. Principal recommendation was that Brazil work out 
comprehensive economic and financial program with IMF. Reference to gold 
pledge was merely means tiding Brazil over if necessary before satisfactory 
program agreed upon with IMF.
88
 
 
 
As the context indicated, the U.S. expected that Brazil could comply with the IMF to 
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achieve economic progress. However, Brazil would undertake a series of economic 
programs based on the developmental funds.
89
 As I see it, Brazil presented economic 
problems in Latin America in front of the U.S. Kubitschek delivered a clear message 
that the current U.S. foreign aid policy was inadequate to meet economic problems in 
Brazil. Hence, Brazil, as a rising power in Latin America, served as a representative to 
solicit economic assistance from the U.S.  
 
Kubitschek saw a chance of revising the U.S. loan position in Eisenhower’s economic 
policy towards Latin America. Kubitschek’s shaky position upon the concept of 
Operation Pan America, as the DOS pointed out, was a political expediency with a 
view to the urgent need for U.S. balance-of-payments loans without the 
implementation of the total exchange reform program being required by the IMF. He 
identified Brazilian interests with U.S. interests by reaffirming Operation Pan 
America so as to get diplomatic support.
90
 In doing so, he claimed 95% compliance 
with the IMF. The reason he avoided the final steps in the reform was that they might 
trigger a series of political and social disturbances his government would not able to 
control. Mann analysed that if Kubitschek did not reach a satisfactory agreement with 
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the IMF, there would be an avalanche of demands for such loans that would divert 
U.S. limited public resources from economic development.
91
  
 
Eight days later, Ellis O. Briggs, U.S. ambassador to Brazil, telegrammed the DOS 
illustrating Kubitschek’s approach to Hemispheric Affairs. This approach was based 
on the concept of “Operation Pan America”. According to Ellis O. Briggs, he reported 
Kubitschek’s design of “Pan Americanism” to the DOS. He stated “Kubitschek has 
got no detailed plan [Pan Americanism] to offer but would welcome early opportunity 
to confide in President since he believes it is high time we jointly undertake an 
examination of fundamentals”.92 In my analysis, U.S. bureaucrats questioned the 
concept of Pan Americanism although they were morally obligated to any program 
proposed by Latin American states. This has shown the inherent contradiction in 
Eisenhower’s policy of neutrality. In theory, the Executive Branch recognized the 
importance of economic development in Latin America, but in practice it was 
concerned about the viability of the concept.  
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One month later, Kubitschek developed his concept of Pan Americanism for 
strengthening bilateral relations between the U.S. and Brazil. Brazil’s role, in 
consequence, was of much importance to the rest of the Latin American countries. 
What was the concept of Operation Pan America all about? On 20th June, Rubottom 
enclosed the concept of Operation Pan America in depth, and forwarded a 
memorandum to Eisenhower in which Kubitschek argued the U.S. should double its 
efforts to tackle Latin American poverty. In other words, the U.S. should take not only 
a bilateral approach but also a multilateral approach to support economic progress in 
Latin America.
93
 As I see it, Kubitschek’s proposal was a response to the Buenos 
Aires Conference during which the request for regional funds was put forward for 
discussion. Did the U.S. foreign policy change because of Operation Pan America?  
What was Dulles’ response to this concept?  
 
Kubitschek’s belief underpinned Operation Pan America and contributed to joint 
communiqués on the subject of multilateralism. Dulles embraced Kubitschek’s 
philosophy for multilateralism in general but recognized the principal problems as: 
(a) Coffee.  
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(b) Eximbank loans, which he said during the next two years would amount to 
requests totalling $300 million dollars (electric power $150 million, iron and steel 
$75 million, other industries $75 million).  
(c) Other assistance which he mentioned, included P.L. 480, and DLF loans which 
he hoped to expand.
94
 
 
Finally, he requested that “there be conversations with the U.S. government for 
petroleum development without contemplating changes in Brazilian oil legislation”.95 
The Operation Pan America challenged not only bilateral relations between the U.S. 
and Brazil but also the U.S. position upon multilateralism. In the first place, Dulles 
noticed that Brazil was now in urgent need of rapid economic growth but the problems 
of rapid economic development were very great in free societies and they involved 
great risks. The key point was:  
It is very difficult to attain a rapid rate of development without a high degree of 
economic controls, which are destructive of free enterprise and freedom. 
Observing that rapid economic development involves the risk of inflation he 
expressed the belief that the Brazilian Foreign Minister is fully aware of the 
problem.
96
  
 
The Embassy in Brazil added that increases proposed in MSP military and non-military 
programs for Brazil FY 1960 were proper to U.S. objectives. P.L. 480 purchases and 
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loans were beneficial to the Brazilian economy. The U.S. had recently expressed 
willingness to study means of combating underdevelopment in Latin American 
countries, as did the Secretary’s recent visit and joint Brazil-U.S. communiqués. The 
role of the U.S. Information Service was extremely important in this context.
97
 In the 
second place, some economic reservations remained unsettled after the Buenos Aires 
Conference. Dulles considered that U.S. participation in international forums such as 
the Coffee Study Group and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
important. The U.S. established a Coffee Study Group in Washington; there were over 
twenty producing and consuming countries.
98
 To be fair, although there were many 
initiatives for policy change in 1958 during which U.S.-Latin American countries’ 
relations reached their lowest point, the leading bureaucrats did not change the policy 
towards Latin America. At best, Dulles recognized the merit of Operation Pan 
America but did not change the policy line upheld by the Executive Branch. Free trade 
and minimal aid were the cornerstones of U.S. economic policy in Latin America. 
Rubottom, Dillon and Milton S. Eisenhower took the initiative in expanding the 
current policy line, bridging the gap in the public capital domain. However, Dulles 
was concerned with the viability of a multilateral approach.   
                                                        
97 Foreign Relations of the United States, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, 
“Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State,” FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. V, August 
18th, 1958. 
98 Ibid. 
 - 240 - 
 
Overall Assessment on U.S. Foreign Policy from 1957 to 1958 
Latin American demands for public capital never came into realization since 
Eisenhower took office in 1953. In examining U.S.-Latin American relations, the 
neglect of public capital represented a cycle which fermented widespread discontent in 
Latin America. The impact of bureaucratic change in Eisenhower’s cabinet members 
gave fresh impetus to Eisenhower’s current foreign policy. Even though there was no 
immediate policy change right after the Buenos Aires Conference, the level of 
influence from newly appointed bureaucrats such as Anderson, Dillon and Rubottom 
gradually gained a foothold within the foreign policy politics. On the other hand, the 
influence of senior bureaucrats, like Dulles, was on the wane. Whether the U.S. 
liberalism or idealism could be achieved in individual Latin American states was still 
disputable. 
 
The outcome of the Buenos Aires Conference undoubtedly carried much pressure on 
Latin American countries; likewise, the added-on tariffs increased the level of 
discontent. Stirred up by this, Latin Americans sought to strengthen the concept of 
anti-Americanism - the violent attack on Nixon in 1958 was a clear presentation of a 
growing trend of anti-Americanism. Nixon labelled the furious mob as a communist 
conspiracy but he felt the necessity of reviewing current policy, paying much attention 
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to Latin Americans. Had the violent demonstrators been so relevant to the communist 
conspiracy, why were they consciously prone to its inspiration? Neither political 
ideology nor economic assistance could explain this riot attack. In my analysis, the 
incident was not just simply because of the tariff imposition on lead and zinc. The story 
behind was the anti-Americanism serving as an underlying force for the grass-roots 
movement. 
 
The idea of the Drago Doctrine, mostly used in the business activities with other 
countries, has its historical roots in the Calvo Doctrine. The former represents the latter 
in a narrow sense. The Drago Doctrine has recognized the contractual obligations 
between the binding parties and agreement to mediation by a third-party institution 
such as the inter-state tribunal services. In response to the Drago Doctrine, the 
Roosevelt Corollary was launched by Theodore Roosevelt since the Drago Doctrine 
misinterpreted its argument from the 11
th 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States and Alexander Hamilton which likewise gave Roosevelt a political justification 
to intervene in Latin America under the auspices of the Monroe Doctrine. What was the 
direct connection between the Monroe Doctrine and the Drago Doctrine? The Drago 
Doctrine prohibits the European countries from collecting public debts in Latin 
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America by force due to the equality of sovereignty. Why could Latin American 
nations not have their own doctrine without any compulsions? 
 
Free trade was the foundation in Eisenhower’s foreign policy towards Latin America 
but could this policy be pursued without domestic pressures?  If not, how could the 
U.S. solve the economic disputes that ferment anti-American sentiments? What has the 
U.S. learnt from Nixon’s visit to South America and Kubitschek’s proposal of Pan 
Americanism?  Ironically, the U.S. bureaucrats were aware of the driving force of 
nationalism but they never appealed to the Latin American public to counteract the 
effects of anti-Americanism. As a consequence, the conflation of anti-Americanism 
and the Brazilian nationalism was used by Kubitschek to counteract the influence of 
U.S. foreign policy. When Eisenhower took office in 1953, bureaucrats tried to 
influence or even control Latin American national leaders to serve anti-communism 
policy. However, this did not mean that they actually won the hearts of Latin American 
nationals. The fallacy was not clearly corrected until Nixon came back from South 
America. In an analysis of the present political trend in Latin America, the NIE 
80/90-58 report evaluates: 
the Communists were not numerically strong in Latin America, but were adept 
at identifying themselves with popular sentiments already prevalent and 
exploiting them for their own purpose. They fostered the tendency of 
intellectuals, students, and other leaders of opinion to interpret both the local 
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situation and US relations in Marxist terms.
99
 
 
Senior bureaucrats during the first term of Eisenhower’s administration were largely 
obsessed with the Cold War belief to fight against the international communism which 
led to inappropriate or biased decisions. Local communists were not strong but why 
did not the U.S. try to improve its friendly image in Latin America? The fundamental 
problem lies in a historical fact that Latin America was not the first priority of U.S. 
global foreign policy and it was described as an area to support U.S. world policy. As 
a result, they often reviewed their policy with hindsight not with foresight. 
 
In June 1958, U.S. citizens in Cuba encountered problems of safety and security 
because 47 American citizens were abducted by Castro rebels. Even though the 
Americans were released, the case illuminated two defects in U.S. foreign policy 
towards Latin America. As far as the domestic politics in Cuba were concerned, the 
difficulties of dealing with this “guerrilla-type activity with the techniques and policies 
which have been primarily developed in the context of dealing with or through 
governments in effective control of their national territories”. With regard to the 
inter-American system, there was no central authority to govern the national territory, 
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let alone any legal enforcement to maintain social order.
100
 Altogether, it meant that the 
non-intervention principle was, once again, being challenged. The inflow of private 
investment was the cornerstone of Eisenhower’s economic policy towards Latin 
America; however, how did the U.S. respond to the new nationalist leader? 
 
U.S. bureaucrats gave too little weight to the Cuban Revolution. On 16
th
 February 1959, 
they did a policy review and issued NSC 5902/1, which covered many areas, including 
economic development in Latin America, the non-intervention principle, the threat of 
communism, and informational and cultural aspects. This document has identified that 
the main problem in U.S.-Latin American relationships resulted from the psychological 
factor. The factor has been compounded by the following three points: 
(a) the feeling of Latin Americans that the U.S. has neglected them while 
devoting attention and resources to more distant areas in order to combat 
communism, 
(b) the tendency of Latin Americans to shift to the U.S. the blame for lack of  
satisfactory progress, and 
(c) the growth of nationalism.
101
 
 
Interesting of all, U.S. bureaucrats almost repeated the same problem recurring in Latin 
American states without contributing a constructive policy. NSC 5902/1 suggests 
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“greater friendship, mutual respect and sense of interdependence among governments 
and peoples of the American Republics” and “greater Latin American understanding 
and support of U.S. world policies as well as greater recognition of the constructive U.S. 
interest in Latin American aspirations”.102 Was this the so-called political expedient to 
release the tensions? Did this apply to Cuba? How far could this reach? In this chapter, 
it has also shown that different policy objectives could be “maintained” through 
Eisenhower’s foreign policy and they were not always in conflict with one another. 
 
                                                        
102 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Castro-Communist Threat:  
Agrarian Reform and Disillusion of Castro’s Leadership 
 
The fifth chapter of this thesis simply purports that the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and 
the subsequent U.S.-Cuban relations were the central case of the conflict between U.S. 
economic interests and the Latin American objective of economic sovereignty. The 
revolution was indeed a consequence of economic inequalities between the economic 
control imposed by the U.S. and the economic initiative launched by oppositional 
forces. Castro’s leadership articulated the long latent sense of Latin American 
nationalism to which a degree of gaining economic control by Latin American 
initiatives was countered by the U.S. The rising anti-American sentiment was the 
cornerstone of Cuban nationalism that gained political momentum against the 
dictatorship of the Batista regime and the influence of American companies in Cuba. 
The political objective of the revolutionary element was to disrupt the growth of U.S.  
influence in Cuba. 
 
The success of the revolution was a challenge to the reactive nature of foreign policy 
towards Latin America, components of which were the combination of communist 
infiltration and U.S. private investment. While the U.S. tried to keep out communist 
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influence, this was defined through the context of private investment in Cuba. In 
consequence, the image of communism was imposed on political and economic reality, 
which served more to obscure policy operation. The root cause affecting U.S.-Cuban 
relations with respect to this revolution was political and economic disputes but there 
was no urgent communist threat to U.S. interests in Cuba at the nascent stage of the 
revolution. After Castro won the revolution, his attitude towards the U.S. was 
extremely ambivalent. Some liberal bureaucrats such as Rubottom even conceived of 
possible cooperation with Castro - this was a positive prelude to Castro’s visit to the 
U.S. in April 1959. There was no significant change to the policy for the enforcement 
of the Agrarian Reform Law on 17
th
 May 1959. 
 
Given the fact that nationalization was one of the political objectives for economic 
nationalists, the U.S. bureaucrats demonstrated more attention to Cuban 
development.
1
 The U.S. still preferred to pursue the non-intervention policy. The 
theme of national security, details of which have been associated with the threat of 
international communism, was magnified and even integrated after Anastas Mikoyan, 
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the Soviet deputy premier, visited Cuba on a trade mission in early February 1960.
2
 
The bilateral contact with Moscow was a blatant challenge against anti-communism 
principles, U.S. private investments, and the safety of U.S. citizens in Cuba. This 
made the U.S. position on neutrality unable to respond to Cuba’s situation 
unequivocally: 
The U.S. would not adjust its general policy but alter policy operation that 
would be undertaken not as the output of a coherent U.S. strategy. 
Furthermore, this would combine two different organizations (the DOS and 
CIA) for coordination to deal with the political reality in Cuba. In pursuance 
of policy review in Memorandum of Discussion at the 432d Meeting, it clearly 
set out that the U.S. objective in Cuba was to: adjust all our actions in such a 
way as to accelerate the development of an opposition in Cuba which would 
bring about a change in the Cuban Government, resulting in a new 
government favorable to U.S. interests.
3
 
 
 
Due to the fact that the DOS had been working with the CIA on Cuban problems, the 
U.S. tried to formulate a program of covert action against the Castro government. The 
adjustment in policy operation pursued aimed to bridge the gap between U.S. 
objectives and political reality in Cuba. The covert action unavoidably resulted in 
fundamental tension in the non-intervention principle. 
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It is apparent that the U.S. took the initiative to deal with the political reality in Cuba 
through a bilateral rather than a multilateral approach. In addition, NSC 5902/1 never 
prioritized illustrated methods to achieve overall U.S. objectives. The question raised 
here was whether a multilateral approach should be utilized before or after a bilateral 
approach. In a memorandum for Gray, Milton Eisenhower expressed his views on 
NSC 5902 (paragraphs 21-a and b) showing that he would delete the phrase “taking 
overt unilateral action only as a last resort” in paragraph 21-a. Also, he would delete 
the last phrase “take overt unilateral action only when the President determines vital 
U.S. security interests to be involved” in paragraph 21-b.4 The formulation of covert 
action did not belong to the exceptions of the non-intervention policy nor did it 
portray the non-intervention principle. 
 
Castro’s regime has had a profound effect upon the course of Latin American affairs. 
Here I put forward three policy themes from a historical approach in U.S.-Cuban 
relations: (a) The Agrarian Reform Law might bring about instability and threat of 
nationalization of private investments. The Cuban Model was supposed to be one of 
the options for modernization in Latin America; (b) Cuba served as a major target 
within the narrative of the SEO soon after Mikoyan’s visit to Cuba. Mikoyan 
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developed trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba; (c) The rise of Castro to power 
reflected a failure of Eisenhower’s general policy in Latin America. The image that 
the U.S. has neglected Latin American countries recurred, and long-smouldering 
discontent was found soon after Nixon’s visit to Latin America on 27th April 1958.  
 
First of all, the Agrarian Reform Law in May 1959, and the follow-up actions 
nationalizing both foreign and domestic industrial and commercial enterprise in Cuba 
in 1960 had significant economic repercussions in Latin America. According to 
Alfonso Gonzalez, he indicated that: 
Latin American capitalists feared the increasing political and economic pressures 
and the threats of new policies similar to those of the Arbenz administration in 
Guatemala (1951-1954) and the measures enacted following the Bolivian 
Revolution (1952).
5
 
 
By comparison with Guatemala, Bolivia was moderate with its land reform policy. 
Rabe analysed that “the U.S. stake in Bolivia was minimal; land reform in Bolivia did 
not involve collectivization”.6 Eisenhower used economic aid to keep Bolivia in 
non-communist line, and to force the MNR to adopt free trade and investment policies. 
In general, political instability would decrease the inflow of private capital in Latin 
America. 
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Secondly, as far as diplomatic means were concerned, Cuba was a paradigm 
responding to economic offers provided by the Russians within the ideological 
framework. Mikoyan went to Havana on a Soviet scientific, cultural and technical 
exhibition on 5th February 1960. George J. Boughton explained that the Joint 
Communique summarized that “the Soviet Union contracted to purchase 425,000 tons 
of sugar from Cuba’s 1960 harvest, and 1 million tons of sugar in each of the 
following four years”. Mikoyan’s visit was considered much as a formal campaign to 
re-establish relations with Cuba.
7
 
 
In the past, economic assistance served as an added lever of influence in Latin 
America but Latin American countries got limited foreign aid or public funds even 
after the Buenos Aires Conference. By the Act of Bogotá 1960, the U.S. was formally 
committed to contributing to Latin America's social progress. The establishment of the 
Inter-American Development Bank was a program to extend “soft loans” for social 
development in Latin America.
8
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Thirdly, little attention paid in Latin America also signifies that the DOS bureaucrats, 
Christian Herter and Rubottom alike, came no closer to solving the fundamental 
issues in Latin America. From 1958 to 1959, the U.S. had no clear objective in Cuba, 
let alone what to achieve. This made non-intervention policy unable to respond to 
Castro effectively while Castro gained much economic control upon U.S. private 
companies. This turned out to be economic divergence sharpened between the U.S. 
private companies and the Castro regime. In dealing with the rise of the Castro regime, 
the U.S. tended to rely much on the CIA to formulate covert action against Castro due 
to the triumph of the intelligence operation in Guatemala. The failure of 
non-intervention conducted by the DOS facilitated the coordination with the CIA, 
which accentuated the lack of clarity in what to achieve, and how to develop 
non-intervention. 
 
Non-intervention Principle: A Catalyst for Local Nationalism?  
According to Andrew Zimbalist, he provided some statistics of Cuba’s economy in 
1958. The statistics showed U.S. economic interests in Cuba: 
98% of Cuba’s trade was with non-communist countries. The U.S. alone 
accounted for 71% of Cuba’s exports and 64% of her import. Total U.S. direct 
private investment in Cuba was close to $2 billion, controlling over 30% of the 
sugar industry, one-third of public utilities, and major shares of the mining and 
manufacturing sectors where sales by U.S.-owned companies amounted to over a 
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quarter of Cuba’s GNP.9 
 
The U.S. had suspended its arms policy towards Cuba nearly nine months before 
Castro’s victory, and thus relationships between the Batista government and the U.S. 
were becoming more and more strained.
10
 Non-intervention was the principle in 
dealing with Cuba in domestic tensions between Batista and Castro. In consequence, 
no matter who won the revolution, the U.S. could continue doing business with the 
winner. As a result, I think that non-intervention was an official language but there 
was no pure non-intervention policy in U.S.-Latin American relations – another 
paradox.  
 
The Cuban presidential election was supposed to be held in November 1958. Cuba’s 
politics was delineated by two centres of power represented by the Batista regime on 
the one hand and the revolutionary opposition, mainly the “26th of July” Movement, 
on the other. In analysing the Cuban situation, Allan C. Stewart, the Deputy Director 
of the Office of Middle American Affairs, concluded: 
Batista’s regime is unpopular, and he has not yet promised the public to have a 
clean election. A change in arms sales policy could give rise to further 
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kidnappings in Oriente Province or reprisals against American citizens, property, 
or both, not only in Oriente but elsewhere.
11
 
 
The U.S., more to the point, did not want to irritate oppositional insurrection by 
giving all-out support to Batista. From my judgement, maintaining neutrality in 
Cuban politics was rational but could this approach ensure the safety of U.S. nationals 
in Cuba? The U.S. Embassy was very passive about Cuban politics. In the past, the 
U.S. supported Batista but caused anti-American sentiment in Cuba – an accusation of 
intervention. On the other side, nationalist sentiment grows stronger if the U.S. does 
not intervene. It is contradictory in maintaining the non-intervention principle and 
containing local nationalism.    
 
Non-intervention policy could be defined as “refraining from overt unilateral 
intervention in the affairs of the other American Republics”. 12  Based on the 
Preliminary Memorandum on Considerations for Policy Recommendations for Cuba, 
it summarized why the DOS did not support the Batista regime: 
To throw our [U.S.] support at this time in favor of the expiring Batista regime 
would, it is believed, destroy the last remaining faith which the majority of the 
Cuban people have in U.S. protestations of support for the cause of democracy in 
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a free world.
13
 
 
To put it in an analytical framework, Batista’s dictatorship and brutalities could not 
convince the Cuban people to seek a democratic transition of power in the first place, 
and in the second place, Fidel Castro gained strength and enjoyed popularity among 
middle-class labour. The forces of the 26th of July movement substantially controlled 
Oriente Province outside the principal cities and towns.
14
 
 
Given the fact that Cuba’s politics were in high political tension, the U.S. must take a 
wait-and-see attitude on both sides. On one hand the U.S. would suspend all arms 
shipments to Batista, and on the other hand the U.S. could not be sure what Castro’s 
position might be. There were two alternatives confronting U.S. non-intervention 
policy in Cuba: 
(a) To allow the situation to drift, which in the Embassy’s judgment would 
result in a sharper polarization of centres of power represented by the Batista 
regime and revolutionary opposition.  
(b) To do everything possible to promote free and open elections and to 
discreetly encourage political opposition to unite behind one candidate.
15
 
 
U.S. ambassador to Cuba, Smith, analysed the consequences of the two alternatives. 
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In terms of the first plan, the U.S. would be blamed by both sides. Neither Batista nor 
Castro would be willing to negotiate with each other. Allowing the situation to drift 
also meant little possibility of a peaceful solution through elections based on 
constitutional guarantees. In the long run, this plan would bring about a high level of 
instability in the Caribbean Sea. The second plan was identical with the majority of 
people of Cuba to have a new government elected, not committed to either extreme, 
capable with U.S. support of restoring normalcy to Cuba. Thus, Smith personally 
recommended the Department urgently consider the second alternative.
16
 
 
According to the Report Prepared by the Division of Research and Analysis for 
American Republics, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research indicated that: 
A general strike was attempted on April 9, but did not receive nation-wide 
popular support and was quickly frustrated by strong government counter 
actions… Its chances for success in overthrowing the Batista regime have 
increased. Raúl Castro doubled efforts on the guerilla forces (now about 4,000 
strong), and strengthened territorial control in Oriente Province.
17
 
 
The rebels recovered from their April defeat and arrived at their present advantageous 
position. In addition, Castro had recently entered into “a unity pact opposing the 
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Batista regime”. The revolutionary forces tenaciously rejected foreign intervention in 
Cuban internal affairs, and replacement of Batista by a military junta.
18
 
 
In the past, the U.S. used to supply the Batista regime with war matériel whereby 
Batista could maintain political stability in Cuba or at least its facade. That certainly 
precipitated the revolutionary forces opposing the Batista regime. The kidnap incident 
in June presented some indication that the Castro forces had by no means taken a 
pro-U.S. position. On 26th June, the Castro forces attacked the facilities of the Moa 
Bay Mining Company, seized 11 Americans working there, and 24 U.S. naval 
personnel were successively abducted at Guantanamo base. This incident gave Castro 
political influence against the U.S.; based on this fact, additional revenge on 
Americans in Cuba might be likely to happen unless foreign policies were changed.
19
  
 
Since the Cuban Revolution had become acute, U.S. foreign policy was being 
challenged. According to the Letter from the Consul at Santiago de Cuba (Wollam) to 
the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy), it revealed that the rebels 
“condemned the U.S. for supporting the government of President Batista and other 
so-called dictatorships”. Batista tried to please the U.S. claiming that the 
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revolutionary elements were penetrated by communism. However, there had been no 
clear evidence of communist involvement in the opposition forces; at best, it would 
seem that “the possibility of the Communists advancing their objectives through the 
anti-Americanism might be a source of concern” as they were leftists as far as the 
political spectrum was concerned.
20
  
 
The Letter from Wollam to Leonhardy showed “the U.S. appeared to receive no credit 
from either side”. The rebels simply deduced from past experience that Cuba used to 
be under the MDA Agreement with respect to the use of grant aid equipment 
previously furnished to the Batista regime, while Batista was annoyed with the 
inability of the U.S. to provide more materials to defeat Castro. Thus, this delicate 
local problem needed to be handled carefully. In search of the U.S. national interests, 
the U.S. had better not get involved in local politics; meanwhile, promoting 
censorship and due process of election would also defend the U.S. position in Cuba.
21
 
In policy operation, the U.S. interests were best served by holding up the decision 
until a new leader came out to govern Cuba. At this moment, the U.S. would identify 
policy objectives with those of the Cuban people to facilitate the belief that the U.S. 
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supported the cause of democracy in a free world. In doing so, the U.S. would not be 
shackled by either side in the revolution narrative. 
 
The U.S. still suspended the sale of arms to Cuba.
22
 Yet, Smith assessed that U.S. 
interests would be best served if the Batista government could remain in power until 
24th February 1959. The new president would have to “install cabinet, and try to gain 
confidence of Cuban people”. The new administration might survive with support of 
the army and support of the U.S. It was his hope that violent overthrow of the present 
government would result in political chaos in Cuba that might in turn threaten 
American life and property. Communists might take strength out of the political chaos 
in Cuba.
23
 
 
U.S. foreign policy in Cuba was conducted by the U.S. embassy to Cuba that pursued 
short-term objectives. In policy operation, the U.S. embassy to Cuba tended to 
prioritize political objectives rather than economic objectives. The general 
non-intervention proposition was to stay out of political troubles in Cuba. More 
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specifically, if the U.S. made any political commitment to either side, it would be 
viewed as an overt intervention in Cuba’s domestic politics by the public. It is Smith’s 
belief that the U.S. interests were best served if Batista could be the president until 
24th February 1959. Smith did not envisage a contingency plan to protect U.S. 
interests when the rebel forces came out to power. Consequently, U.S. foreign policy 
towards Cuba at this moment was short-term planning rather than long-term planning. 
 
Challenge of Political and Economic Sovereignty 
The continuance of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba developed a 
schema of sources of power held by the rebel forces over eastern provinces of Cuba, 
which by the same token gave Castro a great chance to gain strength at an alarming 
pace. The U.S. government analysed that the revolutionary opposition had announced 
its purpose to “disrupt the elections on 3rd November due to the lack of public 
confidence in candidates”.24 According to the document from the Embassy in Cuba to 
the DOS, it revealed that: 
The unacceptability of the elections to the rebels means that their efforts to 
overthrow the Government will continue, and hence that the elections offer 
little hope of resolving this immediate problem.
25
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As the document from the Embassy in Cuba to the DOS shows, four candidates would 
turn up in the oncoming presidential election. Rivero Agüero was in favour of 
“continuism” of the regime because he was very faithful to Batista. Grau San Martin 
was known for the “One Hundred Days government” from 10th September 1933 to 
15th January 1934. Salas Amaro, who was the leader of the Party of Cuban Unity, had 
few public followers. Marquez Sterling, a former president in 1940 Constitutional 
Convention, had a good reputation. The DOS also urged American nationals not to 
involve themselves in the Cuban Revolution, or to pay tribute to either side. This 
would undermine the non-intervention principle.
26
  
 
In a Memorandum of a Conversation, Mr. Bump, who was the Vice President of 
United Fruit Company in Boston, referred to the request the Company had received in 
Cuba to pay tribute to the rebel movement: 
In 1957, tribute was being assessed on the basis of the Company’s sugar 
production of last year and added up to almost $186,000. The rebels requested 
$10,000 paid immediately by 1st October so they could buy some mobile 
equipment in possession of the United Fruit Company.
27
 
 
Mr. Raines, the Vice President of United Fruit Company in Cuba, explained that they 
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had lost to the rebels in the past year nearly “$50,000 worth of equipment and 
livestock”. He anticipated that the U.S. Government could come up with a strong 
statement opposing tribute payments, and the rebels would withdraw their demand. 
He presumed that the rebels would control most areas in eastern Cuba, and “the 
Cuban Army in the area was completely ineffectual”.28 
 
The public statement that Herter issued did not help American companies in Cuba at 
all. It was nothing more than an official document reiterating the U.S. position of a 
non-intervention principle in Cuba: 
The U.S. government is opposed to American nationals involving themselves in 
the internal political affairs of any foreign country. Accordingly, the United 
States disapproves of contributions, whether forced or voluntary, by American 
citizens or firms, to any political party or faction within Cuba which would 
violate that principle.
29
 
 
In examining non-intervention policy, there was considerable poor identification 
between U.S. objectives and actions. Even though the DOS stood on a 
non-intervention principle dictated by U.S. NSC policy, the public statement seemed 
unhelpful in preventing the kidnapping incident. There was considerable logical 
fallacy when the DOS approached political reality in Cuba. The U.S. embassy in Cuba 
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analysed that “the rebel movement is much stronger in Oriente now than it was in 
April, and that its potential for creating disturbances is greatly increased”.30 Yet, what 
the DOS instructed or pursued did not entirely contribute to the basic principle of 
protecting private investment in Cuba. U.S. properties and lives were of vital 
importance. 
 
Two employees in Texaco were abducted by Castro forces close to Santiago but they 
were released by the rebels later. In despatch 41 from Santiago, October 29, Consul at 
Santiago de Cuba, Park F. Wollam, summarized why rebel representatives wanted to 
see the local manager for Texaco. It revealed “the demands made by the rebels in their 
meeting on October 25 with the Texaco representative for either $500,000 in cash or 
$300,000 worth of arms”.31 Even though “the urgency of the matter was stressed by 
the Consulate”, the DOS did not have a back-up plan to protect U.S. interests 
operating in eastern Cuba.
32
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The DOS bureaucrats symbolically had a meeting with the American business 
representatives in Cuba. The President of the UFCO, Mr. Kenneth H. Redmond, tried 
to elicit the possible course of action and policy the U.S. might take towards the 
newly elected government in Cuba from the Department. Redmond claimed “the 
increasing difficulties his company was having in Oriente Province and others in the 
group were or would be faced with a similar situation”.33 Mr. Wieland and Mr. 
Leonhardy, who represented the Office of Caribbean and Mexico Affairs, raised a 
critical question whether “any significant reduction in Castro’s activities would take 
place after the elections?” Rubottom deferred making any comment on that. There 
was a considerable lack of clarity in U.S. policy operations after the elections.
34
  
 
The Director of the American Foreign Power, Mr. Hummel, identified the key issue 
with reference to U.S. companies paying tribute to the rebel forces in the political 
struggle in Cuba. He asked that: 
If they [private companies in Cuba] continuously refused to pay tribute as the 
Embassy indicated they should do, how much protection could they expect from 
the U.S. Government and what recourse would they have against present and 
future losses caused by the Castro forces.
35
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Rubottom again deferred to Marjorie M. Whiteman who was Assistant Legal Adviser 
for Inter-American Affairs. She explained that:  
Eastern Cuba are under control of rebels who have no status recognized by the 
U.S. So far as the Cuban Government is concerned, they are not acting within 
its authority. Thus, we are unable to look to the legitimate government or to 
the rebels to provide protection.
36
 
 
 
In other words, they did not have the sovereignty and jurisdiction. Based on this point, 
the U.S. would be unable to look to the legitimate government or to the rebels to 
provide protection. If Castro came into power, the claim for property damages would 
be unlikely according to her conjecture. 
 
Andrés Rivero Agüero whom Batista supported was the only candidate in the Cuban 
presidential election in 1958. In accord with the Memorandum of a Conversation 
between Smith and Agüero, Smith inquired whether Agüero: 
could eliminate Castro’s forces before the inauguration in February. Agüero 
replied that with the present equipment of the Cuban Army he did not think 
this would be possible. He then referred to a press report of November 15 to 
the effect that the United States Department of Defense is requesting a 15 
billion-dollar special appropriation to re-equip with advanced weapons U.S. 
military and NATO forces overseas.
37
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Smith reiterated the U.S. position in Cuba’s struggle that the Department was largely 
concerned about any peaceful solution that the new Cuban Government would 
follow.
38 In my analysis, Smith’s behaviour was a form of intervention that imposed 
political influence on the Cuban politics. The issue was that he wished Agüero could 
eradicate Castro’s nationalists but the Department supported a peaceful resolution. 
Was Smith in line with the DOS approach?  
 
U.S. bureaucrats tended to focus on various strategic objectives issues rather than on a 
single dimension of policy. Notable among these was the water supply to Guantanamo 
naval base, which was considered more important than U.S. private investment. In fact, 
Cuban rebel-controlled operators stopped supplies to Guantanamo for varying periods 
on 23rd, 25th, and 27th November, with an expected six to eight hour shutdown by 
Saturday, November 29th. Based on the strategic security, the Navy Department 
concluded that “U.S. Marines should be sent to the water plant to protect it, and the 
Embassy in Havana recommended such action in the event of a further stoppage”.39 
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A series of incidents indicated that the rebel forces were now endangering U.S. private 
investment in Cuba and U.S. strategic security. The caretaker government temporarily 
governed by Agüero could not break the existing political impasse; as a result, the U.S. 
considered a military junta to govern Cuba would be the most effective way in the 
present chaotic internal situation. According to a Special National Intelligence Estimate, 
it summarized the U.S. desire to install a military junta: 
A military junta would be the most effective means of breaking the existing 
political impasse…would have to offer a political solution satisfactory to Fidel 
Castro, but would not of itself restore peace and stability.
40
 
 
On 17th December 1958, under Rubottom’s instructions, Smith informed Batista that 
“the U.S. will no longer support the present government of Cuba and that the U.S. 
believes the President is losing control”.41 
 
A number of policy objectives were pursued by the U.S. government with little 
interaction with each other at a certain period of time, but they seemed to be intertwined 
to a certain degree when the rebel forces gained more domestic power affecting U.S. 
strategic interests in Cuba like Guantanamo naval base. Castro was well aware of the 
strategic importance of the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo, and he might “demand an 
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increase in rental for the base”. 42  It is the rise of Castro’s power in Cuba that 
determined policy objectives rather than a priori concept of communism. Consequent 
peril to American lives and property in Cuba, and the naval base in Guantanamo would 
need better coordination between the DOS and the CIA, Eisenhower said. However, he 
indicated that “he did not wish the specifics of covert operations to be presented to the 
NSC”.43  
 
On 31st December 1958, the government was united against Castro because Castro was 
a continuing threat to U.S. interests defined by strategic and economic concerns (U.S. 
private interests and Guantanamo naval base). But, there was no real coordinated policy. 
Gray inquired whether the DOS would try to “prevent Castro from getting to power.” 
Mr. Herter said that was not the case. Senator Mike Mansfield assumed that “the men 
around Castro were Communist”.  Rubottom’s position was that it was too early to pin 
a communist label on the Castro movement. The JCS, Admiral Arleigh Burke, stated 
that “if Castro gets into power, if he is cautious he may want to slow down, but may 
then be a prisoner, so to speak, and the Communists then might be able to get in”. 
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Rubottom replied that Castro could not endure this if he tried to take over, and that the 
communist threat could be eliminated.
44
 
 
On 1st January 1959, Batista fled Cuba when realizing that the revolutionary movement 
led by Castro had the upper hand on Batista’s army. On 6th January, the U.S. Embassy 
at Havana received a note from the Ministry of State showing: 
A government headed by Dr. Urrutia had been constituted. This note adds that 
the Provisional Government has complete control of the Republic, that 
peaceful conditions have returned to Cuba…45 
 
 
Dulles assured that because the Provisional Government seemed free from communist 
taint, it was in the U.S. national interest to recognize “the Provisional Government of 
Cuba without delay”.46 The U.S. embassy in Cuba assumed that Cuba could be back to 
political stability under the control of the military junta but it did not happen. The fall of 
the Batista government meant the failure of Eisenhower’s economic approach. When 
Castro came in, he opened a space to talk to the U.S. based on a bilateral approach. 
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Castro’s Honeymoon with the U.S. and Agrarian Reform  
The Eisenhower administration now prepared to seek the possibility of working with 
the new regime. Eisenhower confessed that by the end of 1958, he had “little choice 
but to accept the rebels’ triumph”.47 The DOS was about to change Smith from his 
current position to another position in foreign service because Smith maintained 
“satisfactory relations with Batista”. The image of “Pro-Batista” would reflect 
adversely on recognition of the new regime. Dulles suggested that Smith leave Cuba 
soon, and not to discuss his personal situation with Urrutia.
48
 Smith’s resignation 
reached Eisenhower on 10th January, and Eisenhower approved the appointment of 
Philip Bonsal as Ambassador to Cuba two days later.
49
 
 
According to Daniel M. Braddock, Cuban people did not oppose American people or 
U.S. government, but did complain against Ambassador Smith, American press, and 
military missions. Braddock referred to specific things against Smith, including 
Smith’s statement to U.S. press last January, his acceptance of Batista’s suppression of 
human rights, and his advocacy of the November elections as a solution to Cuban 
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conflict. Foreign Minister of Cuba, Roberto Agramonte Pichado, though was unaware 
that it had been as a result of Smith’s proposal to appeal to Batista that constitutional 
guarantees were restored in January 1959, the new government was greatly pleased at 
the nomination of a career diplomat as new Ambassador and felt that normal good 
relations would be quickly re-established.
50
 
 
Castro indicated that U.S. foreign policy conducted by U.S. Ambassadors contributed 
to “Cuba’s perennial economic troubles”. Braddock postulated that Castro tried to 
“appeal to latent anti-Americanism of uninformed masses”. Both the DOS and the 
Embassy considered: 
Whether visit of Castro to U.S. would be beneficial to U.S.-Cuban relations and to 
stabilization of Cuban situation…Braddock believe[s] visit could dispel much of 
his suspicion and prejudice. He suggested that invitation be conveyed by Bonsal 
soon after arrival.
51
 
 
The new government was undoubtedly in the formative stage. Although some of 
Castro’s rebel lieutenants publicly attacked this Government and fermented 
anti-American sentiment, John C. Hill Jr., who was the Special Assistant to the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, voiced that “no concrete action 
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has been taken so far or formally proposed against the U.S. or its interests”. Castro 
professed “an admiration for the American people and a desire for good relations, a line 
followed by the titular government with perhaps greater sincerity and consistency”.52 
 
The U.S. policy towards Cuba was again constrained by bureaucratic tangles. It had 
been quite difficult for the White House to examine whether multiple objectives within 
the policy framework were still relevant, not to mention analysing many assumptions 
behind them. Allen Dulles pointed out the Communist Party in Cuba might take 
advantage of growing unemployment; even worse, “Castro did not have previous 
experience in government”, and he was destined not only to liberate Cuba but to 
liberate all the other dictatorships. Sarell Everett Gleason said Cuba was like a partial 
breakdown of the machinery of government.
53
 This is the assumption deriving from the 
“Cold War” narrative, which emphasizes on ideological security. However, ideological 
security does not often sit compatibly with economic development in Cuba. 
 
Anderson said that some governmental officials from Cuba came to talk to him with 
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regard to a stabilization fund. He voiced: 
They apparently [officials from the new Cuban Government] wanted $100 
million for this purpose from the U.S…Anderson informed Eisenhower that a 
decision would have to be made in the next few days as to how far the U.S. 
government was going to go in support of the Castro government.
54
 
 
Dillion held the same view that “a financial blow-up in Cuba could very well lead to a 
blow-up of the new Cuban Government”. This was in accord with Anderson’s position. 
It is quite hard to know how far we could go so as to stabilize the Cuban currency until 
“the Government of Cuba itself had become stabilized”, Eisenhower commented. 
Anderson replied Cuban finances were not in particularly bad shape if we could rely on 
their figures.
55
 On the other hand, he felt that the President was right as to the 
requirement for a stabilized government prior to a stabilized currency. 
 
The U.S. conceptualized a “short-range position toward Cuba” after Castro became 
Prime Minister of Cuba on 16th February 1959. The U.S. sought to influence Castro, 
the radical element of the 26th of July forces and the communists. At the same time, the 
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U.S. should be careful in terms of economic assistance to Cuba.
56 As shown in the 
Memorandum from Snow to Dillon, it evaluated the peso condition: 
After Batista fled, the peso reserve was almost depleted, and $60 million 
below the legal requirement. Cuba was in a hope to restore confidence and to 
maintain the parity and free convertibility of the peso.
57
 
 
 
Despite the fact that “the Cuban Government has introduced certain temporary 
emergency controls on dollar payments and other measures designed to conserve dollar 
exchange”, the National Bank of Cuba yearned for economic assistance from the IMF 
and from the U.S.
58  
 
In the Memorandum from Snow to Dillon, it expressed the desirability to stabilize the 
Cuban peso in accord with Dillon’s position:  
The total amount of money that the National Bank of Cuba placed was $100 
million. It has put forward the maximum standby credit possible from the IMF 
which was $50 million ($25 million new money, and $25 million renewal), and 
hoped to attain a Treasury stabilization credit. Furthermore, it has indicated its 
intent to borrow from the commercial banks in New York and reschedule short 
maturities.
59
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Snow proposed to urge the U.S. Executive Director of the IMF to provide the Cuban 
government with “the IMF $25 million of new money and a renewal for one year of 
the $25 million standby agreement which otherwise expires in March 1959”.60 
 
 
Cuba, like most of the Latin American countries, still needed economic funds from the 
U.S. to sustain its economic development. U.S. economic assistance, serving as 
influential elements in Cuba, might work out this time. Therefore, the Eisenhower 
administration could reshape U.S.-Cuban relations to seek the possibility of 
cooperation based on a bilateral approach, and to exert U.S. influence upon Castro 
when he came to the U.S. by an invitation from the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors (ASNE) in April 1959. Although Castro’s visit to the U.S. was an informal 
invitation, it set a considerable precedent for a foreign Chief of government without the 
U.S. government issuing an invitation. Rubottom voiced that the U.S. pursued “the 
long-range relationships with Cuba” regardless of numerous anti-American statements 
Castro had made soon after the overthrow of the Batista administration.
61
 
 
Rubottom came closer to reshaping U.S. foreign policy in Cuba with Bonsal. Before 
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Castro set off to the U.S., Bonsal said to Castro that: 
the U.S. was sensitive to neutralism in Cuba’s situation. Castro replied he would 
try to understand this issue. Moreover, Castro justified his position in recent 
press “freedom to lie” by the United Press International (UPI) - claiming that 
Cuba would support U.S. in East-West conflict.
62
 
 
 
Even though he had not yet consulted with his advisers regarding economic relations 
with the U.S., he thought this visit would be constructive.
63
 Castro’s statements had 
temporarily cleared DOS bureaucrats’ doubts. There was no significant change in U.S. 
foreign policy in Cuba between the Castro government and Batista’s government; that 
is to say, DOS bureaucrats still conceived that the U.S. could use economic assistance 
to decrease the level of anti-American sentiments in Cuba and orient Castro to take a 
pro-American position.  
 
Castro’s visit started from 15th April to 26th April 1959. Rubottom greeted Castro at 
Washington National Airport on 15th April, and asked what economic aid Castro really 
needed. Yet, Castro said none.
64
 Nixon met Castro on 19th April in the Vice 
President’s formal office in the Capitol. Nixon’s appraisal revealed that Castro was a 
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leader of “indefinable qualities” with the support of the majority of Cubans. Castro 
tried to “convince Nixon that he was not a Communist”. In a discussion of the 
free-enterprise system, Castro said: 
He preferred socialism for Cuba. Nixon conceded that Castro had leadership 
but he is either incredibly naïve about Communism or under Communist 
discipline. Nixon chose to think he was naïve. He also thought Castro had no 
idea how to manage a government or direct the island’s economy.65 
 
The DOS made a tentative evaluation of Castro’s visit on 23rd April. This 
memorandum highlighted the reactive nature of foreign policy towards Latin America 
which indicated that Castro remained an “enigma” and the U.S. should await his 
decisions on “specific matters before assuming a more optimistic view than heretofore 
about the possibility of developing a constructive relationship with Castro.
66 The 
memorandum summarized the following points:  
(a) Castro’s frankness and sincerity lessened lots of criticism against him in 
the general press and public. 
(b) Though Castro had indicated that Cuba would support the U.S. in 
East-West conflict, he did not go sufficiently far in his declarations to be 
vulnerable to the criticism of the radicals among his supporters. There is a 
degree of uncertainty over his future course when Castro returns to Cuba. 
(c) Agrarian reform was the focus point of social development in Cuba. Castro 
noticed that this policy may adversely affect certain American-owned 
properties in Cuba. U.S. government may also have increased difficulties 
regarding the U.S. government-owned Nicaro Nickel Plant. However, Castro 
had no desire to create any problems in terms of the U.S. naval base in 
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Guantanamo. 
(d) Castro’s speeches and statements have shown that he was much concerned 
with ends than means; what’s more, his idea of law and legality was not 
identical to that of U.S. citizens. His notion of democracy derives simply from 
the roar of mass audiences.
67
 
 
During Castro’s visit, he did not refer to economic assistance or Cuba’s sugar exports to 
the U.S., which were regulated by an import quota. This had weakened U.S. ingrained 
belief to use economic assistance to influence Cuba. The failure of Eisenhower’s 
economic foreign policy meant the failure of the political attempt to reshape U.S. 
foreign policy in Cuba. Economic non-cooperation would gradually escalate into 
political confrontation. Upon Castro’s return on 8th May, he made a public statement to 
the crowds: 
Revolution neither capitalist, Communist nor center, but rather step in advance 
of all. Said current world conflict was between concept which offered people 
democracy and starved them to death, and concept which offered food but 
suppressed liberties. Cuban solution was to promote all rights of mankind, 
including social rights. Only ideas which satisfy both material and spiritual 
needs of mankind will prosper.
68
 
 
In Castro’s political philosophy, his ideas have articulated the latent tension between 
democracy and capitalism. As a socialist, Castro’s social development seems to 
combine “negative liberty” and “positive liberty” - concepts put forward by Isaiah 
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Berlin. By positive liberty, Castro had got his leadership to determine Cuba’s future, 
while negative liberty should be regarded as an end. The final goal of the Cuban 
Revolution was to build a socialist society, based upon the ideas of economic, social, 
and cultural equality for all Cuban citizens. In Castro’s understanding, liberty could be 
defined as the freedom to improve Cuba materially and spiritually; in other words, 
being free may probably improve Cubans, individually and as a society. It would be 
precious even if it did not achieve an end.
69
 
 
Castro became much more radical in the light of social development in Cuba. An 
Agrarian Reform Law issued on 17th May expropriated farmlands of over 1,000 acres, 
with no specific compensation for U.S. private investors in Cuba. According to the 
FRUS document, it revealed that “the expropriated land would be either run by the new 
Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) or to be distributed as individual holdings of 67 
acres”.70 The law had given cause for economic concern (sugar supply from Cuba). 
Some of the expropriated properties like sugar companies could continue to operate the 
sugar plantations. Ernesto Dihigo, who was Cuban ambassador to the U.S. in 1959, 
reaffirmed that: 
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the law is not in final form, and accordingly, it refers nothing in relation to 
compensation. In any case, he was confident that this measure will in no way 
endanger the ability of Cuba to supply its quota in the U.S. sugar market.
71
 
 
Aftermath of the Agrarian Reform Law 
To what degree would the impact of the Agrarian Reform Law affect the sugar supply? 
Every related agency in the U.S. may have an explicit mission statement that seeks to 
interpret mandates into its own terms. It is apparently true when the broad goals 
conflict or offer little operational guidance. Morton Halperin adds the concept of 
organizational essence, defined as “the view held by the dominant group in the 
organization of what the missions and capabilities should be”.72 This section is going 
to construct that there is competition between the DOS and the Secretary of 
Agriculture (SOA) in terms of governmental attitude towards the affect upon the 
Agrarian Reform Law.  
 
The SOA held different views from those of the DOS. The SOA wanted to make sure 
whether there would be sufficient supply for the U.S. market; however, its only 
concern was to extend the Sugar Act during the current session of Congress, 
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regardless of recent radical agrarian reform in Cuba. The Agricultural organization 
assumed that:  
the Agrarian Reform Law might reduce sugar production to such an extent that 
Cuba will be unable to meet its quota for the U.S. market after 1960. Plan 
should therefore be made now to meet such a contingency by amending the 
Sugar Act to give the Administrator discretionary authority to adjust quotas 
when necessary to assure an adequate supply for the U.S. market.
73
 
 
The DOS did not expect the Act extended without change at the present time because 
the extension of the Sugar Act would be interpreted by Castro as justification of the 
Land Reform Law that possibly convinced Castro of U.S. inaction on expropriation of 
U.S. properties through Cuba’s sugar quota. Hence, the DOS expected “to keep the 
question open to provide leverage in obtaining amendments to the land reform 
proposals”.74 The DOS tried to allay any rising doubts in the SOA claiming that if 
“the land reform measures impaired Cuba’s ability to fill its quota”, the U.S. could get 
sugar elsewhere. Therefore, the DOS could not recommend action this year on the 
Sugar Act; instead, it viewed the extension of sugar as a political leverage to influence 
Cuba.
75
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The SOA was quite “surprised that the DOS favored deferral of action until next year 
as there is little flexibility in the present law”. It has been standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) of the SOA to extend the law with a year’s lead time, although 
sugar legislation did not expire until January 1st, 1961. This is so because the 
“production cycle for sugar cane is 18 months at a minimum”. Mann’s office strongly 
argued that it saw no issue in relation to the Sugar Act if put forward to next year. The 
White House needed to: 
maintain a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis Cuba and sugar is the point at 
which Cuba is most vulnerable…the SOA simply wanted the question faced 
realistically, and if action were to be deferred, it wanted it recognized that the 
decision rested on foreign policy considerations.
76
 
 
On 4th June, the DOS’s position was being constructed - the extension of Sugar Act 
should not be considered until the effect of the Agrarian Reform Law on Cuban sugar 
producers was clarified. Finally, the SOA concurred with the DOS. The Agrarian 
Reform Law had given serious concern to the DOS with relation to the adequacy of 
the provision for compensation. The U.S. recognized that under international law a 
state had the right to take property within its jurisdiction for public purposes but the 
accompanying obligation was effective compensation. Before Castro’s regime, the 
right of private investment was written in the Cuban Constitution of 1940 providing 
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that should property be expropriated by the state, there must be prior payment of the 
proper indemnification in cash, in the amount judicially determined.
77
  
 
When confronted with conflicting goals or orders, organizations prioritize them and 
define the trade-off. The DOS was quite satisfied with the information provided by 
the U.S. embassy in Cuba. On 12th June, the telegram referred to two concerns 
following the Agrarian Reform Law: (a) Possible decrease in sugar production to 
assure adequate supply for the U.S. market; (b) Compensation for expropriated 
properties.
78
 First, Bonsal explained to Castro about “lifting restrictions on sugar 
quota in US” previously considered as a reaction to the Agrarian Reform Law but also 
reassured regarding Cuba’s ability “to supply 8 million tons of sugar in 1961”.79 
Second, on the issue of compensation, Castro indicated government’s inability to “pay 
promptly in cash unless it could reach some financial arrangement with U.S.”  Since 
the Reform Law would come into effect next year, Cuba at present would not split 
over “20, 30 or 40 million pesos in total amount”. Castro believed that both sides 
could negotiate issues as they arose.
80
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In dealing with two implications of the Agrarian Reform Law, the DOS undoubtedly 
emphasized subsequent compensation rather than the extension of sugar. The 
extension of sugar would be used as a political tactic to influence Castro so the DOS 
advocated deferral of action until next year. Organizations are likely to be inclined to 
emphasize, in policy operation, the objectives most congruent to their special 
capacities and to the hierarchies of beliefs in the organization’s culture. Allison and 
Zelikow stated that: 
If conflicting goals both accord with the organization’s capacities and culture, 
the incompatible constraints tend to be addressed sequentially, the 
organization satisfying one while deferring another.
81
 
 
 
The Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs made an assessment on the 
Cuban economy. This memorandum has shown that: 
the balance of payments deficit in Cuba has been reaching at roughly $100 
million per annum for some years. There would be added about $75 million 
($50 million in sugar income owing to lower prices and $25 million each for 
the loss of tourist income and foreign capital investment).
82
 
 
From its estimate, this figure might have reached $200 million by the second half of 
1959. Castro might try to reverse the situation by pouring in his $80 million of 
reserves. But, this was unlikely to happen. Therefore, Castro would need to control 
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the deficit effectively. If Castro could survive, the national economy was still shaky. 
Castro might be taken over when “(a) the monetary reserves are exhausted, and (b) 
the price of the country’s major export is very low”.83  
 
The organization suggested that the U.S. not make a balance of payments loan to 
Castro, nor should it seek means of financial pressure. As for the cut of sugar quota, it 
should be examined further. It summarized some general arguments not to seek 
authority to cut the Cuban quota that year:  
(a) It will rally nearly all Cubans behind Castro. Our experience in 1947 with 
the Sugar Act of 1948 proves this point. 
(b) If a cut in the Cuban quota is made, the new order of reallocation would be 
domestic industry, Philippines, Mexico, Peru and Central America. The U.S. 
would need to take six million Cubans into consideration even after Castro is 
gone.  
(c) Using the quota systems for economic sanctions is not suggested as Article 
16 of OAS Charter 4 provides that no State may use coercive measures of an 
economic character to force the sovereign will of another State.
84
 
Furthermore, if Castro became even more communist-oriented or approached closer to 
anti-Americanism, the organization would be in the same position as the DOS. On 
condition that the Soviets tended to take advantage of the strained U.S.-Cuban relations, 
the U.S. would consider it intolerable, and apply the sanction envisaged for a 
communist-influenced Cuba. If Russia started to contact Cuba on a trade mission after 
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the passage of sugar legislation in 1960, the U.S. would apply economic sanctions 
through special legislation.
85
 Still, the U.S. tried to orient Castro to take a 
pro-American position, and thereby to improve U.S.-Cuban relations.  
 
From mid-July to mid-October, it was believed that U.S.-Cuban relations should be 
developed but the U.S. should avoid long-range commitments. U.S.-Cuban relations 
would still be limited to short-term consultation projects in fields like technical 
assistance.
86
 Adequate provision for compensation and expropriated American 
property continued to be of major concern to the U.S. business disputes arising from 
private investment in Latin America revived the application of the Calvo Doctrine, 
which placed foreigners on an equal footing with Latin American nationals by 
providing that foreigners could seek legal assistance in the country where the 
investment was located. These kinds of business disputes have not been resolved for 
quite a long time.  
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While Cuba’s approach to the power of State entities was extended to arbitration 
agreements, the right to arbitrate was still subject to certain limitations. Bonsal 
discussed the right of arbitration with Felipe Pazos, alleging that:  
INRA provincial representatives had taken certain actions against American 
properties that seemed arbitrary and extralegal. Pazos replied that same thing had 
been experienced by many Cubans and showed no sympathy for this kind of action 
by INRA.
87
 
 
In Pazos’ understanding, he believed that U.S. private investments were treated as 
equally as Cuban nationals’. Pazos said his Government would make reasonable 
evaluation of American properties. Based on previous precedent, the Cuban 
Government would pay American owners in dollar bonds.
88
 Perhaps the most 
important of all was that there could be a conflict between the procedural provisions of 
an applicable bilateral investment treaty and the jurisdictional provisions in the contract 
or even the immaturity of legal justice in Cuba. 
 
The bilateral approach that the U.S. used could not fundamentally improve 
U.S.-Cuban relations. The recurrence of economic disputes arising from private 
investment would invoke wider discussion of the “Calvo Doctrine”; more specifically, 
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dispute about arbitration might evolve into political and economic conflict. Other than 
that, the DOS wished that compensation for the expropriated property should be paid 
in cash, while Cuba lacked resources to pay promptly in cash. Based on this point, the 
U.S. would need to seek a compromise between demand for cash payment of aid 
value and the Cuban proposal of 20-year bonds based on municipal tax registrations. 
That explained the current policy was not able to deal with the political and economic 
issues in Cuba. The U.S. would have to revise its policy and change its attitude 
towards Cuba.  
 
Disillusion of Honeymoon: Changing Attitude toward Castro 
The Castro government was not consistent with the minimal requirements of the 
current U.S. policy, and with U.S. objectives for Cuba. Apparently, Castro’s present 
course was in opposition to most Latin American countries. Rubottom stated that the 
U.S. gave Castro “every opportunity to modify his attitudes and policies” if he wished 
to maintain harmonious U.S.-Cuban relations. However, Castro failed to do so. It was 
indeed Castro’s economic policies which raised additional problems in U.S.-Cuban 
relations. If Cuba’s statist and nationalist orientation was adopted by other Latin 
American countries, that would eventually weaken U.S. economic policies and 
objectives towards Latin America. The U.S. urged that the “Castro government meet 
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at least minimally the objectives and standards indicated in the OCB Regional 
Operations Plan for Latin America”.89 
 
In the policy assessment, the U.S. conceived of a change in the Cuban regime. The 
U.S. must avoid any implication of overt opposition in order to achieve this objective; 
for that reason, the U.S. would encourage and coalesce oppositional forces - presently 
or potentially acceptable to the Cuban people - to undermine the Castro regime. The 
oppositional elements both within and without Cuba should be encouraged, but in 
case of conflict, the U.S. tended to encourage opposition outside of the Castro regime 
with a view towards “a step-by-step development of coherent opposition”.90 The 
policy objective was to sabotage Castro’s regime but the political and economic 
tensions between the U.S. and Cuba diverted U.S. bureaucrats to using a different 
method to achieve it. More specifically, there was no clear connection between 
method and objective in NSC general policy. Policy implementation, in consequence, 
would be slightly different in method chosen by U.S. bureaucrats to achieve the 
objective. 
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In the decision-making process, this might divide policy operation into different 
sectors so as to attain the objective. In the diplomatic domain, Herter pressed 
international cooperation that facilitated a cooperation process with Selwyn Lloyd, 
who was U.K. Foreign Secretary. Herter stated that “the U.S. cooperated with some 
left-wing governments in Latin American countries like Bolivia and Venezuela” but 
neither of them fell in Cuba’s case. The U.S. has sought, since Castro came to power, 
to exercise the greatest restraint in the face of provocation and to take a position as 
sympathetic as possible to Cuba. In the past, “the U.S. was willing, even anxious, to 
cooperate with Castro had he set out on a genuine reform program within the 
framework of good relations with the U.S. and the Free World”.91 Selwyn replied 
“the Western Bloc confronted with another Guatemalan situation in a far less 
favourable climate of opinion”.92  
 
Herter thenceforth changed his friendly attitude towards Cuba. He briefed a statement 
to Eisenhower with regard to agencies concerned with the implementation of U.S. 
policy in Cuba, and also to the American Ambassador in Havana. For the past ten 
months, the DOS applied a series of tests to the Castro regime. The conclusion was 
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that Castro would not voluntarily modify policies and attitudes consistent with 
minimum U.S. security requirements and policy interests: 
(a) Castro manipulated anti-American sentiments, and conflated them on 
nationalism. This, if emulated by other Latin American countries, would have 
serious adverse effects on Free World support of our leadership, especially in 
the U.N. on such issues as the Chinese representation problem. 
(b) Castro tolerated the growth of Communists in governmental institutions, 
the armed forces, and organized labor. The international Communist apparatus 
has made clear in Moscow last January that it saw in the advance of Castroism 
the best chance of achieving its immediate objectives. 
(c) Castro apparently took state control of the economic life of Cuba. U.S. 
private interests in Cuba would be endangered; what’s more, Cuba’s policy 
would obstruct the basic proposition to promote private investment in Latin 
America.
93
 
 
U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba was one of non-intervention policy, and how could 
the U.S. build in incentive to decrease Castro’s increasing influence? Communism, 
serving as an ideological imperative, operated simultaneously with a reductionist 
understanding of the world eventually suggests “appropriate ways of dealing 
with...reality”. 94  Bonsal grafted ideology onto U.S. foreign policy. Pursuant to 
Bonsal’s statement in his Memorandum, he removed ideology from foreign policy: 
There was no real awareness of the issues of the East-West struggle even on 
part Minister of State. Anti-communism considered merely a weapon of U.S. 
reactionaries forged in time of McCarthy hysteria…Continuous accusations of 
communism played into hands of communists and extremists help them to 
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control and influence Castro.
95
 
 
National Socialism was not associated with communism but with Nazism. Firstly, 
Marxism-Leninism was described by Castro as a natural outlet for economic 
development, political power, and social progress. The merit associating National 
Socialism with communism was that both of them would not be able to separate 
totalitarian implications; that is, National Socialism and communism tended to use 
state control and centralized decision-making. Secondly, socialism was characterized 
as the more powerful sway of nationalism over communist ideology in forging 
allegiances of people in the developing countries. Marked by anti-colonialism and 
anti-imperialism features, it was indeed a vital force to disengage military and 
economic dependence from the Western Bloc. As a result, the USSR tried to “ride the 
tides, and cooperate with leaders in the Third World”.96 
 
Certainly, the USSR was also labelled as “imperialism” in the eye of Castro’s 
National Socialism. Judging from the point, the USSR would not identify itself with 
Castro’s policy in the beginning and that is why Mikoyan decided not to go to Cuba at 
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first.
97
 Mikoyan did not wish to give additional credence to the view that the people 
around Castro had communist affiliations. The closer ties were accentuated by Cuba’s 
move to the Afro-Asian Bloc known as nonaligned nations. The United Arab Republic 
was promoting the sale of cotton to Cuba, and Cuba was ready to suggest a 
conference of twenty-eight underdeveloped countries. The indications showed Cuba’s 
potential attempt to move closer to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. By virtue of this tide, the 
Soviet exhibit would soon be moved from Mexico to Havana and Rojas plans to go to 
Communist China in January.
98
 
 
Nixon no longer believed that “Cuba should be handled in a routine fashion through 
normal diplomatic channels”. Cuba’s case required more efforts to coordinate policy, 
and further Congress would be involved in. Gordon Gray, who was the National 
Security Advisor, also disagreed with the current basic approach to the Cuban 
problem.
99
 By the end of 1959, the Eisenhower administration eventually changed 
U.S. attitude towards Cuba since Castro’s radical change in the policy with 
anti-Americanism not only destroyed U.S. private investment throughout the 
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hemisphere but also mocked the U.S. leadership. At that moment, the U.S. foreign 
policy towards Cuba should not be limited by the DOS approach but be broadened by 
more efforts from different organizations. 
 
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Charles Pearre Cabell, proposed 
to increase covert and semi-covert programs aimed at Castro - psychological warfare, 
political action, economic action, and paramilitary action, all of which had been 
conducted in some degree during the past year. The DOS worked hand in hand with 
the CIA on U.S. courses of action related to Cuba. The objective being pursued was to 
modify U.S. policy implementation in order to accelerate the development of an 
opposition in Cuba.
100
 
 
In doing so, Castro’s downfall would seem to be the result of his own mistakes, 
leading to a new government favourable to U.S. interests. The DOS embraced the 
change of the Cuban government but it did not explicitly go for the overthrow of 
Castro. Allen Dulles commented that: 
the Special Group 5412 on covert operations was different from the 
responsibilities of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
(PFIAB). If the Board of Consultants, like Congress, was going to get 
involved in the details of covert action, that would be an infringement of 
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President’s prerogative as Commander-in-Chief.101 
 
The anti-Castro activity discussions punctuated demarcation between the Special 
Group 5412 and other agencies. For the former, Allen Dulles stressed contingency 
planning should be undertaken by the Special Group 5412, without necessarily 
involving either the President or the NSC. For the latter, the DOS was concerned 
whether the political situation would be worse if Castro was deposed. Castro’s 
successors might be Che Guevara or Raul Castro. At one 5412 Committee, Gray 
stated that this was a prelude to the Bay of Pigs Operation. The U.S. would use the 
OAS and UN as “the myth of plausible deniability overruled common sense” in case 
of a leak.
102
 In a CIA meeting of 21st January 1960, J.C. King identified potential 
leaders like Ramon Barquin, Justo Carrillo, and Miro Cardona (who would finally 
head up the principal anti-Castro activities supported by the Agency).
103
 
  
Cuba successfully reduced the level of economic dependence on the sugar market. 
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According to the Memorandum of Discussion at the 432d Meeting, Cuba provided 
Bloc customers with discounts which made the sugar price fall below the world price. 
The falling sugar price was deemed crucial for the USSR to promote the USSR 
exhibit from Mexico City to Havana in February.
104
 Allen Dulles concluded his 
briefing in the Memorandum of Discussion at the 433d Meeting: 
the Soviet exhibit would move from Mexico City and open in Havana about 
January 30. It was believed that Mikoyan would open the Soviet 
exhibit…[Dulles] discovered that the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico 
City were in close contact, probably laying the groundwork for the resumption of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries…The USSR would not only 
extend a credit of $5–6 million to Cuba but also expand trade with Cuba.105 
 
Cuba’s trade relations with the Soviet Union highlighted U.S.-Cuban conflict through 
external assistance. This had totally reversed Cuba’s status in the Inter-American 
system as a puppet state of the U.S.  
 
Mikoyan’s Visit to Cuba on Trade Mission  
Mikoyan’s visit to offer trade and aid assistance to Cuba epitomized the implication 
imposed by the SEO. With the Soviet’s assistance in political and economic fields, 
Castro was described as the espousal of the Soviet communism. This event also 
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presented a shift in Soviet foreign policy towards Cuba from cautious attitude to 
active support. Not only did the Soviet expand trade and aid assistance to Cuba but it 
provided potential military assistance to Cuba. Overall, it was indeed a diplomatic 
breakthrough for the Soviet in the Cold War narrative. Mikoyan’s move, which 
accurately deteriorated U.S.-Cuban relations, pushed the U.S. to take stronger 
economic sanctions against Cuba and to please other Latin American countries with 
more aid.  
 
As far as trade and aid was concerned, the new trade agreement required the USSR to 
buy approximately 5,000,000 tons of Cuban sugar over the next five years, one-fifth 
of which was to be paid for in cash. Cuba also agreed to take Soviet goods which 
would constitute ten per cent of Cuban foreign trade. In 1960, the USSR would be 
taking nearly 17% of Cuba’s sugar export. The 100 million economic aid credit was to 
be supplied in the form of agricultural equipment and industrial machinery during the 
next five years. Soviet technicians would also be supplied under the credit.
106
 This 
meant that the U.S. would not be the only country that could dominate Cuba’s sugar 
industry. Moreover, Cuba would not need to acquire standby credit available from the 
IMF. 
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Second, despite no mention of arms in an official communique, Mikoyan expressed 
Soviet readiness to supply military aircraft if requested. Castro turned to the USSR for 
help because he did not succeed in buying aircraft from the Western Bloc. Having said 
that, Mikoyan only “decided to provide guns and planes”. 107  Mikoyan’s visit 
intensified political, economic, and military contacts with Cuba that was indeed the 
extension of the SEO in 1956. Even though the U.S. had a trade agreement with Cuba 
on a bilateral basis, the U.S. could not prevent Cuba from doing business with the 
USSR. Castro positively destabilized U.S.-Cuban relations by introducing 
international communism into the Inter-American system.  
 
Cuba’s cooperation with the USSR triggered off a rethinking of the U.S. bilateral 
approach to Latin America; that is, there was a fundamental clash between the U.S. 
and Latin America. Values like democracy, political beliefs, economic freedom, and 
social customs were dictated within the narrative of the Cold War. However, Castro 
succeeded in challenging the U.S. bilateral and multilateral approach against Cuba. 
This would contribute to short-term cooperation between the nonaligned nations, the 
Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc. Castro was a continuing threat to the U.S. based 
on bilateral and multilateral approaches. On 8
th
 March 1960, the Planning Board 
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prioritized U.S. interests in Cuba: “(a) Denial of Cuba to the influence and control of 
hostile interests; (b) The Guantanamo naval base; (c) Encouragement of other 
revolutionary groups; (d) Safety of U.S. citizens; (e) U.S. business interests”.108  
 
The Board had very clear objectives in terms of U.S. interests but Cuba-Soviet Union 
relations were more than that. Cuba established diplomatic ties with Moscow, and one 
Soviet tanker had already unloaded fuel oil in Cuba. Cuba also provided the so-called 
strategic access for Soviet crude oil. Most U.S. petroleum companies in Cuba would 
be asked to process Soviet crude oil.
109
 According to Herter, he said “Venezuelan oil 
had been refined by oil refineries in Cuba under a compromise arrangement enabling 
them to obtain enough dollars to purchase such oil”. The Cuban Government required 
that “the oil companies refine more Soviet petroleum”. They might be confiscated by 
the Cuban Government if they refused to do so. Herter urged that this government had 
to be careful about the advice it gave the refineries.
110
 
 
Tex Brewer, who was the Standard Oil of New Jersey representative, analysed that 
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there were three oil refineries in Cuba: Esso (American), Texaco (American), and 
Shell (British-Dutch). The Soviet crude oil was a case that definitely encompassed the 
wider issue of the political/economic principle down to economic sovereignty in Cuba. 
Brewer defended that “the U.S. government would take no stand in the matter; it 
would be inevitable to refine the Russian crude as desired by the Cuban 
Government”.111 Anderson, Mann, and Barnes made a statement:  
(a) Refusing to refine Russian crude in Cuba.  
(b) The U.S. companies under an agreement to a refusal would not violate the 
U.S. anti-trust laws.  
(c) That if the Cuban government were to intervene one of the American 
refineries to handle Russian crude, leaving the other to refine its own crude from 
its own sources, U.S. government would agree that the latter, without incurring 
any consequences from U.S. anti-trust laws, could refuse to furnish any more 
crude from its own sources.
112
 
 
Important among these was that the DOS now imposed domestic law on the foreign 
policy domain to conduct the behaviours of U.S. oil refineries in Cuba. The statement 
imposed would force U.S. refineries not to refine the Russian crude; as a result, the 
Cuban government would have no choice but to refine crude from Russia in one way 
or another. If the decision resulted in potential expropriation on U.S. refineries in 
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Cuba, the U.S. government would support them for the proper compensation.
113
 The 
Mikoyan-Castro pledge of cooperation in political, economic or military areas had 
intensified over the previous three months. Castro’s involvement with communism 
was the greatest clarity.  
 
Esso, Texaco, and also British Shell had already decided not to process Soviet crude 
oil which incurred expropriation of oil refineries in late June. The U.S. government 
vigorously protested the Cuban government in issuing the orders to these companies 
to refine such crude oil and for intervening in the companies thereafter.
114
 The 
intensification of contact was enhanced by Khrushchev’s agreement to visit Cuba 
intended on 26th July. Dillon claimed that the U.S. should use the sugar legislation as 
a tool of economic sanction against Cuba. On 6th July, Eisenhower approved “a 
reduction of 700,000 short tons from the original Cuban quota of 3,119,655 short 
tons”.115 On 11th July, Khrushchev placed an early solution to the Cuban problem 
claiming that Soviet missiles could reach the U.S. in the event of “aggression” against 
Cuba. This has been by far the most serious challenge to the Inter-American 
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System.
116
  
 
The political and economic disputes escalated from bilateralism to multilateralism. 
Although the Cuban government appealed to the United Nations Security Council, it 
refused to consider Cuba’s case at least until the OAS had considered the Cuban 
situation. At that point, the U.S. was supposed to get the support of the Latin 
American government in its economic disputes with Cuba.
117
 It was indeed the 
leftward trend in Cuba which fermented instability within the hemisphere. This could 
be curbed by the increase of social development projects suggested by Eisenhower 
during his trip to Brazil in June. The “Operation Pan America” was envisaged, and 
gradually realized. It was called “the Act of Bogotá”. In a letter to Kubitschek, 
Eisenhower perceived that: 
the U.S. could make some efforts to promote the unfulfilled requests by Latin 
America at the Buenos Aires Conference could be promoted. Among all, the 
Inter-American Development Bank was the most encouraging.
118
 
 
On 11th July, Eisenhower affirmed U.S. sympathy with Latin American aspirations 
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118 Foreign Relations of the United States, Cuba, “Letter From President Eisenhower to President 
Kubitschek,” FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. VI, July 8th, 1960. 
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for social and economic progress and declared his intention to seek funds from 
Congress to assist the countries of Latin America to develop their nations and achieve 
better lives. The President referred to “matters of supreme gravity in the Caribbean 
area; matters that invoke a challenge to the American community”. Willard L. Beaulac 
explained that the principal matter of supreme gravity was the Castro matter. On 8th 
September: 
Congress authorized the extension of $500 million to establish a special 
inter-American social development fund to be administered by the 
Inter-American Development Bank. Now, soft loans for social development 
would be extended for social development in Latin America.
119
 
 
The Act of Bogotá served as a method to influence other Latin American countries, 
and at that point, Castro would feel isolated within the OAS. On 13th September, the 
Committee approved the Act of Bogotá which contained various recommendations for 
economic and social development by a vote of 19 to 1 (Cuba). The result convinced:  
Latin Americans can achieve a better life only within the democratic system, 
renew their faith in the essential values which lie at the base of Western 
civilization, and re-affirm their determination to assure the fullest measure of 
well-being to the people of the Americas under conditions of freedom and 
respect for the supreme dignity of the individual.
120
 
 
The creation of the Inter-American Development Bank was the last marginal 
                                                        
119  Willard L. Beaulac, A Diplomat Looks at Aid to Latin America (Illinois: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1970), pp. 18-21. 
120 Foreign Relations of the United States, Cuba, “Editorial Note,” FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. VI., 580. 
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modification during Eisenhower’s administration for the purpose of fermenting 
Anti-Castroism within the Inter-American System.  
 
Overall Assessment on U.S. Foreign Policy from 1958 to 1960  
Eisenhower’s foreign policy toward Cuba failed because Eisenhower did not really 
associate moral imperatives upon any claimant. Before the rise of Castro to power on 
1st January 1959, the U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the U.S. ambassador, 
Smith. He was the key influential figure who sometimes presented more important 
than the Cuban president. Eisenhower’s constant support of military dictators 
indicated that Eisenhower’s policy was scant of great understanding for Latin 
American nationalism.  
 
Some bureaucrats in the DOS, like Herter, Anderson, Bonsal and Rubottom, tried to 
orientate Castro’s attitude by offering some economic assistance to Cuba. Still, they 
did not propose any concrete plan if Castro did not accept the offer or not even 
appreciate it. It delineated the reactive nature of foreign policy towards Latin America; 
U.S. foreign policy was often half a beat on the tone. In consequence, it is fair to say 
that U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba was based on a short-term basis rather than a 
long-term basis. It was not until Castro’s promulgation of an agrarian reform on 17th 
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May 1959 that U.S. organizations studied the implications of the law. This law indeed 
tightened U.S.-Cuban relations but strengthened Cuba’s position on economic 
sovereignty. 
 
This law not only presented a possible decrease in sugar production and compensation 
for expropriated properties but also incurred the right to arbitrate before the new law 
took effect. The DOS wished to delink the connection between the Agrarian Reform 
Law, and the extension of sugar. It decided to use the sugar issue as an economic 
sanction if Castro was being more and more communist-influenced. Although the 
tactics adopted by the U.S. government were determined under the influence of what 
were perceived as continuing threats, the U.S. objective in Cuba was clear - a change 
in the Cuban regime. A syndrome of irregularity in non-intervention policy was used 
to describe the inability of the DOS’s approach to attain U.S. objectives in Cuba. 
 
The fundamental problem with U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America seldom 
reflected some of the variety of interests that fed into most Latin American countries. 
During the Caracas Conference in 1954, Latin American countries’ main concern was 
to envisage an inter-American bank but their requests were not met even after the 
Buenos Aires Conference. The remaining issues like the increase of public funds, and 
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the economic integration recurred to Eisenhower in September 1960. Cuba was a 
stimulus for the U.S. to provide more public capital for other Latin American 
countries with a view to isolating Cuba.  
 
This analysis might help one toward a clearer view of change in the future. In October 
1959, the U.S. changed its friendly attitude towards Cuba. Most U.S. bureaucrats 
believed that the U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba should be broadened by more 
efforts from different organizations. Thus, the U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba was 
not simply conducted by the DOS but by the OCB. Its methods now included 
diplomatic, paramilitary, and economic tactics to curb the influence of Castro. The 
tactics employed by the Eisenhower administration towards Latin America differed in 
degree from each organization. The DOS wanted to employ political or economic 
pressure to speed up the downfall of the Castro regime, while the CIA fancied 
paramilitary action to overthrow Castro.  
 
These efforts were identically realized when Mikoyan visited Cuba on a trade mission 
to offer trade and aid assistance to Cuba on 17th February 1960. In March, the CIA 
began its covert campaign against Castro, and the DOS began to get support from the 
OAS members to recognize Cuba as a continuing threat within the Inter-American 
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System. Cuba expropriated U.S. oil refineries in late June 1960. Eisenhower cut about 
700,000 short tons of sugar quota. Cuba was a stimulus for bringing the bilateral 
approach to the multilateral approach. The U.S. tried to influence other Latin 
American countries via the inflow of more public funds, and hopefully, they could 
support the U.S. position against Cuba.  
 
U.S.-Latin American policy emerged from interplay of many actors but this did not 
mean that U.S. interests matched most Latin American interests. Within the 
emergence of Castro, Cuba indeed became the central paradigm fighting for economic 
sovereignty against U.S. dominance. Hence, U.S.-Cuba relations could be described 
as asymmetries of various powers; the concept of dependency theory must be known 
by scholars. With Castro’s success, this meant that Eisenhower’s approach lacked 
sovereignty imperatives upon any claimant. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In examining Eisenhower’s policy towards Latin America from 1953 to 1961, the 
thesis offers an alternative perspective on the President’s staff structuring relating to 
Latin American policy, allowing different interpretations of Eisenhower’s hidden hand 
and modernization model. The thesis comes to a very precise conclusion that 
Eisenhower’s effective management of the advisory machinery did not present policy 
consistency towards Latin America during the Cold War. Consequently, I list the 
following suggestions for the revisionists to rethink regarding the effect of 
Eisenhower’s system upon Latin America.  
 
First and foremost, Eisenhower’s NSC was hierarchically structured and distinctively 
staffed with levels of leading bureaucrats who represented different viewpoints 
towards Latin America. The key figures in Eisenhower’s system often debated over 
different means to reach U.S. ends in Latin America, which resulted in bureaucratic 
conflicts. Eisenhower’s hidden hand leadership contributed little to resolve the 
conflicts but more to accommodate a variety of foreign policy objectives despite the 
potential tensions between them. Moreover, Greenstein’s hidden hand did not explain 
how economic objectives and security concerns were blended. Eisenhower also 
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utilized covert action in Guatemala to rectify the dilemma between economic 
cooperation and the security perspective. From the evidence, Eisenhower’s 
administration tried to pursue more than one objective simultaneously within his 
advisory system where he and key secretariats had the final say over the decision. 
This made the NSC far more bureaucratic subsequently leading to arbitrary decisions. 
Eisenhower himself sought to integrate economic and security concerns into one 
policy line as shown in the NSC 5432/1, rather than fundamentally discussing the 
policy discrepancies.  
 
Secondly, the employment of modernization was to create a pro-American 
government conducive to the inflow of private investment. Eisenhower also used the 
covert action to remove economic nationalism and define the future economic 
cooperation. Scholars have investigated different categories of nationalism which 
reflect disagreements about definitions of nation. Based on the examination of 
existing scholarship, I conclude that the study of nationalism has been divided into 
two different schools: Constructivism, such as Anderson, Centeno, Calhoun and 
Miller, insists that nation be interpreted by the construction of national identity 
measured by collective memory; and Primordialism, held by Smith, Lomnitz and 
Heywood, has argued that nationalism has its ethnic, cultural and territorial origins. 
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From my perspective, U.S. policy-makers perceived of Latin American nationalism 
based on Primordialism which contributes to the modernization theory, while Latin 
American states shaped their own nationalism through Constructivism. These two 
approaches to understanding the nature of nation might bring about different 
interpretations. For example, the concept of nation as a priori or a posterior is 
disputable. Although the U.S. approach of modernization is a priori reasoning based 
on the western-centrism, this often represents misinterpretations of social progress 
and development in Latin America. As a result, different visions of nation 
undoubtedly lead to temporary cooperation or confrontation.  
 
The Paradigm of Cooperation and Confrontation  
The threat of communism did not constitute serious impact upon Latin American 
states. Rather, it was economic nationalism that embraced the principle of state 
control or economic nationalization threatening U.S. private enterprises in Latin 
America and free trade policy. Even though economic nationalism resembles 
communism a little in economic perspectives (state ownership of economy and 
redistribution of land), this does not mean that those Latin American states, who 
implement the policy of nationalization, are communist. The tenet of communism was 
to create an economic system owned by a society where classlessness and 
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statelessness are two stinking characteristics of the socioeconomic context. After Dr. 
Milton Eisenhower came back from Latin America, he acknowledged the 
misunderstanding that emerged between the U.S. and Latin America but his 
explanation for ultra-nationalism in Latin America came as the result of economic 
nationalism. The conflation of communism and Latin American nationalism was 
widely utilized by the U.S. bureaucrats, which did not reflect an in-depth 
understanding of political ramifications in Latin America. 
 
Perónism bears several conspicuous similarities to the MNR Bolivian nationalism. 
Both reshaped a new identity for the working class in search of social reform against 
social injustice, notably U.S. economic domination upon raw materials in Latin 
America. Firstly, the working class was a catalyst for progressive initiatives in both 
states. Perón and Paz conceptualized civic participation by creating an equal society 
for the minorities. The Perón government enhanced the conditions of the working 
class, such as increasing the minimum wage by law and yearly benefits for the 
prescribed jobs. The MNR also extended universal suffrage to Indians, indigenous 
residents and women. Secondly, the Perón government was a political coalition and so 
was the Paz government. There were lots of different factions in the Perón coalition. 
Miranda was a strong advocate of the state control plan (IAPI) whereas Sosa Molina 
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was a lukewarm adherent of nationalization policy. In Bolivia, Paz and Andrade, 
seeking to gain the U.S. economic assistance to diversify the Bolivian economy from 
the tin industry to the agricultural industry, represented the moderate force within the 
MNR coalition. However, the leftists within the MNR coalition were mineworkers 
and peasants who otherwise supported the nationalization policy. The U.S. economic 
assistance was the crucial factor to strengthen Paz’s political power within the MNR 
coalition.  
 
The analogy between Guatemala and Cuba is clear because Árbenz and Castro were 
unwilling to accept the so-called “adequate, effective and prompt compensation” 
principle proposed by the U.S. Their tough positions on respective sovereignty made 
U.S. diplomatic negotiation on the investment dispute unsettled. Judging from the 
principle of compensation, the two cases were the manifestation of an impasse, which 
incurred CIA involvement to overthrow the two regimes. These two cases provoke a 
further discussion on whether a legal entity in any other individual Latin American 
nation could perform the same functions as that in the U.S. If not, the White House 
decision-makers could have chosen a relatively positive method. Would a less formal 
Dispute Resolution Panel be a better idea than the CIA’s initiative in launching covert 
action? Castro’s intransigence was a recurrence of the Guatemalan case, which meant 
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that the White House did not explore alternative possibilities to solve the fundamental 
problems. In these two cases, the pattern of U.S. approach was to use the diplomatic 
mediation proposed by the DOS and the covert action would be used as a last resort.  
In the long run, Árbenz and Castro turned out to be the purported communists after 
the Agrarian Reform - it is also irrefutable that both leaders nationalized the private 
properties for public purposes. 
 
Latin America as Low Priority in U.S. Agenda  
Overall, the U.S. foreign policy objective during the Cold War was to keep its 
hegemony and to counteract the infiltration of Soviet communism.  When Bulganin 
framed economic propaganda to strengthen economic, diplomatic, cultural and 
technical cooperation in 1956 with the underdeveloped countries, the tensions were 
stretched in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Murphy recognized the gap between the 
current military assistance and the standardization of U.S. military equipment in Latin 
America. To this end, he tried to advocate U.S. military assistance based on a 
reimbursable basis. His initiative was challenged by Humphrey on the matter as to 
whether unnecessary military purchase would increase economic burdens for Latin 
American nations. Humphrey assumed that Latin American states would seek 
alternative markets to improve their military facilities such as the European suppliers; 
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his recommendation was incorporated into NSC 5613/1 on 25
th
 September 1956. 
Moreover, U.S. Congress was motivated by Bulganin’s economic propaganda to 
advocate the inflow of public capital into Latin American states. The Smathers Fund 
was the first attempt that Congress made; however, it was a stimulus for the DLF. In 
my analysis, Eisenhower was a President who liked to maintain an integral foreign 
policy team. There were so many foreign policy objectives but they were all 
maintained in Eisenhower’s foreign policy recommendations. If any bureaucrats 
wanted to bridge the gap, the recommendations would be closely reviewed or 
scrutinized before full consideration of NSC staff.  
 
This thesis has proved that the SEO did not directly impact on individual Latin 
American states. Rather, it ideologically challenged Eisenhower’s “trade and aid” 
policy. Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica cared for 
economic advantages more than ideological appeal. These Latin American states were 
economically and politically dependent upon the U.S. Therefore, a belief held by most 
Latin American leaders tended to focus on what economic incentives they could get 
from the U.S. to stabilize their domestic economies. Likewise, this made U.S. foreign 
policy-makers focus on Latin American national leaders rather than Latin American 
nationals. In this sense, Eisenhower did not necessarily need to distinguish left-wing 
 - 315 - 
 
nationalists from military dictators because the U.S. could continuously exercise its 
influence in individual states once they could get support from Latin American 
national leaders. For example, Jiménez in Venezuela, the Klein-Saks mission in Chile 
and Somoza in Nicaragua.  
 
A belief in the infiltration of communism strengthened the importance of U.S. 
national security in Latin America - it is this belief that drives Dulles to advocate 
anti-communism resolution in Latin America. This belief overshadowed any policy 
objectives until Anderson, Rubottom and Dillon were newly appointed to different 
positions prior to the Buenos Aires Conference. Even though Anderson, Rubottom 
and Dillon tried to bridge the gap to reduce the anti-American sentiments in Latin 
America, they could only arouse bureaucratic attention for a specific policy. Nixon’s 
visit and the proposal of Pan Americanism have shown the claim of economic 
sovereignty.  In view of the constant neglect of Latin America by the U.S., the area 
was not a top priority for consideration by the White House.   
 
Is Eisenhower a Policy Failure?  
Eisenhower’s economic policy envisaged a gradual economic integration of 
individual Latin American states. From the inflow of private investment as a starting 
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point, he was aware of historical, socio-cultural and institutional differences but 
imposed a top-down modernization theory throughout whole Latin American states. 
This approach could only touch at governmental level rather than provide social 
services for Latin American nationals. The latter was advocated by U.S. Congress not 
the White House. U.S. bureaucrats lacked foresight to anticipate the local politics in 
Latin America. For example, a success of the Guatemala coup d’état facilitated the 
CIA’s involvement in Cuba and finally gave rise to Cuba in the Bay of Pigs Invasion.  
 
Bureaucrats reviewed their policy towards Latin America regularly but the U.S. 
foreign policy towards individual Latin American states was relatively passive. Senior 
bureaucrats did not greatly adjust policy until a significant historical episode 
happened. Was Latin America important to the U.S.? Did the compensation for the 
nationalized properties threaten U.S. national security? I think U.S-Latin American 
conflicts were politicized; senior bureaucrats conceptualized foreign policy objectives 
based on a belief of American exceptionalism and advocated a policy agenda in 
accordance with individual preference. In short, Eisenhower’s global approach 
advanced American values but due to the limited applicability to Latin American 
societies, this approach fell short of in-depth understanding of Latin American 
identity. 
 - 317 - 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
1.  Primary Sources  
 
CIA Historical Review Program. Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, CIA History 
Staff. Vol. III, 1959-1961.  
 
Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), database system from University 
of Birmingham. 
 
Eisenhower, Dwight D. “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union in 
1953”, the American Presidency Project, 1953-1961.    
      http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9829 
——. “Executive Order 10483-Establishing the Operations Coordinating Board”, the  
American Presidency Project. 1953-1961 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=60573 
——. “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 6, 1955”,  
  the American Presidency Project, 1953-1961.  
  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10416 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), the American Republics, Vol. IV, 
1952-1954. United States Government Printing Office, 1983. 
——. the American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Vol. VI, 1955-1957.  
 United States Government Printing Office, 1987. 
——. the American Republics, Vol. V, 1958-1960. United States Government Printing  
 Office, 1991. 
——. the American Republics: Central and South America, Vol. VII, 1955-1957.  
 United States Government Printing Office, 1988. 
——.Cuba, Vol. VI, 1958-1960. United States Government Printing Office, 1991. 
——. National Security Policy, Vol. XIX, 1955-1957. United States Government  
     Printing Office, 1990. 
 
United States Department of State. Department of State Bulletin 1949. Washington:  
Government Printing Office, 1949.  
——. Department of State Bulletin 1954. Washington: Government Printing Office,      
     1953. 
 - 318 - 
 
——. Department of State Bulletin 1954. Washington: Government Printing Office,      
     1954. 
——. Department of State Bulletin 1957.  Washington: Government Printing Office,  
     1957. 
——. Department of State Bulletin 1958.  Washington: Government Printing Office,     
 1958. 
——. Department of State Bulletin 1959.  Washington: Government Printing Office,  
 1959. 
——. Department of State Bulletin 1960.  Washington: Government Printing Office,  
 1960. 
 
United States Government. Blue Book on Argentina: Consultation Among the 
American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation Pamphlet – 1946. 
Greenberg, 1946.  
 
United States White House. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 
Harry S. Truman 1949. United States Government Printing Office, 1945-1953.  
——. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Eisenhower 1953. United  
     States Government Printing Office, 1953. 
——. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Eisenhower 1953. United  
     States Government Printing Office, 1954.  
——. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Eisenhower 1953. United  
     States Government Printing Office, 1956.  
 
2.  Secondary Sources Articles  
 
Ahmed, Samina. “Cuban Foreign Policy under Castro,” Pakistan Horizon (Fourth 
Quarter, 1980): 52. 
 
Allcock, Thomas Tunstall. “The First Alliance for Progress?: Reshaping the 
Eisenhower Administration’s Policy toward Latin America,” Journal of Cold War 
Studies (Winter, 2014): 86. 88. 95-99.  
 
Ameringer, Charles D. “Philippe Bunau-Varilla: New Light on the Panama Canal 
Treaty,” Hispanic American Historical Review (Feb., 1966): 51. 
 
Barkway, Michael. “Mugwumpery in the Randall Report,” International Journal 
 - 319 - 
 
(Spring, 1954): 125-127. 129-130. 
 
Berhó, Deborah L. “Working Politics: Juan Domingo Perón's Creation of Positive 
Social Identity,” Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature (2000): 65. 72. 
 
Boughton, George J. “Soviet-Cuban Relations, 1956-1960,” Journal of Inter 
American Studies and World Affairs. (Nov., 1974): 449-451.  
 
Connery, Robert H. and Paul T. David. “The Mutual Defense Assistance Program,” 
The American Political Science Association (June, 1952): 341-342.  
 
Cutler, Robert. “The Development of the National Security Council,” Foreign Affairs 
(Apr., 1956): 448. 457.  
 
DiBacco, Thomas V. “American Business and Foreign Aid: The Eisenhower Years,” 
The Business History Review (Spring, 1967): 25. 
 
Donohoe, Paschal. “Economic Sovereignty and Our National Question,” Studies: An 
Irish Quarterly Review (Spring, 2013): 21-22. 
 
Dorn, Glenn J. “Bruce Plan’ and Marshall Plan: The United States’s Disguised 
Intervention against Peronism in Argentina, 1947-1950,” The International History 
Review (June, 1999): 336. 341-344. 347-348.  
 
Duncan, W. Raymond. “Ideology and Nationalism in Attracting Third World Leaders 
to Communism: Trends and Issues in the Late Twentieth Century,” World Affairs 
(Winter, 1988-89): 105-108.  
 
Esquiroi, Jorge L. “The Failed Law of Latin America,” American Journal of 
Comparative Law (Winter, 2008): 76-80. 82. 84. 86. 88.  
 
Francis, Michael J. “Military Aid to Latin America in the U.S. Congress,” Journal of 
Inter-American Studies (July, 1964): 391-393. 
 
Gonzalez, Alfonso. “Castro: Economic Effects on Latin America,” Journal of 
Inter-American Studies. (April, 1969): 288-291. 
_____. “Castro: Economic Effects on Latin America,” Journal of Inter-American 
Studies. (April, 1969): 302. 
 - 320 - 
 
Goldblatt, David. David Held. Anthony McGrew and Jonathan Perraton. “Economic 
Globalization and the Nation-State: Shifting Balances of Power,” Alternatives: Global, 
Local, Political (July-Sept., 1997): 269-270. 
 
Greenstein, Fred I. and Richard H. Immerman. “Effective National Security Advising: 
Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy,” Political Science Quarterly (Autumn, 2000): 
343-345. 
 
Grossman, Claudio. “Latin American Contributions to International Law,” 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (April, 5-8 2000): 45. 
 
Henderson, Phillip G. “Organizing the Presidency for Effective Leadership: Lessons 
from the Eisenhower Years,” Presidential Studies Quarterly (Winter, 1987): 54-59. 
 
Hershey, Amos S. “the Calvo and Drago Doctrines,” the American Journal of 
International Law (Jan -April, 1907): 29. 31. 
 
Hoxie, R. Gordon. “The National Security Council,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 
(Winter, 1982): 109.   
 
“In the Claim by the United States of America on Behalf of P.W. Shufeldt against the 
Republic of Guatemala,” The American Journal of International Law (Oct., 1930): 
799-800. 813. 822.  
 
Kaufman, Burton I. “The United States Response to the Soviet Economic Offensive 
of the 1950s,” Diplomatic History (April, 1978): 153-165. 
 
Koh, B.C. “The War’s Impact on the Korean Peninsula,” The Journal of 
American-East Asian Relations (Spring, 1993): 63. 
 
Lanciotti, Norma S. and Alexandre Macchione Saes. “American and Foreign Power in 
Argentina and Brazil,” Australian Economic History Review (July, 2014): 137. 138.  
 
Longley, Kyle. “Resistance and Accommodation: The United States and the 
Nationalism of José Figueres, 1953–1957,” Diplomatic History (Jan., 1994): 18. 
 
López-Maya, Margarita. “The change in the discourse of US-Latin American relations 
from the end of the Second World War to the beginning of the Cold War,” Review of 
 - 321 - 
 
International Political Economy (Winter, 1995): 135-143. 145-148.  
 
Luban, David. “The Romance of the Nation-State,” Philosophy & Public Affairs (Feb., 
2017): 392. 
 
McMahon, Robert J. “The Illusion of Vulnerability: American Reassessments of the 
Soviet Threat, 1955-1956,” The International History Review (Aug., 1956): 594-600. 
602-605. 612. 616. 617. 
 
Miller, Nicola. “The historiography of nationalism and national identity in Latin 
America,” Nations and Nationalism (March, 2006): 207-210. 
 
Morgan, Arthur E. “Purposes and Methods of the Tennessee Valley Authority,” The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (March, 1934): 51. 
56. 
 
Parker, Jason. “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung 
Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era*,” Diplomatic History 
(November, 2006): 867. 871. 874. 876. 886. 888. 889.   
 
Putterman, Theodore L. “Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty: A Reassessment and 
Revision,” Polity (Jul., 2006): 417-418. 
 
Radmann, Wolf. “Nationalizations in Bolivia: Gulf Oil Investments Negotiation 
Patterns and Settlement Agreements,” Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America (1972): 277-278. 
 
Redding, Saunders. “The Meaning of Bandung,” The American Scholar (Autumn, 
1956): 412. 
 
Romualdi, Serafino. “Labor and Democracy in Latin America,” Foreign Affairs 
(April, 1947): 480. 482.  
 
Rubottom, R. Richard Jr. “An Assessment of Current American Influence in Latin 
America,” Nonalignment in Foreign Affairs (July, 1966): 121. 
——. “Developments in Latin America: the Buenos Aires Economic Conference,” 
delivered before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, October 10
th
 1957: 93. 
 
 - 322 - 
 
Santamarina, Juan C. “The Cuba Company and the Expansion of American Business 
in Cuba,” The Business History Review (Spring, 2000): 57-65.  
 
Sewell, Bevan. “A Perfect (Free-Market) World? Economics, the Eisenhower 
Administration, and the Soviet Economic Offensive in Latin America,” Diplomatic 
History (Nov., 2008): 841-843. 848-849. 865.  
——. “Early Modernisation Theory? The Eisenhower Administration and the Foreign 
Policy of Development in Brazil,” English Historical Review (November, 2010). 
 
Sloan, John W. “The Management and Decision-Making Style of President 
Eisenhower,” Presidential Studies Quarterly (Spring, 1990): 296-305.  
 
Spiegel, Hans W. “Origin and Development of Denial of Justice,” The American 
Journal of International Law (Jan., 1938): 79. 
 
Thorp, Willard L. “American Policy and the Soviet Economic Offensive,” Foreign 
Affairs (Jan., 1957): 271. 278. 279. 
 
Treanor, William M. “The Origins and Original Significance of the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” The Yale Law Journal (Jan., 1985): 
694.  
 
Vinacke, Harold M. “Communist China and the Uncommitted Zone,” Nonalignment 
in Foreign Affairs (Nov., 1965): 114. 
 
Vink, Matthew. “The Competition for Self-Determination in Czechoslovakia, 
1918-1919,” New Zealand Slavonic Journal (2012): 41-43. 
 
Walcott, Charles and Karen M. Hult. “White House Organization as a Problem of 
Governance: The Eisenhower System,” Presidential Studies Quarterly (Spring, 1994): 
328-336.  
 
Walsh, Charles J. “U.S. Economic Foreign Policy and the Escape Clause,” Review of 
Social Economy (March, 1959): 4-6. 13-16. 
 
Weston Jr., Charles H. “An Ideology of Modernization: The Case of the Bolivian 
MNR,” Journal of Inter-American Studies (Jan., 1968): 85. 98-99. 
 
 - 323 - 
 
Zimbalist, Andrew. “The Prospects for U.S.-Cuba Trade,” Challenge (Jan./Feb., 1978): 
51.  
 
3. Books 
 
Adams, Sherman. First Hand Report: The Story of Eisenhower Administration. New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1961.   
 
Allison, Graham T. and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999.  
 
Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower: Soldier and President. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1990.  
 
Anderson, Benedict. Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso Press, 2016. 
 
Andrade, Victor. My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia, 1944-1962. London: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976. 
 
Barber, James David. The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the 
White House. New York: Pearson Education Inc, 2009. 
 
Beaulac, Willard L. A Diplomat Looks at Aid to Latin America. Illinois: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1970. 
 
Black, C.E. the Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History. New 
York: Harper and Row Press, 1966.  
 
Braden, Spruille. Diplomats and Demagogues: The Memoirs of Spruille New York: 
New Rochelle, 2017.  
 
Cabot, John Moors. First Line of Defense: Forty Years’ Experiences of a Career 
Diplomat. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown School of Foreign Service, 1971.   
 
Calhoun, Craig. Nationalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.  
 
Centeno, Miguel Angel. Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America. 
 - 324 - 
 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 2002.  
 
Centeno, Miguel A. and Fernando López-Alves. ed. The Other Mirror: Grand Theory 
through the Lens of Latin America. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001.  
 
Dunkerley, James. Americana: The Americas in the World, around 1850. London: 
Verso Press, 2000.  
 
Eisenhower, Dwight D. The White House Years: Mandate for Change. New York: 
Doubleday &Company, Inc., 1963.  
——. White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961. London: Heinemann Press, 
1966. 
——. The Eisenhower Diaries. Robert H. Ferrell. ed. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1981.  
 
Eisenhower, Milton S. The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America. New 
York: Doubleday & Company, 1963. 
 
Fresquet, Rufo Lopez. My 14 Months With Castro. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 
1966.  
 
Friedman, Max Paul. Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional 
Concept in American Foreign Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012.  
 
Gambone, Michael D. Eisenhower, Somoza, and the Cold War in Nicaragua 1953-196. 
California: Praeger Publishers, 1997.  
 
Gellman, Irwin F. President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015.  
 
Greenstein, Fred I. The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader. London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 
 
Gutierrez, Alberto Ostria. The Tragedy of Bolivia: A People Crucified. New York: 
Devin-Adair Company, 1961.  
 
Halperin, Morton H. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: 
 - 325 - 
 
Brookings Institution, 1974. 
 
Harris, Richard L. and Jorge Nef. ed. Critical Currents in Latin America Perspective. 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008. 
 
Heywood, Andrew. Political Ideologies: An Introduction, 5th ed. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012.  
 
Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.  
 
Huntington, Samuel P. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press, 1998. 
 
Immerman, Richard H. The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention. 
Texas: Oxford University of Texas Press, 1982.  
 
Kaufman, Burton I. Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy, 
1953-1961. London: The Johns Hopkins Press Ltd, 1982.  
 
Kingdleberger Charles P. the World in Depression, 1929-1939. California: University 
of California Press, 1986. 
 
Kingdon, John W. Agendas. Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd. ed. New York: 
Longman, 1995. 
 
Knight, Franklin W. The Caribbean: The Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism, 2nd 
ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.  
 
Knorr, Klaus and Patterson, Gardner. A Critique of the Randall Commission Report. 
Princeton, New Jersey: International Finance Section and Center of International 
Studies, Princeton University, 1954.  
 
Latham, Michael. Modernization As Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation 
Building” in the Kennedy Era. North Carolina: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2000.  
 
Lowenfeld, Andreas F. International Economic Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
 - 326 - 
 
2008. 
 
Mcpherson, Alan L. Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
 
Mora, Frank O. and Jeanne A. K. Hey. Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Policy. 
New York: Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, 2003.  
 
Morley, Jefferson. Our Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the 
CIA. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2008. 
 
Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of 
Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1990. 
 
Pach, Chester J., Jr. and Elmo Richardson. The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991.   
 
Rabe, Stephen G. Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of 
Anti-Communism and Latin America. Chapel Hill: NC, 1988. 
——. The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976. Texas: 
University of Texas Press, 1982. 
 
Robinson, William I. Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change and 
Globalization. London: Verso Book Press, 2003.  
 
Rostow, Walt Whitman. The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-Communist 
Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.  
 
Ryan, David. US Foreign Policy in World History. London: Routledge Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2000.  
 
Schlesinger, Stephen and Stephen Kinzer. Bitter Fruit: The United: The Untold Story 
of the American Coup in Guatemala. London: Sinclair Browne, 1982. 
 
Schoultz, Lars. National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America. 
Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1987. 
——.  Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America. 
 - 327 - 
 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
 
Semán, Ernesto. Ambassadors of the Working Class: Argentina's International Labor 
Activists and Cold War Democracy in the Americas. Durham: Duke University Press, 
2017. 
 
Sewell, Bevan. The US and Latin America: Eisenhower, Kennedy and Economic 
Diplomacy in the Cold War. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2016. 
 
Shea, Donald R. Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter-American and International Law 
and Diplomacy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. 
 
Siekmeier, James F. Latin American Nationalism: Identity in a Globalizing World. 
London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2017.  
——. The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present. 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011. 
 
Smith, Anthony. Myths and Memories of the Nation. Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
Smith, Gaddis. The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine 1945-1993. New York: 
HarperCollins, 1994. 
 
Subedi, Surya P. International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle. 
Oregon: Hart Publishing 2012.  
 
Wagner, R. Harrison. United States Policy Toward Latin America: A Study in 
Domestic and International Politics. California: Stanford University Press, 1970.  
 
4.  Online Report  
 
Malkin, Elisabeth. “An Apology for a Guatemalan Coup, 57 Years Later.” New York 
Times, 20
th
 October 2011. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/americas/an-apology-for-a-guatemalan-c
oup-57-years-later.html 
